[{"date":1647475200,"name":"ApeCoin","classification":"Governance","technique":"Flashloan Governance Attack","amount":820000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2665","language":null,"description":"ApeCoin airdrop lacked snapshot protection against flash loans. An attacker flash-loaned BAYC NFTs from NFTX, claimed the airdrop allocation for those NFTs (60,564 APE tokens), and sold them for ~$820K profit in ETH."},{"date":1641081600,"name":"DefiChain","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Fee Accounting","amount":null,"chain":["DefiChain"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#defichain","language":null,"description":"DeFiChain’s atomic swap implementation contained a fee-denomination vulnerability that allowed attackers to substitute BTC for DFI while preserving the numerical fee amount. This caused the protocol to pay disproportionately large fees in BTC-denominated assets, introducing unbacked dBTC into circulation. The vulnerability existed from approximately June 2021 and was discovered on January 2, 2022."},{"date":1528588800,"name":"Coinrail","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":37200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On June 10, 2018, South Korean exchange Coinrail suffered an intrusion that resulted in the theft of over $40M in altcoins. The attack compromised approximately 30% of assets held on the platform, including ~$20M in NPXS tokens, $14M in Aston X, and $6M in other tokens. Two-thirds of stolen assets were recovered through partner exchanges."},{"date":1663459200,"name":"GMX V1 EVM","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Stale Price Arbitrage","amount":565000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"337","parentProtocolId":"parent#gmx","language":"Solidity","description":"GMX V1's AVAX/USD perpetuals were drained via wash trades on CEXs that manipulated oracle-reported prices, allowing arbitrage at zero slippage."},{"date":1755043200,"name":"Grizzifi","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":61000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 13, 2025, Grizzifi, a BSC-based staking protocol, was exploited via a flaw in its reward mechanism. The attacker created multiple controlled wallets to amplify the milestoneReward through the harvestHoney function, then collected additional rewards via collectRefBonus. The root cause was that milestone calculations were based on total cumulative investments rather than active investments."},{"date":1556841600,"name":"TronBank","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Backdoor Contract","amount":4270000,"chain":["Tron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A backdoor was injected into TronBank's compiled bytecode during deployment via TronSmartContract.space. The hacker exploited the backdoor in the withdraw() function to extract 26.73M TRX from the contract."},{"date":1662076800,"name":"Bad Guys by RPF","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The Bad Guys NFT WhiteListMint function failed to properly check the number of NFTs minted per wallet. Users could pass arbitrary amounts and bypass the one-per-wallet limit, allowing two accounts to mint approximately 450 of the 1,221 free NFTs."},{"date":1707436800,"name":"PlayDapp","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":290000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The PlayDapp deployer key was compromised via spear-phishing attack. The attacker added themselves as a minter for the PLA token contract and minted 1.79 billion tokens across two transactions (Feb 9 and Feb 12), valued at $290M."},{"date":1752969600,"name":"Stepp2p","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":43000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 20, 2025, Stepp2p on Binance Smart Chain suffered a smart contract exploit resulting in approximately $43,000 in losses. The attack exploited a logic vulnerability in the protocol's core functions."},{"date":1658966400,"name":"Nirvana V1","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":3500000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1825","parentProtocolId":"parent#nirvana","language":"Rust","description":"Nirvana V1 lost $3.5M on July 28, 2022 to a flashloan attack via Solend. Attacker borrowed 10M USDC, minted 10M+ ANA at artificially low prices by manipulating the oracle, swapped for USDT, and repaid the flashloan. ANA crashed 85% from $8.97 to $0.81."},{"date":1668038400,"name":"DFX V2","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":4000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"366","parentProtocolId":"parent#dfx-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 10, 2022, DFX Finance V2 was exploited for $4.3 million (plus $3.2M via MEV) through a reentrancy vulnerability in the flash function introduced in V2. The contract failed to prevent reentrant deposits, allowing attacker to repay flashloans while recording deposits as debt."},{"date":1760486400,"name":"Typus Perp","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":3440000,"chain":["Sui"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6014","parentProtocolId":"parent#typus-finance","language":"Move","description":"On October 15, 2025, Typus Finance's custom price oracle was exploited via missing assertion logic and improper access control. The attacker called update_v2 to arbitrarily set token pair prices to extreme values and drained $3.44M in SUI, USDC, xBTC, and suiETH."},{"date":1743724800,"name":"AIRWA","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":33600,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"AIRWA token exploited on Binance Smart Chain through improper access control vulnerability. Lack of proper permission checks allowed unauthorized fund extraction from the protocol."},{"date":1667347200,"name":"Skyward Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":3000000,"chain":["Near"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"Skyward Finance was exploited on November 2, 2022 when missing input validation in treasury redemption logic allowed attacker to redeem 1.08M $NEAR (~$3M) in a single transaction. Attacker purchased SKYWARD on Ref.finance and redeemed at unfavorable rates."},{"date":1640044800,"name":"Gamma","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":4500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"355","language":"Solidity","description":"Gamma Strategies (formerly Visor) was exploited for at least $4.5M via infinite mint vulnerability. Attacker minted unlimited tokens and converted to other assets; token migration announced two days later."},{"date":1787616000,"name":"CometDEX","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":717000,"chain":["Stellar"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"CometDEX’s Soroban AMM allowed same-asset swaps such as USDC→USDC. When token_in and token_out were identical, the contract loaded two independent copies of the same reserve record, added the input amount to one copy and subtracted the output from the other, then wrote both back to the same map key. The second write overwrote the first, causing the pool’s recorded reserve to fall below its actual token balance. The attacker then deposited against the understated reserve, received excess LP shares, and redeemed those shares for real pool assets. The cycle was repeated 36 times using flash liquidity. Blend contracts themselves were not exploited, but Blend Backstop depositors were exposed because the backstop held BLND/USDC Comet LP shares"},{"date":1764806400,"name":"US Permissionless Dollar","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Proxy Upgrade Hijack","amount":1000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"In December 2025, USPD stablecoin protocol was exploited through its smart contract deployment process. Attacker used Multicall3 to claim admin role before the official deployment script, then deployed a malicious proxy that forwarded to the audited code while using event manipulation and storage slot spoofing. After months, attacker minted 98M USPD and drained ~$1M in stETH."},{"date":1665619200,"name":"FTX","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"API Key Compromised","amount":70000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"In October 2022, an attacker exploited FTX's withdrawal fee sponsorship mechanism by submitting 500,000 gas unit withdrawal requests—far exceeding normal 21,000 gas transfers. FTX subsidized the excess fees, unknowingly covering costs for smart contract calls that minted XEN tokens on the attacker's behalf."},{"date":1790467200,"name":"Fake GIWA Bridge","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Impersonation Scam","amount":2080000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Scammers deployed a counterfeit OP Stack-style network impersonating GIWA, including an RPC endpoint, Ethereum bridge and batch-posting infrastructure. The fake network reported GIWA’s expected mainnet Chain ID 9134, causing DYORSWAP and users to mistake it for the legitimate GIWA mainnet. Users voluntarily deposited ETH into the fraudulent bridge. After accumulating deposits, the scammers drained 766.25 ETH to an attacker-controlled address. GIWA’s actual mainnet had not launched, and neither GIWA nor DYORSWAP’s smart contracts were exploited"},{"date":1719878400,"name":"MintRisesPrices","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":59000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MintRisesPrices on BNB Chain suffered a reentrancy attack where the attacker repeatedly entered and exited mint and burn functions in a single transaction, manipulating pricing mechanisms to drain approximately $59K from the protocol."},{"date":1681084800,"name":"Terraport","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":4000000,"chain":["Terra Classic"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7517","language":"Solidity","description":"Terraport, a Terra Classic DeFi platform, was drained of liquidity barely 10 days after launch through an access control vulnerability. An attacker with excessive permissions manipulated the DND token price and systematically drained liquidity pools."},{"date":1782000000,"name":"Taiko Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":1700000,"chain":["Taiko"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4692","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 21, 2026, an SGX signing key leaked on GitHub allowed an attacker to forge invalid proofs and drain approximately $1.7M from Taiko's ERC20 Vault on Ethereum."},{"date":1721520000,"name":"UtopiaSphere","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":521000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 21, 2024, UtopiaSphere (UPS) token on BSC was exploited for approximately $521,000 through a flashloan-based price manipulation attack. The attacker exploited the swapBurn() mechanism by flash-loaning 89.672M USDT and 6.424M USDT in vUSDC to manipulate UPS token prices and drain the PancakeSwap pair."},{"date":1661299200,"name":"KaoyaSwap","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":118000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4316","language":"Solidity","description":"KaoyaSwap's swap function had faulty logic allowing attackers to manipulate token calculations. Using a flashloan, an attacker exploited the vulnerability to extract value from the protocol's swap mechanism."},{"date":1721952000,"name":"Solrise Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":6700000,"chain":["Casper"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1537","language":"Rust","description":"On July 26, 2024, the Casper blockchain was exploited via a privilege escalation vulnerability that allowed contract installers to bypass access rights checks on urefs. Attackers gained unauthorized access to 13 accounts and transferred approximately $6.7M in tokens before validators halted consensus to prevent further exploitation."},{"date":1581724800,"name":"Ooki","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":350000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"197","language":null,"description":"Attackers exploited bZx price oracle on February 14-15, 2020, taking flash loans and spreading funds across exchanges to manipulate wrapped bitcoin prices, profiting $350K. Oracle lacked sufficient price source diversity."},{"date":1708214400,"name":"FixedFloat","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":26100000,"chain":["Ethereum","Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On February 16-18, 2024, FixedFloat (non-KYC exchange) was compromised and ~$26.1M in Bitcoin and Ether were stolen: 409.304 BTC and 1,728.48 ETH. Private keys controlling hot wallets on both networks were compromised. Initially suspected as insider attack or rug pull, the team claimed external attackers exploited infrastructure vulnerabilities. Ethereum funds moved through eXch exchange; Bitcoin funds dispersed across addresses."},{"date":1729209600,"name":"Tapioca DAO","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Impersonation Scam","amount":4700000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Tapioca DAO co-founder was compromised on October 18, 2024 via social engineering and malware download. Attacker gained control of TAP vesting contracts and drained stablecoin pools for $4.4M in USDC and ETH."},{"date":1660780800,"name":"Celer cBridge","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":240000,"chain":["Multi-Chain"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"The cBridge DNS was hijacked, redirecting users to malicious smart contracts. Users who approved transactions on the fake site had their approved token amounts drained."},{"date":1580860800,"name":"Altsbit","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":70000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"The Italian exchange Altsbit suffered a hot wallet breach on February 5, 2020, losing cryptocurrency including Bitcoin, Ether, Pirate Chain (ARRR), VerusCoin (VRSC), and Komodo (KMD). The attackers accessed hot wallets holding 'almost all funds', forcing the platform to suspend operations and eventually cease operations in May 2020. LulzSec claimed responsibility on Twitter."},{"date":1673395200,"name":"Roe Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":80000,"chain":["Ethereum","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2357","language":null,"description":"On January 11, 2023, Roe Finance was exploited for $80K via a flashloan-enabled Uniswap V2 oracle price manipulation attack. The attacker borrowed massive amounts of UNI-v2 tokens to create pool imbalance and manipulated the oracle price, then swapped at the false rate without Roe Finance validating freshness."},{"date":1793059200,"name":"Fence Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":1010000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6201","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited a tranche vault associated with Fence Finance and Valinor Digital by using a flash loan to obtain an inflated allocation of vault shares. The attacker subsequently redeemed those shares to withdraw approximately $1.01 million in USDC from the vault"},{"date":1611705600,"name":"SushiSwap","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":103842,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"119","parentProtocolId":"parent#sushi","language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker exploited SushiMaker's fee-conversion mechanism by creating a fake DIGG/WETH trading pair with minimal liquidity. By routing 0.05% of DIGG/WBTC swap fees through this illiquid pool, the attacker caused massive slippage and captured 81 ETH in outsized fees that should have gone to xSUSHI stakers."},{"date":1679184000,"name":"Harvest Keeper","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":933000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Harvest Keeper, marketed as an AI-based DeFi platform, executed a coordinated rug pull barely one month after launch. The team drained the contract through a privileged getAmount function and conducted ice phishing attacks to steal additional user funds."},{"date":1779408000,"name":"Polymarket","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":700000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Polymarket's internal operations wallet was drained on May 22, 2026 of ~$700K in POL tokens. An attacker obtained a 6-year-old private key and withdrew funds in 5,000 POL batches, but Polymarket confirmed user funds were unaffected."},{"date":1652227200,"name":"X2Y2","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1431","language":null,"description":"Attackers created fake X2Y2 URLs via Google Ads with display URLs matching the legitimate site, tricking users into connecting wallets to phishing contracts. ~100 ETH (~$200K) was stolen from victims across multiple phishing sites."},{"date":1774310400,"name":"UdonFi Lending","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":null,"chain":["Chromia"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6711","parentProtocolId":"parent#udonfi","language":null,"description":"Udon Finance’s lending pool was exploited through a vulnerability in its withdrawal function that allowed an attacker to extract funds without proper authorization. The team confirmed that the stolen assets remained on Chromia and offered the attacker a 10% bounty in exchange for returning the remaining 90%. The precise technical mechanism and total loss were not disclosed"},{"date":1631836800,"name":"JayPegs Automart","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Frontend Compromise","amount":3100000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"JayPegs Automart DONA auction ($3.1M) on SushiSwap MISO exploited when contractor injected malicious code into the frontend deployment, redirecting proceeds to their wallet. Funds were fully recovered after identification and legal threats."},{"date":1786147200,"name":"Atomic Green","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Replay","amount":29984,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3081","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 8, 2026, Atomic Green on Arbitrum was exploited via a signature replay vulnerability, resulting in a loss of approximately $29,984. Flagged by SlowMist with the exploiter address and transaction identified on-chain."},{"date":1793664000,"name":"DeFiChain","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":null,"chain":["DefiChain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#defichain","language":"C++","description":"An attacker exploited an arithmetic overflow in DeFiChain's native account-to-account transfer mechanism, causing the blockchain to deduct only one satoshi of DFI from the sender while crediting recipients with the full transfer amounts. The vulnerability was exploited at least twice, creating approximately 184.47 billion unauthorized DFI across two addresses, more than 140 times the intended maximum supply. The development contributors contacted declined to implement a fix or rollback, leaving the vulnerability and inflated supply unaddressed"},{"date":1710460800,"name":"MOBOX","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Borrow Logic Flaw","amount":750000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1058","language":"Solidity","description":"MOBOX borrow function exploited by cyclically borrowing and redeeming funds while incrementally increasing loan amounts. Referral rewards were transferred back to the contract to inflate the next borrow, netting ~$750K USDT."},{"date":1553472000,"name":"Coinbene","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":40000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Coinbene hot wallet was compromised and all ERC-20 tokens were drained to unknown addresses. The exchange downplayed the incident as routine 'maintenance' while customer assets were transferred out."},{"date":1721692800,"name":"dYdX V3","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":31000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"144","parentProtocolId":"parent#dydx","language":null,"description":"On July 23, 2024, the dYdX domain (dydx.exchange) was compromised when attackers changed DNS nameservers via a compromised Squarespace account. Two users lost approximately $31,000 when redirected to a malicious contract attempting to steal their tokens. The site was restored within three hours and the domain was transferred to Cloudflare."},{"date":1730160000,"name":"BUBAI","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Liquidity Rug","amount":131000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 29, 2024, BUBAI token on Ethereum executed a rug pull by removing liquidity, resulting in approximately $131K in losses for users."},{"date":1787443200,"name":"TermFinance Vaults","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":8500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5946","parentProtocolId":"parent#termfinance","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker acquired majority voting power in the thinly held governance tokens controlling Term Vaults and used that voting power to pass malicious governance proposals. The proposals gave the attacker control over the affected vaults, enabling the underlying assets to be withdrawn. The attack therefore did not require stealing an administrative key or bypassing an authorization check—the attacker obtained the required authority through the governance mechanism itself. Recent reporting indicates the affected products were Term’s strategy vaults built on Yearn V3 infrastructure rather than Term Finance’s core fixed-rate repo lending architecture"},{"date":1729728000,"name":"Cryptobottle","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":490000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Cryptobottle's swap contract was exploited by disabling balance checks after callback, allowing arbitrary swaps that manipulated NAS token price and drained $490K in USDT to the attacker's address."},{"date":1689984000,"name":"CoinsPaid","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Impersonation Scam","amount":37300000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Lazarus Group stole $37.3M from CoinsPaid via a 6-month social engineering campaign posing as recruiters. Attackers conducted fake job interviews and tricked an employee into installing JumpCloud Agent malware on their laptop, gaining access to operational systems and wallets."},{"date":1624924800,"name":"Merlin","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":330000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"370","language":"Solidity","description":"Merlin was exploited for $330K when an attacker deployed a fake Alpaca-BNB vault and sent 1000 BNB to trick the contract into inflating reward calculations."},{"date":1723507200,"name":"Vowcurrency","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 13, 2024, Vowcurrency Protocol on Ethereum was exploited for approximately $1.2M when the usdRateSetter address changed the VOW/vUSD exchange rate from 1 to 100 without atomic validation. In the 15-30 second window, a bot minted $2 billion in vUSD using exploited rates and swapped 26.1M VOW for 175.4778 ETH and 595,970 USDT."},{"date":1684454400,"name":"Swaprum","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Backdoor Contract","amount":3000000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2903","language":null,"description":"Swaprum founders exploited a backdoor add() function in their smart contract to steal approximately $3 million in deposited liquidity pool tokens from users. The stolen funds were laundered through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1740096000,"name":"StepHeroNFTs","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":90000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"The StepHeroNFTs claimReferral function was vulnerable to reentrancy, allowing an attacker to repeatedly trigger transfers before state updates. The attacker drained approximately 90K USD in a single transaction."},{"date":1730937600,"name":"VRug","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Liquidity Rug","amount":8400,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 7, 2024, VRug executed a rug pull by removing liquidity from its protocol, resulting in approximately $8.4K in losses for users."},{"date":1705449600,"name":"BasketDAO","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":1200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"250","language":"Solidity","description":"BasketDAO was exploited via a flaw in its smart contract that allowed arbitrary low-level external calls in the approval process. The vulnerability enabled attackers to drain approved funds from users, resulting in over $1.2M stolen. The protocol subsequently shut down and was acquired by PieDAO."},{"date":1706140800,"name":"Nebula Revelation","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":180264,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Nebula Revelation's staking contract on Optimism was exploited via a reentrancy vulnerability. The attacker used a self-destructing contract to complete all malicious operations within a single transaction, enabling unauthorized token withdrawals totaling approximately $180,264."},{"date":1787616000,"name":"FH Token","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":20000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"FHToken was exploited through faulty sell-handling logic in its token contract. Reporting on the incident identifies a flaw in _transfer involving the isSell path, which incorrectly altered token balances during sell transactions. The attacker repeatedly bought and sold FH to exploit this behavior and extract value from the FH/USDT PancakeSwap V2 pool"},{"date":1777852800,"name":"SmartCredit","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":72000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1687","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 4, 2026, SmartCredit's Leveraged Lido staking module was exploited for 26.382 ETH (~$72K) via an undisclosed vulnerability. The team paused the feature and compensated users from the Loss Provision Fund; technical details were never published."},{"date":1605139200,"name":"Akropolis","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":2000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 12, 2020, Akropolis lost $2 million in DAI from its yCurve and sUSD pools. The attacker used a flash loan to exploit a bug in the SavingsModule smart contract where the deposit logic minted tokens twice, allowing withdrawal of double the intended amount."},{"date":1731715200,"name":"Polter Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":8700000,"chain":["Fantom"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4152","language":null,"description":"Polter Finance on Fantom exploited November 16, 2024 via flashloan oracle manipulation. Attacker borrowed ~1.4M BOO from SpookySwap, collapsing the pool and inflating BOO price. With 1 BOO valued at $1.37T by the oracle, attacker extracted massive loans."},{"date":1705363200,"name":"Hector Network","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Hector Network's compensation contract for token holders was exploited when a malicious account deposited only 0.0001 HEC and then transferred $2.7M worth of assets to itself. The vulnerable AddEligibleWallet function allowed the attacker to designate arbitrary addresses as eligible and drain the treasury via mintWithdraw and transferRedemption functions."},{"date":1604793600,"name":"Grin","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":null,"chain":["Grin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Unknown miner(s) acquired 57.4% of Grin's network hash power on November 7-8, enabling 51% attack capabilities. The attacker reorganized at least one forked block, likely through rented hashrate from cloud mining services during a price surge."},{"date":1791590400,"name":"Papertrade","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1280000,"chain":["Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"9065","language":"Solidity","description":"Papertrade, a perpetual trading protocol on HyperEVM, reportedly suffered an oracle manipulation attack shortly after launch. The attacker manipulated Hyperliquid’s ETH order-book midpoint through external trades while opening and closing highly leveraged synthetic positions on Papertrade. Because the protocol used the instantaneous BBO midpoint without TWAP, deviation limits, or independent price validation, manipulated prices were accepted for execution and PnL settlement, transferring approximately $1.28M from the Martingaler LP"},{"date":1647734400,"name":"Umbrella Network","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":700000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Umbrella Network's Polar Stream staking contracts on Ethereum and BSC suffered an unchecked underflow in the withdrawal function. The attacker drained LP tokens and used them to withdraw liquidity from UMB-ETH Uniswap and UMB-BNB Pancakeswap pools."},{"date":1769299200,"name":"Aperture LM","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":3670000,"chain":["Ethereum","Base","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1582","parentProtocolId":"parent#aperture-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On January 25, 2026, Aperture Finance V3/V4 contracts across Ethereum, Base, and Arbitrum were exploited for $3.67M via arbitrary external call vulnerability. Insufficient validation allowed attackers to abuse existing ERC-20 and ERC-721 approvals and drain assets without key compromise."},{"date":1790726400,"name":"SKYDAO","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":183482.88,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SKYDAO’s taxed sell flow called its pool controller before the seller’s net tokens were credited to the PancakeSwap V2 pair. The controller sold the 35% tax, moved the gross sell amount from the pair to the dead address through controlburn(), and called pair.sync(), causing the pair to record an almost-zero SKYDAO reserve. When the original transfer subsequently credited the net SKYDAO to the pair without updating that recorded reserve, the attacker exploited the balance/reserve mismatch through pair.swap() to extract USDT liquidity"},{"date":1666483200,"name":"Layer2DAO","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":190000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On October 23, 2022, a hacker gained access to Layer2DAO's multisig wallet on Optimism and drained 49,950,000 L2DAO tokens. Layer2DAO negotiated with the attacker and repurchased 31,239,677 tokens to stabilize the market. The token price dropped 36.48% following the incident."},{"date":1784937600,"name":"Bankr","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Social Account Takeover","amount":479885,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"The Bankr AI wallet's X account was compromised on July 25, 2026. The attacker posted fake airdrop links while draining the project's wallet of approximately 1.5 billion BNKR tokens that lacked MFA protection."},{"date":1665446400,"name":"TempleDAO","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"875","parentProtocolId":"parent#temple-dao","language":"Solidity","description":"TempleDAO's staking contract lacked access control on the migrateStake function. An attacker exploited this vulnerability to withdraw 321,154 xLP tokens from the staking contract and swap them for 1,418,303 TEMPLE tokens and 1,262,438 FRAX tokens, totaling $2.3M."},{"date":1645574400,"name":"Flurry Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":293000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Flurry Finance yield aggregator was exploited via manipulation of the rhoToken multiplier. An attacker switched an address from EOA to contract and artificially inflated rhoToken balance, then redeemed inflated shares to withdraw underlying stablecoins from the FinanceRabbit strategy vault."},{"date":1783987200,"name":"Drips Network","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":24883,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 14, 2026, legacy DaiDripsHub on Ethereum was exploited for 24,883 DAI via unsafe unsigned-to-signed integer conversion that reversed transfer direction from deposit to withdrawal."},{"date":1693094400,"name":"Balancer V2","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2611","parentProtocolId":"parent#balancer","language":"Solidity","description":"Balancer V2's boosted pools suffered a $893k-$979k exploit on August 27, 2023 via rate manipulation in linear pools (ERC4626). The attacker manipulated token conversion rates to drain liquidity."},{"date":1753660800,"name":"SuperRare","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Merkle Proof Forgery","amount":730000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3144","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 28, 2025, SuperRare RareStakingV1 contract was exploited for ~$730K (11.9M RARE) via broken access control in updateMerkleRoot(). Attacker submitted malicious Merkle roots for fraudulent token claims; a frontrunner later hijacked the exploit."},{"date":1669939200,"name":"Ankr","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":5000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":5000000,"defillamaId":"278","language":"Solidity","description":"On December 2, 2022, a former Ankr employee exploited an access control flaw in the aBNBc staking token contract, minting 10 trillion tokens and converting ~$5M to USDC. Binance froze $3M; Ankr reimbursed affected users from company reserves."},{"date":1688342400,"name":"AzukiDAO","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Replay","amount":68000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 3-4, 2023, AzukiDAO's governance token claim contract was exploited via signature replay when the signatureClaimed mapping was never verified. The attacker replayed one valid signature across multiple transactions to steal approximately 1.79M BEAN tokens (~$68,000)."},{"date":1780444800,"name":"GPU.NET","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":10600,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Unverified incident claimed on Ethereum involving GPU.NET on 2026-06-03 (~$10,600); no news coverage, security report, or on-chain confirmation."},{"date":1788048000,"name":"Weft V2","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":47200,"chain":["Radix"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5411","parentProtocolId":"parent#weft-finance","language":"Scrypto","description":"Weft V2 accepted HUG as collateral using a severely incorrect live oracle valuation. HUG traded around 0.000131 XRD, but Weft’s Default PriceFeed valued it at 1,330.41 XRD at the time of the borrow, roughly 10 million times its actual value. The attacker bought 539,703.17 HUG for 70.6 XRD and introduced it through the flash_remove_collateral / flash_add_collateral path, which remained enabled despite normal HUG collateral additions having been disabled. Weft valued the HUG at approximately 718M XRD and allowed the attacker to borrow 47.28M LSULP and 13.1005M XRD"},{"date":1792972800,"name":"Bloom Trading Bot","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Supply Chain Attack","amount":953000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5806","language":null,"description":"An attacker exploited a reported remote code execution vulnerability in a third-party software module used by Bloom’s trading infrastructure, enabling unauthorized transfers from user wallets. Approximately 9,408 SOL was drained from 48 wallets belonging to nine traders within 94 seconds. Bloom attributed the incident to the third-party module and denied that private keys were exposed, while Bitquery confirmed that the transactions were signed using the affected wallets’ keys"},{"date":1761004800,"name":"DoodiPals","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":171000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"The DoodiPals project on Solana suffered a private key security vulnerability. Hackers exploited the flaw to sell tokens from multiple wallets, converting them into approximately 917 SOL (valued at $171K). The team announced plans to relaunch after a security audit and committed to providing 1:1 compensation to holders prior to the attack."},{"date":1792368000,"name":"Vara Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Proof Verifier Bug","amount":12776,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7911","language":null,"description":"An attacker reportedly exploited Vara Bridge's cross-chain proof verification process to submit fraudulent Merkle roots representing outbound messages from Vara. These roots allegedly enabled unauthorized messages to be processed on Ethereum, resulting in approximately $12,776 in losses"},{"date":1732060800,"name":"MainnetSettler","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":66000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 20, 2024, the MainnetSettler contract was exploited through an approval vulnerability that allowed arbitrary calls. Users with Hold token approvals to MainnetSettler had their tokens drained when attackers executed transferFrom calls, resulting in approximately $66K in losses."},{"date":1792108800,"name":"Pirate Chain","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Unbacked Mint","amount":null,"chain":["Pirate Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Pirate Chain suffered an exploit in the transparent supply-accounting layer introduced with its Ironwood upgrade. Two transaction-validation failures reportedly allowed an attacker to bypass issuance restrictions and exploit incorrect output-script interpretation, creating approximately 39.8 million unauthorized ARRR. The tokens were transferred into the Sapling shielded pool, obscuring subsequent transfers. The team initially proposed a blockchain rollback but later confirmed that it could not execute one unilaterally"},{"date":1686960000,"name":"Pawnfi","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":820000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Pawnfi's ApeStaking contract allowed attackers to use the same NFT as collateral multiple times for borrowing APE tokens. The vulnerability stemmed from missing NFT transfer verification in the depositAndBorrowApeAndStake() function, enabling an attacker to borrow without securing proper collateral by leveraging an already-staked NFT."},{"date":1640044800,"name":"Bent Finance","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Backdoor Contract","amount":1750000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Bent Finance was exploited by rogue developer who inserted backdoor into contracts during period lacking multisig protection, extracting 513k cvxcrv LP tokens (~440 ETH/$1.75M)."},{"date":1652745600,"name":"FEG Token","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1900000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"FEG's swapToSwap() function lacked input validation on the 'path' parameter, allowing attackers via flashloan to gain unlimited allowance and drain contract assets. Multiple attacks on May 15-16 extracted ~$1.3M + $1.9M total across ETH and BSC networks."},{"date":1709164800,"name":"Shido","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":3300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On February 29, 2024, the Shido staking contract was compromised via a private key compromise. The attacker transferred ownership, upgraded the contract with a hidden withdrawToken() function, and drained 4.3 billion SHIDO tokens ($3.3M realized in ETH). Token price collapsed 94% within minutes."},{"date":1773619200,"name":"CheckoutPool","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":85700,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Fun.xyz's legacy CheckoutPool contract on Polygon exposed a bridge() function without access control or recipient binding, allowing attackers to redirect execution into trusted settlement paths and drain funds to attacker-controlled accounts."},{"date":1787616000,"name":"Enjin","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Ownership Takeover","amount":162000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Enjin’s legacy CryptoItems infrastructure was exploited through a storage-slot collision between a registered adapter and its Managed Delegate Proxy. Because adapter functions execute in the proxy’s storage context via DELEGATECALL, the attacker called the adapter’s public initialize(uint256), which wrote the attacker’s address into the proxy’s pendingManager storage slot. The attacker then called acceptManager(), gained managerial control, registered a malicious adapter, stole ENJ-backed assets from users, and liquidated them through melt()."},{"date":1619568000,"name":"Uranium Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":57200000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Uranium Finance on BSC suffered a calculation error in its v2 pair swap function. The sanity check validation used an incorrect constant (1,000,000) that was 100x too large compared to actual balance adjustments (10,000), allowing attackers to send minimal value and extract maximum reserves through the swap function."},{"date":1604275200,"name":"Axion","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1298","language":"Solidity","description":"Insider(s) injected malicious code into Axion's OpenZeppelin dependencies prior to deployment, enabling unlimited token minting via the unstake function. Attacker minted 79 billion AXN and dumped on the market, causing 99% price collapse and netting 1,300 ETH (~$500K) despite passing audits from Hacken and Certik."},{"date":1686960000,"name":"Midas Capital","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":340000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1925","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 17, 2023, Midas Capital's HAY/BUSD pool on BSC was exploited for $340K-$600K via a rounding error in cToken redemption logic. The attacker crafted positions that rounded down to 1 wei, repeatedly exploited the error with minimal deposits and flash-loaned ANKR collateral to withdraw disproportionately large sums."},{"date":1614556800,"name":"Seascape","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"An early investor's private key was compromised, allowing an attacker to transfer 18,750 CWS tokens from the investor's wallet. The tokens were immediately liquidated on-chain."},{"date":1593302400,"name":"Balancer","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Balancer pools holding deflationary tokens (like STA which burns 1% per transfer) were exploited. An attacker used a dYdX flashloan to repeatedly trade between STA and ETH, depleting STA to 1 wei while Balancer's balance tracking failed to account for the fee burns. They extracted ETH, WBTC, LINK and SNX from severely imbalanced pools."},{"date":1654646400,"name":"Gym Network","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2100000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"GYM Network deployed a new contract function on June 6, 2022. On June 8, attacker exploited missing caller verification in depositFromOtherContract() to create deposit records without actually transferring tokens, inflating balance and draining approximately 2,475.91 WBNB (~$716K). Funds were laundered through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1725235200,"name":"Pythia","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":53000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On September 2, 2024, Pythia Finance's algorithmic stablecoin protocol was exploited for approximately $53,000 via a reentrancy vulnerability in the claim rewards function. The attacker repeatedly called the function without allowing reward balances to update between calls, extracting unauthorized rewards."},{"date":1711670400,"name":"Lava","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Liquidation Logic Flaw","amount":340000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4241","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 28-29, 2024, Lava Lending on Arbitrum was exploited for $340K via calculation error in liquidation engine. Flashloan enabled improper collateral/debt evaluation; markets paused within 15 minutes of detection."},{"date":1638230400,"name":"MonoX","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":31400000,"chain":["Ethereum","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"948","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 30, 2021 MonoX was hacked for $31.4 million across Ethereum and Polygon when an attacker exploited a swap function that allowed same-asset swaps, using rapid swaps to manipulate the __updateTokenInfo function and artificially inflate MONO token price through a feedback loop, draining $18.2M WETH and $10.5M MATIC."},{"date":1690934400,"name":"Uwerx","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":327000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Uwerx was exploited on August 2, 2023 for $327,000 (176 ETH). Attacker flash-loaned 20,000 ETH, swapped for WERX tokens, dumped them into Uniswap pool, then used the skim() function with a specific address. The 1% burn mechanism on transfers created a price imbalance the attacker arbitraged for profit."},{"date":1691884800,"name":"Zunami Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":2100000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1201","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 13, 2023, Zunami Protocol lost $2.1M to a flash loan attack that manipulated pricing via donation. The attacker exploited a flawed calcTokenPrice function (total_holdings / token_supply) to inflate pool value, increasing their UZD balance 3.5x before withdrawing through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1714867200,"name":"GeniusAI","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Social Account Takeover","amount":1270000,"chain":["Fantom","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Gnus.AI suffered a $1.27M exploit on May 5, 2024 when a Discord breach exposed the team's deployment wallet private key. The attacker minted 100M fake GNUS tokens on Fantom, bridged them to Ethereum, and sold them into Uniswap pools, crashing the price 95%."},{"date":1647302400,"name":"Hundred Finance","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":6200000,"chain":["Gnosis Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"607","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 15-16, 2022, an attacker exploited a reentrancy vulnerability in Hundred Finance's callback handling to borrow $6 million across multiple markets. The attacker deposited ~$2M USDC collateral, then repeatedly borrowed against it via the onTokenTransfer() callback which triggered before debt was updated."},{"date":1693785600,"name":"Stake.com","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":41300000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Stake.com's hot wallets were compromised on September 4, 2023, leading to $41.3M theft of USDT, ETH, and other assets across Ethereum, BSC, and Polygon."},{"date":1703462400,"name":"Telcoin","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Uninitialized Proxy","amount":1250000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Payments","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Telcoin's Polygon wallet proxy contracts were uninitialized, allowing an attacker to initialize dormant wallets with malicious versions and drain user funds that had never executed transactions."},{"date":1684540800,"name":"Tornado Cash","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":2173500,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DAO","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"148","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited Tornado Cash governance by proposing a malicious proposal that appeared identical to a previously approved one, gaining voter trust. The malicious code granted 1.2M governance votes to the attacker, exceeding legitimate votes and gaining full governance control. The attacker drained 483,000 TORN tokens ($2.17M) from governance vaults before later proposing its reversal."},{"date":1708732800,"name":"ZoomerCoin","classification":"Governance","technique":"Flashloan Governance Attack","amount":41000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A flash loan attack on ZoomerCoin exploited constructed calldata parameters to call transferFrom, transferring tokens previously authorized to the project contract. Attackers then exchanged stolen tokens for ETH."},{"date":1777507200,"name":"Wasabi Perps","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":5500000,"chain":["Ethereum","Base","Berachain","Blast"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2900","parentProtocolId":"parent#wasabi","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 30, 2026, Wasabi Protocol's deployer EOA was compromised, which held the sole ADMIN_ROLE without timelock or multisig protections. The attacker executed unauthorized UUPS proxy upgrades on vaults and pools across Ethereum, Base, Berachain, and Blast, sweeping approximately $5.5M in collateral and pool balances."},{"date":1542585600,"name":"EOS Lelego","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"EOS Lelego gambling DApp was exploited via a randomness vulnerability in November 2018. Attackers predicted the random number generation algorithm by using information from previous blockchain blocks. Lelego was one of eight EOS gambling platforms targeted in coordinated attacks using the same vector."},{"date":1697587200,"name":"HOPE Lend","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":825000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3637","parentProtocolId":"parent#hope-money","language":"Solidity","description":"HopeLend was exploited via a precision loss vulnerability in hToken's share calculation during the _handleFlashLoanRepayment function. The attacker minted tiny PEPE shares, donated large volumes to distort the exchange rate, then borrowed ETH using rounding errors in the redeemUnderlying function."},{"date":1706313600,"name":"Somesing","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Unbacked Mint","amount":11580000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Somesing, a South Korean Web3 social music service, suffered a vulnerability attack that resulted in the theft of 730 million SSX tokens. Of these, 504 million were undistributed tokens and 226 million were foundation-held tokens. The foundation reported the incident to the National Police Agency Cyber Investigation Unit."},{"date":1675987200,"name":"Sheep","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":3000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On February 10, 2023, the SHEEP reflection token on BSC was exploited. The attacker repeatedly executed the burn function and synchronized the pair to manipulate the reflection mechanism, causing balances to drop due to improper rate calculations and extracting approximately $3K."},{"date":1605571200,"name":"Origin Protocol","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":7700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On 2020-11-17 at 00:47:19 UTC an attacker exploited a flash-loan-funded reentrancy in OUSD VaultCore's mint function to inflate totalSupply. The contract failed to validate the transferred-in asset and lacked reentrancy protection, allowing the attacker to redeem against the inflated supply and drain the vault."},{"date":1609113600,"name":"LuBian","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Weak Key Generation","amount":3500000000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On December 28, 2020, LuBian Bitcoin mining pool (6% of network hashrate in 2020) was hacked. An attacker exploited weak key generation in LuBian's infrastructure to brute-force private keys and steal 127,426 BTC (~$3.5B)."},{"date":1642464000,"name":"Multichain","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":1400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"591","language":"Solidity","description":"Multichain's token contracts for WETH, PERI, OMT, WBNB, MATIC, and AVAX lacked proper validation of ERC20 permit() function calls. An attacker exploited this vulnerability to steal tokens from users who had previously granted approvals. A white-hat responder later returned approximately $1M of the $3M total loss, retaining 62 ETH as a bounty."},{"date":1690675200,"name":"Kannagi","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":2130000,"chain":["zkSync Era","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Kannagi Finance, a yield aggregation protocol on zkSync Era, performed an exit scam on July 30, 2023, draining nearly all value from contracts (leaving $0.17 TVL). The launched contract code contained malicious functionality not present in the audited version. The team deleted all online presence."},{"date":1330560000,"name":"Bitcoinica","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":228000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Bitcoinica suffered its first major hack when attackers breached Linode web hosting and stole 43,000 BTC from the exchange. The compromise of the hosting provider gave attackers direct access to Bitcoinica's wallet infrastructure."},{"date":1621728000,"name":"Bogged Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":3000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"617","language":"Solidity","description":"A flashloan attacker exploited a bug in Bogged's deflationary token _txBurn() method, which charged only 1% instead of the intended 5% fee per transfer. This allowed the attacker to manipulate self-transfers to inflate staking reward calculations and mint 15M BOG tokens. The token crashed 98% from $8.50 to $0.15."},{"date":1630713600,"name":"DAO Maker Vesting","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":4000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"921","parentProtocolId":"parent#dao-maker","language":"Solidity","description":"On September 4, 2021, DAO Maker's vesting contracts were exploited via an unauthenticated init() function allowing contract reset and ownership claim. The attacker used emergencyExit() to extract ~$4M from vesting contracts for DERC, CPD, CAPS, and SHO."},{"date":1640995200,"name":"Tinyman","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":3000000,"chain":["Algorand"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"680","language":"PyTeal","description":"Tinyman's AMM pools were exploited via a vulnerability in the liquidity withdrawal mechanism. An attacker could receive the same token twice after a burn rather than two different tokens, extracting twice as much liquidity as authorized. The initial attack was imitated by others, with approximately $3M in losses and $2M in additional at-risk liquidity before the team urged removal from all pools."},{"date":1611532800,"name":"Badger DAO","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":103842,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"173","language":"Solidity","description":"Sandwich attack exploiting SushiMaker's fee-conversion vulnerability in the DIGG/WBTC Sushiswap pool. When Sushiswap added DIGG/WBTC to Onsen but failed to set up a bridge in SushiMaker, the attacker routed protocol fees through an illiquid pool, capturing 81 ETH in excessive slippage fees intended for xSUSHI holders."},{"date":1714435200,"name":"Yield Protocol","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":181000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"876","language":"Solidity","description":"In April 2024, an attacker drained $181,000 from Yield Protocol on Arbitrum by exploiting a logic error in pool token accounting. Using flash-loaned assets, the attacker created a discrepancy between actual token balance and recorded total supply, then withdrew excess tokens."},{"date":1648425600,"name":"Cryptovoxels","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":171000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Cryptovoxels' Discord server was compromised via a vulnerable bot. An attacker posted a phishing link promising 0.01 ETH parcels, tricking users into connecting MetaMask wallets and approving malicious transactions that drained approved assets."},{"date":1759795200,"name":"TokenHolder","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":26000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"TokenHolder suffered an insufficient access control vulnerability where unauthorized callers could invoke restricted functions. The attacker exploited missing permission checks in the contract to drain approximately $26K from the protocol."},{"date":1606867200,"name":"Compounder Finance","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":12464316,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Twenty-two days after launch, Compounder Finance's development team replaced audited strategy pools with malicious 'Evil Strategy' contracts, removing restrictions on the withdraw function and draining every asset pool. Despite advertising 24-hour timelocks, the team retained ability to swap strategy contracts as a premeditated exit."},{"date":1680912000,"name":"GDAC","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":13900000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"GDAC, a South Korean crypto exchange, was hacked on April 9, 2023 (detected at 07:00 KST), with $13.9M stolen. Attacker gained access to the hot wallet and transferred 61 BTC, 350.5 ETH, 10M WEMIX, and $220K USDT. Stolen ETH was laundered through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1794009600,"name":"LiquidCore","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":136664,"chain":["Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7104","parentProtocolId":"parent#liquidlabs","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 7, 2026, an attacker reportedly compromised a LiquidCore deployer wallet and used its upgrade privileges to modify two liquidity pool contracts on HyperEVM. The attacker subsequently drained approximately $136,664 in USD₮0, WHYPE and UETH from the affected pools. The stolen assets were transferred to an attacker-controlled address and subsequently routed through cross-chain services, including Mayan and LI.FI. The extent of the deployer-key compromise, recovery status and plans to reimburse affected liquidity providers remain unconfirmed"},{"date":1655856000,"name":"pandorachainDAO","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":128000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 22, 2022, pandorachainDAO on BSC suffered a flash loan attack exploiting price oracle manipulation. The attacker leveraged flash loans to artificially manipulate asset prices and execute profitable transactions on the platform, extracting approximately $128,000 in value."},{"date":1791936000,"name":"UNCX Network V2","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":86000,"chain":["Ethereum","Base","BSC","Robinhood Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1765","parentProtocolId":"parent#uncx-network","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited UNCX Vesting V2’s shared token accounting by creating vesting positions, releasing a large position, donating tokens into the pool, and cancelling a topped-up vest. This sequence allowed a small remaining vesting position to withdraw tokens belonging to other users. UNCX confirmed additional affected assets across four chains and introduced emergency fees and restrictions to contain the exploit"},{"date":1794096000,"name":"LNbits","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Bitcoin","Lightning Network"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Python","description":"On November 8, 2026, attackers exploited vulnerabilities in LNbits, an open-source Bitcoin Lightning wallet management platform, to create unauthorized accounts and withdraw funds from affected installations. One confirmed operator reported losing 2,285,545 satoshis, while the aggregate loss across other instances remained undisclosed. LNbits instructed operators to shut down their servers and subsequently released version 1.7.0 on November 10 to address the vulnerabilities. The project also advised operators to rotate wallet keys and funding-source credentials, with the exact attack mechanism pending a full technical report"},{"date":1787529600,"name":"PacaSwap DEX","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":90750,"chain":["Constellation"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":90750,"defillamaId":"6779","parentProtocolId":"parent#pacaswap","language":"Scala","description":"An attacker exploited an arithmetic flaw in Tessellation’s metagraph fee-transaction accounting. A specially constructed batch of fee transactions caused an intermediate subtraction to underflow and wrap into a large positive balance, creating SWAP that was not backed by deposits. Because validation focused on the resulting batch state rather than validating each balance-changing operation individually, the final balances remained apparently valid and reconciled. The attacker created the unbacked SWAP in one snapshot and subsequently sold it into PacaSwap’s SWAP/DAG liquidity pool, extracting approximately 12.1M real DAG contributed by LPs. The flaw was specific to Tessellation’s metagraph fee-transaction path; Constellation’s Hypergraph and DAG supply were unaffected"},{"date":1793836800,"name":"TENDRIL","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":550000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 5, 2026, an attacker exploited TENDRIL's token sell logic to drain approximately 550,000 USDT from its PancakeSwap V2 liquidity pool on BSC. Each sell triggered PoolControl.sellToken(), which called TENDRIL.controlburn() to burn tokens directly from the liquidity pair and synchronize its reserves before the seller's remaining tokens arrived. The attacker used flash-loan-funded transactions to exploit the resulting reserve imbalance and withdraw nearly all the pool's USDT liquidity. ExVul estimated the attacker's campaign profit at no more than 181,910 USDT after observed purchases and gas costs, excluding an unresolved LP-position basis"},{"date":1544572800,"name":"Vertcoin","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Risk Parameter Abuse","amount":100000,"chain":["Vertcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Layer 1","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Vertcoin suffered a 51% attack on December 10-12, 2018 when an attacker gained majority hashpower using the Nicehash rental service. The attacker executed 22 deep chain reorganizations, 15 of which included double-spend transactions with the largest reorg exceeding 300 blocks. Estimated losses exceeded $100,000."},{"date":1794268800,"name":"Curve Finance (CowSwapBurner)","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":38206,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Vyper","description":"On November 10, 2026, an attacker exploited a signature verification flaw in Curve Finance's CowSwapBurner contract on Ethereum, stealing approximately $38,206 in accumulated DAO fee revenue. The contract's isValidSignature() function validated an order description without verifying that it matched the order hash being executed, allowing the attacker to submit 138 fraudulent CoW Protocol orders and redirect proceeds from 135 fee tokens to their own address. Curve's Emergency DAO disabled the affected burner later that day and proposed replacing it with a contract that correctly validates order hashes. No user funds were affected, and the stolen revenue has not been recovered"},{"date":1690243200,"name":"MetaLabz","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":null,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MetaLabz token locker contract had an unprotected emergencyWithdraw() function that bypassed NFT stake records and reward calculations. Users could deposit both NFTs and ERC20 tokens, then execute emergencyWithdraw to extract tokens without processing proper stake accounting."},{"date":1778544000,"name":"Aurellion","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Uninitialized Proxy","amount":456442,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"RWA","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Aurellion Labs on Arbitrum was drained of $456,442.53 USDC on May 12, 2026 after incomplete Diamond Proxy initialization left the SafeOwnable facet's _initialized slot at zero. The attacker called initialize() to seize ownership and inject a draining facet."},{"date":1631404800,"name":"Zabu Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Deposit Logic Flaw","amount":3200000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On September 12, 2021, Zabu Finance's ZABUFarm contract on Avalanche failed to account for deflationary token transfer fees. Attacker was credited with full input amount despite fees, draining liquidity."},{"date":1750809600,"name":"Resupply","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":9600000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5963","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 25, 2025, Resupply's newly-deployed (2 hours old) crcrvUSD vault on Ethereum was exploited. Attacker performed ERC4626 donation attack, minting 1 wei shares against 2,000 crvUSD, then deposited 1 wei collateral to borrow entire $9.6M vault through exchange rate rounding."},{"date":1730332800,"name":"M2 Exchange","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":13700000,"chain":["Ethereum","Solana","Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On October 31, 2024, M2 Exchange's hot wallets were compromised via an access control vulnerability across multiple blockchains, draining 3.7M USDT, 97M SHIB, 1,378 ETH (~$13.7M total). The exchange detected and froze assets within 16 minutes, restoring customer funds from reserves."},{"date":1793232000,"name":"Polymarket International","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Supply Chain Attack","amount":2700000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Prediction Market","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"711","parentProtocolId":"parent#polymarket","language":"JavaScript","description":"Attackers reportedly compromised a third-party website monitoring service used by Polymarket, allowing malicious JavaScript to execute on its international trading platform. The script hijacked authenticated trading sessions to sell prediction-market positions and transfer assets to attacker-controlled wallets. Polymarket temporarily suspended trading, removed the affected integration, and committed to reimbursing impacted users"},{"date":1733011200,"name":"Clipper","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Deposit Logic Flaw","amount":450000,"chain":["Optimism","Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"622","language":null,"description":"On December 1, 2024, Clipper DEX was exploited for ~$450K via single-asset withdrawal flaw on Optimism and Base. Attacker caused severe pool imbalances and withdrew more than deposited (Optimism: $318K to $23K, Base: $197K to $36K)."},{"date":1711670400,"name":"Solareum","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Social Account Takeover","amount":1400000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Move","description":"On March 29, 2024 Solareum (Solana-based Telegram trading bot) suffered a major security breach when a North Korean developer hired by Solareum compromised users' private keys imported into the bot through insecure storage, likely via third-party service vulnerability. Over 6,045 SOL (valued at $1.4M) from approximately 300+ users were stolen."},{"date":1786406400,"name":"Harmony Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":3200000,"chain":["Harmony"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 11, 2026, the Harmony chain was affected by an infinite mint exploit, per a CertiK alert. The loss amount was not disclosed and no dedicated post-mortem has been published."},{"date":1773532800,"name":"Venus Core Pool","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":3700000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"212","parentProtocolId":"parent#venus-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 15, 2026, an attacker drained $3.7M from Venus Protocol THE market on BSC by directly transferring THE tokens to inflate the exchange rate 3.81x, enabling massive borrowing. The attacker had spent 9 months accumulating 84% of the supply cap. The vulnerability was in getCashPrior() reading contract balance directly instead of tracking internal accounting."},{"date":1783468800,"name":"BFB","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":197800,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BFB token's custom price-defense deflationary logic could be triggered by zero-value transferFrom calls without per-transaction limits. An attacker used flash loans to repeatedly invoke the burn function ~151 times in one transaction, destroying BFB reserves and draining WBNB from the PancakeSwap liquidity pool."},{"date":1776124800,"name":"Zerion Wallet","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":100000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4049","parentProtocolId":"parent#zerion","language":null,"description":"Lazarus hackers used AI-assisted social engineering over weeks to compromise Zerion employee credentials on Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, gaining access to internal hot wallet private keys and draining $100K. User funds remained unaffected."},{"date":1622246400,"name":"Belt Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":6300000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"310","language":"Solidity","description":"Belt Finance on BSC lost $6.3M on May 29, 2021 to a flash loan exploit. Attacker used flash loans to deposit into undersubscribed strategies and manipulate pool ratios, exploiting faulty vault-share valuation that assumed strategies remained balanced."},{"date":1629331200,"name":"Pinecone Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":200000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 18-19, 2021, Pinecone Finance's staking pool was exploited when an attacker bypassed the frontend and directly invoked the smart contract to deposit more PCT tokens than their account balance. Due to failed balance verification, the attacker withdrew more tokens than deposited, extracting approximately $200K before the PCT token price collapsed 61%."},{"date":1789776000,"name":"Fetch.ai","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":1530000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Fetch.ai’s TokenConversionManagerV3 conversionIn() relied on an ECDSA signature from a single authorizer as its principal authorization mechanism. After obtaining that authorizer’s private key, the attacker signed a fresh conversion message for an attacker-controlled recipient and called conversionIn(). Unlike conversionOut(), the function lacked the checkLimits(amount) restriction and did not independently require proof that corresponding assets had been burned or locked on the other side of the conversion. The valid signature was therefore sufficient to release the converter’s entire remaining FET inventory in one transaction"},{"date":1735689600,"name":"NoOnes","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Cross-Chain Message Spoofing","amount":7900000,"chain":["Ethereum","Binance","Solana","Tron"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"NoOnes' Solana cross-chain bridge was exploited via a vulnerability in the relay contract's message processing logic. The attacker crafted malicious bridge messages that bypassed validation, tricking the relayer into authorizing unauthorized withdrawals across multiple blockchains through hundreds of small transactions each under $7,000."},{"date":1668988800,"name":"sDAO","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":13000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"sDAO token on BSC suffered a business logic flaw allowing attackers to manipulate protocol mechanics and extract funds."},{"date":1757289600,"name":"Nemo Yield Trading","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2590000,"chain":["Sui"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6313","parentProtocolId":"parent#nemo","language":"Move","description":"Nemo on Sui was drained of ~$2.59M when unaudited code left an internal flash-loan function publicly callable and a query function able to mutate state, enabling the attacker to drain the Market pool and bridge to Ethereum."},{"date":1691366400,"name":"Cypher","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1035000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2575","language":null,"description":"Cypher Protocol, a Solana-based futures exchange, was exploited for ~$1.035M via flashloan-enabled price manipulation. The attacker artificially inflated token prices through flashloans and exploited the protocol's economic model through repeated buying and selling at manipulated prices."},{"date":1773273600,"name":"Stake DAO Yield","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Caller Impersonation","amount":176000,"chain":["Arbitrum","Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"249","parentProtocolId":"parent#stake-dao","language":"Solidity","description":"Stake DAO suffered multiple 2026 exploits: March 12 Oracle Message Spoofing caused $176K loss; May 27 deployer key compromise enabled minting 5.4T vsdCRV on Arbitrum in 25 seconds via LayerZero v2 OFT bridge. Incomplete ownership handover since March 2024 left deployer EOA as owner."},{"date":1794960000,"name":"Gonka AI","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":1050000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker reportedly replaced the epoch BLS group key used by Gonka AI's Ethereum bridge to authorize cross-chain withdrawals and WGNK minting. Using the substituted signing authority, the attacker executed unauthorized withdrawals that depleted the bridge's remaining USDT and USDC reserves and minted WGNK without corresponding GNK escrow on Gonka. The incident resulted in approximately $1.05M–$1.06M in reported losses, while the mechanism that allowed the unauthorized group-key replacement remains under investigation"},{"date":1459987200,"name":"ShapeShift","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":230000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"598","language":null,"description":"Between March-April 2016, ShapeShift suffered three separate thefts totaling ~$230K. An employee stole $130K in mid-March, then after dismissal sold security credentials to external hackers who stole an additional $100K (154 BTC, 5,800 ETH, 1,900 LTC). No customer funds were lost as ShapeShift used a non-custodial architecture."},{"date":1717113600,"name":"TLN Protocol","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":280000,"chain":["BNB"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"TLN Protocol's lending market smart contract was exploited through an undisclosed vulnerability. The attacker drained approximately $280,000 in assets, which were subsequently laundered through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1711065600,"name":"Super Sushi Samurai","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":4800000,"chain":["Blast"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On March 21-22, 2024, the Super Sushi Samurai gaming token on Blast was exploited via a double-token transfer vulnerability in the mint function, allowing an attacker to drain approximately 1,310 ETH (~$4.6-4.8M). The attacker claimed to be a whitehat rescuer and offered reimbursement minus a 5% bounty."},{"date":1559779200,"name":"GateHub","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":9500000,"chain":["Ripple"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"GateHub wallets were compromised via API tokens authorized with valid credentials, allowing attackers to steal 23.2M XRP from approximately 100 user accounts. Of this, 13.1M XRP was laundered through exchanges before recovery efforts."},{"date":1731628800,"name":"ThalaSwap","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":25500000,"chain":["Aptos"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2795","parentProtocolId":"parent#thala-labs","language":"Move","description":"On November 15, 2024, an attacker exploited missing balance validation in Thala's v1 farming contracts to unstake $25.5M in LP tokens without owning them. Thala recovered $25M within 6 hours through white-hat negotiation."},{"date":1670630400,"name":"Lodestar V0","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":6900000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2339","parentProtocolId":"parent#lodestar-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On December 10, 2022 Lodestar Finance V0 on Arbitrum suffered a flashloan and oracle manipulation attack when an attacker manipulated the price of PlutusDAO's plvGLP token to 1.83 GLP per plvGLP, then used flashloans to borrow all available platform liquidity with the inflated collateral, resulting in $6.9M loss."},{"date":1768953600,"name":"Saga","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":7000000,"chain":["Saga"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4639","language":"Solidity","description":"On January 21, 2026, attackers exploited an inherited vulnerability in SagaEVM's Ethermint EVM precompile to bypass IBC messaging validation and mint unbacked Saga Dollars, causing a $7M exploit and protocol pause."},{"date":1779580800,"name":"Fractal Protocol","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":13700,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Fractal Protocol's USDF vault on Arbitrum was drained of 13,700 USDC.e via re-entrant flashloan attack. The attacker looped through Balancer V2 batchSwap callbacks to recursively call the vault's deposit and withdraw functions. The vault's tokenPrice accrued only once daily and its share arithmetic rounded favorably for the depositor, allowing each re-entrant round-trip to extract more than it put in."},{"date":1635897600,"name":"Vesper Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":3370000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Vesper Lend on Rari Fuse Pool #23 exploited when Uniswap v3 oracle returned infinite VUSD price due to missing bounds checking. Attacker claimed unlimited collateral and borrowed ~$3.37M in miscellaneous assets."},{"date":1657929600,"name":"Impermax","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":9000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 16, 2022, private keys to Impermax team wallets were stolen, allowing the attacker to drain approximately 9 million IMX tokens and most of the protocol-owned liquidity. The team responded by frontrunning the attacker's potential sell-off and executed a token swap recovery plan from IMX to IBEX."},{"date":1672272000,"name":"Jaypeggers","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":18500,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4406","language":"Solidity","description":"On December 29, 2022, Jaypeggers (JAY token) on Ethereum was exploited through a reentrancy vulnerability. The buyJay function lacked proper validation and allowed the attacker to insert a malicious contract as an ERC-721 token. The attacker reentered through the sell function using a miscalculated price to profit approximately 15.32 ETH (~$18.5K)."},{"date":1710633600,"name":"Remilia","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":6000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Remilia Collective's multisig was breached, likely via malware intercepting Bitwarden password manager credentials. Attackers stole ~490 ETH, USDC, and 130+ Milady NFTs, with floor-price valuation exceeding $6M."},{"date":1406592000,"name":"Cryptsy","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":9580000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Litecoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Cryptsy announced on July 29, 2014 that an attacker under the nickname Lucky7Coin had inserted Trojan code into the exchange's systems, stealing 13,000 BTC and 300,000 LTC. Though later evidence suggested CEO Paul Vernon may have conducted internal theft and misattributed it, the reported mechanism involved compromised private keys."},{"date":1781827200,"name":"Secret Network","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Unbacked Cross-Chain Mint","amount":4670000,"chain":["Secret"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"The Axelar-Secret Network ICS-20 bridge was exploited on June 10, 2026. An attacker created a custom IBC channel and forged deposit packets, minting $4.67M in unbacked tokens without validating the packet source channel."},{"date":1654560000,"name":"Equalizer Exchange","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":50000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Polygon","Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2332","parentProtocolId":"parent#equalizer","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 7, 2022, Equalizer's vault contracts across four chains were exploited via a flawed calculation in getRatioForOneEToken(). The attacker used flash loans to manipulate vault balances and withdraw more assets than entitled. All losses were covered by Equalizer, with no impact to users."},{"date":1783814400,"name":"PHX","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":89500,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"PHX token's transfer-fee logic burned tokens from the pair before crediting post-fee amounts, causing recorded reserves to desynchronize with actual balances. An attacker used a flash loan to fund the manipulation, exploiting the mismatch to drain WBNB from the liquidity pool."},{"date":1748304000,"name":"Usual USD0","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":43000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4882","parentProtocolId":"parent#usual","language":"Solidity","description":"Usual USD0++ Investment vault lost $43K on May 27, 2025 via an arbitrage exploit. Attacker abused a capped unwrapping mechanism lacking proper validation while depositing into the fund; no user funds were affected."},{"date":1794355200,"name":"Rujira AMM Strategies","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":200000,"chain":["THORChain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"8396","parentProtocolId":"parent#rujira","language":null,"description":"On November 10, 2026, an attacker exploited a flaw in the skew calculations of Rujira's Custom Concentrated Liquidity (CCL) strategy on THORChain, manipulating trading activity in the BTC/USDC orderbook and imbalancing existing liquidity positions. The exploit caused approximately $200,000 in losses, including $175,000 from Liquidy Finance's positions and $25,000 from other users. Rujira halted the CosmWasm application layer and announced plans to remove the vulnerable skew parameter and fully reimburse affected users before resuming operations"},{"date":1699315200,"name":"Curve Finance MEV Bot","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An MEV arbitrage bot on Ethereum was exploited when an attacker discovered a vulnerability allowing unauthorized calls to a function that traded wBTC for wETH. Using a flash loan to manipulate Curve pool prices, the attacker forced the bot to purchase wBTC at inflated prices."},{"date":1735776000,"name":"MoonHacker","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":300000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MoonHacker Vault on Optimism was exploited when an attacker took a flashloan of USDC from Aave, passed a malicious contract as the mToken parameter in the executeOperation function (which lacked validation), gained unauthorized approval to transfer vault USDC, and drained the vault."},{"date":1640044800,"name":"Gamma","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":8200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"355","language":"Solidity","description":"Visor Finance's staking contract was exploited via reentrancy in the delegateTransferERC20 interface. Attackers recursively called the withdrawal function before state updates were completed, stealing 8,812,958 VISR tokens (~$8.2M)."},{"date":1784246400,"name":"FlyCow","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":65300,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"FlyCow's FCOW token burned its own LP pair balance mid-swap and synchronized reserves immediately after, allowing an attacker to manipulate the liquidity pool state and drain approximately $65.3K USDT through a subsequent swap."},{"date":1772841600,"name":"Molt EVM","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":127000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On March 7, 2026, Molt EVM on Base was exploited for ~$127K via missing access control on the setSpawnerToken() function. The attacker overwrote the authorized spawner with their own contract, then called the protected spawnTokens() function to mint 100 million mEVM tokens at zero cost and swapped them for WETH."},{"date":1704499200,"name":"CoinsPaid","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":7500000,"chain":["Ethereum","Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"CoinsPaid, a crypto payment gateway, was exploited for the second time in six months. An attacker with compromised wallet access stole $7.5M in digital assets from ETH and BNB chains, including USDT, USDC, CPD, BNB, and BSC-USD. The attacker swapped stolen assets into ETH and distributed them across multiple EOAs and exchanges including WhiteBit, MEXC, and ChangeNow."},{"date":1624579200,"name":"xWin Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":270000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3231","language":"Solidity","description":"A flashloan attacker exploited invalid slippage control logic in xWin's reward distribution system, which did not properly validate transaction slippage limits. The attacker obtained a flashloan of 76,000 BNB, manipulated the swap price, and extracted 303,998 XWIN tokens by exploiting the broken slippage validation in the _swapBNBToTokens function."},{"date":1653004800,"name":"Llamascape","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Signer Phishing","amount":70000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Staff member accounts on Llamascape's Discord were phished, allowing attackers to post a fake minting scam. Holders lost 30-40 ETH by interacting with the malicious contracts. The team committed to compensation and security improvements."},{"date":1624924800,"name":"THORChain DEX","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":350000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"412","language":"Go","description":"On June 29, 2021, THORChain was exploited via a same-symbol deposit flaw where ERC20 tokens with the 'ETH' symbol were incorrectly identified as genuine ETH, allowing attackers to exchange fake ETH for other tokens and steal approximately $350K. This was the first of three consecutive attacks on THORChain."},{"date":1764460800,"name":"Yearn Ether","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":9000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3973","parentProtocolId":"parent#yearn","language":"Solidity","description":"Yearn Finance yETH stableswap pool drained for $9M on deposit of 16 wei. Attacker minted 235 septillion yETH via accounting flaw caused by cached storage variables not resetting at zero liquidity, then swapped for legitimate derivatives."},{"date":1771459200,"name":"Velar Perps","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Predictable Oracle Update","amount":401000,"chain":["Mezo"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6842","parentProtocolId":"parent#velar-protocol","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 19, 2026, Velar's PerpDEX on Mezo was exploited via predictable oracle price updates. Attacker manipulated BTC/MUSD perpetual pool by systematic trading patterns, flowing ~$72M volume and draining ~$401K through exploitable oracle timing."},{"date":1720137600,"name":"DefiPlaza","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"728","language":"Solidity","description":"DeFiPlaza V2 had a complex vulnerability allowing a carefully crafted transaction to drain all liquidity pool tokens. An MEV bot front-ran the attacker and captured ~$24K before being contacted by the team and returning the funds."},{"date":1659916800,"name":"Dragoma","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":3500000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Dragoma move-to-earn game was a rug pull. The core team exploited admin privileges immediately after listing on MEXC, withdrawing funds and abandoning the project, crashing the token 99.8%."},{"date":1711411200,"name":"Munchables","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Proxy Upgrade Hijack","amount":62500000,"chain":["Blast"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4369","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 26, 2024 Munchables (gaming NFT project on Blast layer-2) suffered a $62.5 million exploit by a rogue developer (pseudonym 'Werewolves0943') hired to write the smart contracts who deliberately built in vulnerabilities, using control of the upgradeable proxy to assign themselves 1 million ETH and drain the protocol."},{"date":1736294400,"name":"Orange Finance","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":840000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3422","language":"Solidity","description":"Orange Finance admin address was compromised on January 8, 2025, and used to upgrade contracts on Arbitrum and transfer $840K. Protocol had inadequate multisig implementation (effectively unisig); ~$731K remained."},{"date":1561593600,"name":"Bitrue","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":4700000,"chain":["Ripple","Cardano"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5731","language":null,"description":"Hackers exploited a vulnerability in Bitrue's withdrawal risk-control second-review process, bypassing security checks to drain 9.3M XRP and 2.5M ADA from the hot wallet."},{"date":1614384000,"name":"Furucombo","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Delegatecall Hijack","amount":14000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"742","language":"Solidity","description":"Furucombo exploited February 27, 2021 for ~$14M via delegatecall hijack. Attacker deployed a fraudulent contract impersonating Aave v2 implementation. Furucombo failed to authenticate the target, allowing the attacker to drain pre-approved tokens (3,900+ stETH and USDC) from ~22 users."},{"date":1679011200,"name":"ParaSpace Lending V1","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":5000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":5000000,"defillamaId":"2517","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 17, 2023 ParaSpace (NFT lending protocol on Ethereum) suffered a price manipulation exploit in the AutoCompoundApe contract allowing attackers to borrow assets with less NFT collateral than required. Security firm BlockSec intercepted the attack and recovered approximately 2,900 ETH ($5M) of BAYC NFTs before the full attack executed."},{"date":1650499200,"name":"Zeed Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":1000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Zeed Finance experienced an arithmetic error in reward distribution calculation. The vulnerability allowed the attacker to manipulate calculations to extract approximately $1M."},{"date":1730332800,"name":"1inch Swap","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Supply Chain Attack","amount":723000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"189","parentProtocolId":"parent#1inch","language":null,"description":"On October 30, 2024, attackers phished a LottieFiles npm account and published malicious lottie-player versions that injected an Ace Drainer wallet-connect prompt into every downstream site, including the 1inch web dApp. The 1inch frontend lacked npm package pinning or integrity checks, leaving it vulnerable to upstream compromise. One user lost 10 wrapped BTC ($723K) from an Avalanche wallet; only the web frontend was affected."},{"date":1705881600,"name":"Concentric","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":1720000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On January 22, 2024, Concentric Finance on Arbitrum suffered a $1.72 million exploit. Attackers used social engineering to compromise the deployer private key, then upgraded vault contracts, minted unauthorized LP tokens, and drained assets. Lacked multi-sig or time-lock protections."},{"date":1776038400,"name":"MONA","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":60950,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 14, 2026, an attacker created 25 accounts to farm MONA using a flash loan and Venus USDT borrow, exploiting flawed accounting in the deferred burn mechanism to drain 60,950 USDT from the liquidity pair."},{"date":1612137600,"name":"Cryptopia","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":45000,"chain":["Multiple"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Cryptopia's dormant XSN token wallet, under liquidators' control, was compromised during the exchange's liquidation proceedings. Hackers stole NZD 62,000 (~$45,000) worth of XSN tokens from a $1.96 million address that had been inactive since the exchange's initial hack in 2019."},{"date":1669852800,"name":"APC","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":6000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"APC token on BSC was exploited through a combined flash loan and price manipulation attack. The attacker used a flash loan to artificially inflate the token price, enabling profitable swaps."},{"date":1787788800,"name":"Moonwell Lending","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":8700000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1853","parentProtocolId":"parent#moonwell","language":"Solidity","description":"The attacker manipulated the spot price of the relatively illiquid MAMO token, increasing the collateral value recognized by Moonwell. The attacker used the inflated MAMO collateral to borrow liquid assets including cbBTC, ETH/WETH, USDC, and wstETH, leaving the lending markets with undercollateralized positions"},{"date":1670716800,"name":"3Commas","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Database Breach","amount":20000000,"chain":["Multi-Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"3Commas' API database containing ~100K API keys was breached and publicly leaked on December 28, 2022. Attackers used the stolen keys to access connected exchange accounts and drain cryptocurrency by performing unauthorized trades across Binance, KuCoin, and other platforms."},{"date":1646438400,"name":"Bacon Protocol","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":1000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Bacon Protocol NFT mortgage lending platform was exploited via reentrancy in the lend() function. The contract used ERC777 without considering callback security, allowing an attacker to reenter lend() to obtain excessive lending credits and drain ~$1M."},{"date":1776297600,"name":"Rhea Lend","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":18400000,"chain":["Near"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1546","parentProtocolId":"parent#rhea-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 16, 2026, Rhea Lend on NEAR was exploited via chained swap path that defeated margin module's slippage protection. Attacker spent April 13-15 deploying fake token contracts and eight Ref Finance pools, then executed complex swap reusing intermediate assets to drain reserves. Oracle accepted attacker-created pool prices as legitimate."},{"date":1785456000,"name":"COLDCARD","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Weak Key Generation","amount":116000000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"Starting 30 July 2026 attackers drained BTC in four waves from thousands of addresses whose seeds were generated on Coldcard hardware wallets running firmware 4.0.0+ (March 2021 onward), where a firmware bug bypassed the dedicated hardware RNG during key generation, cutting effective key strength to as little as 40 bits and allowing offline brute-forcing."},{"date":1785628800,"name":"MOKE","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":907000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Liquidity Pool","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MOKE token on BNB Chain suffered a $907K exploit in early August 2026 via suspected liquidity pool manipulation, detected by TenArmor. The exact attack vector remains unconfirmed."},{"date":1721347200,"name":"Rho Markets","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":7600000,"chain":["Scroll"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4808","language":"Solidity","description":"Rho Markets on Scroll lost $7.6M on July 19, 2024 when a private key compromise allowed attacker to transfer oracle contract ownership and manipulate price feeds, draining all USDT and USDC."},{"date":1393891200,"name":"Poloniex","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":50000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7481","language":null,"description":"An attacker discovered a race condition in Poloniex's withdrawal processing logic. By submitting multiple concurrent withdrawal requests, the attacker could deplete accounts to negative balances before the system updated withdrawal state, extracting 97 BTC without having that balance."},{"date":1708560000,"name":"Tectonic","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":250000,"chain":["Cronos"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1115","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 22, 2024 Tectonic (lending protocol on Cronos) lost $250,000 to a flashloan exploit targeting newly added market functionality that lacked protection against flashloan-based manipulation in the deposit logic."},{"date":1707782400,"name":"DuelBits","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":4600000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On February 13, 2024, DuelBits lost $4.6M when private keys to its hot wallets on Ethereum and BNB Chain were compromised. The attacker stole USDT, APE, and SHIB tokens, converted them to ETH, and laundered the funds through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1785715200,"name":"RISEx","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":673012,"chain":["RISE"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7806","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 3, 2026, a misconfigured withdrawal permission in RISEx's RWA strategy, deployed July 13, allowed an unauthorized address to withdraw 673,011.56 USDC. RISEx patched the contract within minutes and compensated XLP depositors from monthly fees."},{"date":1777420800,"name":"Aftermath Perps","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":1140000,"chain":["Sui"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7540","parentProtocolId":"parent#aftermath-finance","language":"Move","description":"Aftermath Finance's perpetual futures on Sui exploited for $1.14M via missing validation in fee accounting. Attackers set negative builder code fees to inflate synthetic collateral, enabling unauthorized vault withdrawals."},{"date":1786233600,"name":"Coinsbuy","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":7900000,"chain":["Ethereum","Tron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 9, 2026, Coinsbuy’s wallet infrastructure was exploited via improper access control, allowing an attacker to drain approximately $7.9M across Ethereum and Tron. Flagged by PeckShield; no dedicated post-mortem has been published."},{"date":1630195200,"name":"xToken","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":4500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"206","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker used an $81M flashloan from dYdX to manipulate SNX price downward, then exploited an access control vulnerability in xToken's callFunction to purchase SNX at artificially depressed prices, stealing $4.5M in value."},{"date":1615766400,"name":"DEUS Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":3000000,"chain":["Fantom"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1387","language":"Solidity","description":"DEUS Finance lost $3M to a flash loan attack that manipulated the USDC/DEI oracle, triggering incorrect liquidations due to insufficient price checks."},{"date":1532563200,"name":"KICKICO","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":7700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"KICKICO ICO platform was exploited on July 26, 2018 when attackers gained access to the private key managing the KICK token contract. The attacker destroyed KICK tokens at 40 addresses and recreated them at 40 attacker-controlled wallets, stealing over 70 million KICK tokens worth $7.7 million. KICKICO regained control by switching to a cold-storage key."},{"date":1715817600,"name":"pump.fun","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":1900000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4449","parentProtocolId":"parent#pump","language":"Rust/Anchor","description":"pump.fun exploited on May 16, 2024 when a former employee retained access to a service account after leaving. The attacker flash-loaned SOL, used it to complete bonding curves to 100%, then drained the released liquidity (~$1.9M-$2M or ~12,300 SOL) to repay the loans."},{"date":1709856000,"name":"Unizen","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":2100000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":2100000,"defillamaId":"1336","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 8, 2024, the Unizen DeFi aggregator on Ethereum was exploited for $2.1M (primarily USDT and DAI) via an external call vulnerability introduced in a contract upgrade. The CEO reimbursed affected users starting March 11."},{"date":1794096000,"name":"ACryptoS","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":665429,"chain":["Arbitrum","BSC","Polygon","Base","Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"208","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 8, 2026, attackers exploited a missing input validation check in ACryptoS's concentrated-liquidity vaults across Arbitrum, BSC, Polygon, Base, and Optimism, stealing approximately $665,429 from 77 vaults. The vulnerable depositMulti() function accepted an incomplete token-amount array, causing the vault to undervalue its existing assets and mint disproportionately large amounts of shares for minimal deposits"},{"date":1633305600,"name":"pNetwork","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Spoofed Event Log","amount":13000000,"chain":["BSC","Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"On September 19, 2021, pNetwork's cross-chain bridge was exploited when an attacker crafted fraudulent peg-out event logs. The Rust event-log processor failed to validate that requests originated from authorized pNetwork contracts, processing the fake withdrawal requests. The attacker stole 277 BTC (wrapped to BSC) worth approximately $13M."},{"date":1795046400,"name":"Fluidkey","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Fluidkey reported a security incident involving unauthorized transactions affecting users of its self-custodial privacy wallet. The team took its website, application and services offline at 18:05 UTC on November 19, after which it reported no further unauthorized transactions. Fluidkey is investigating the attack with SEAL 911 and tracing the affected funds. The attack vector and total financial losses remain undisclosed"},{"date":1405209600,"name":"Mintpal","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2000000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Mintpal's exchange was compromised and attackers gained control of internal features that allowed them to withdraw 8 million VeriCoin (30% of circulating supply at the time). VeriCoin developers executed a soft fork to roll back the blockchain, returning the stolen tokens to the exchange."},{"date":1715299200,"name":"Tsuru","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":410000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Tsuru on Base suffered a smart contract vulnerability due to insufficient validation, resulting in losses of 137.78 ETH. The vulnerability allowed unauthorized fund extraction from the protocol."},{"date":1730246400,"name":"SUNRAY·FINANCE","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":2855000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 30, 2024, SUNRAY FINANCE on Arbitrum was attacked when a private key was compromised, enabling malicious contract upgrade and 200 trillion SUN token mint. Attacker swapped ~$2.1M for USDC, collapsing SUN to zero."},{"date":1736294400,"name":"Moby","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":1470000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4452","language":"Solidity","description":"In January 2025, Moby Trade on Arbitrum suffered a $2.5M hack when an attacker compromised a private key controlling the proxy upgrade mechanism. The attacker performed a malicious upgrade and called emergencyWithdrawERC20() to steal stablecoins and wrapped assets, but a whitehat recovered $1.5M."},{"date":1600560000,"name":"Soda Protocol","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":160000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"940","language":"Solidity","description":"Hackers exploited a variable naming error in the WETHCalculator.sol smart contract, where 'amount' was used instead of 'lockedAmount', allowing unauthorized drainage of over 400 ETH from the liquidity mining pool."},{"date":1766016000,"name":"Rari Capital","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Uninitialized Proxy","amount":2000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"136","language":"Solidity","description":"On December 10, 2025, Rari Capital Fuse lending pools (dormant after prior $80M+ hacks) were exploited for $2M via unprotected proxy upgrade vulnerability. Attacker hijacked implementation contract to gain admin privileges and enable uncollateralized borrowing."},{"date":1785888000,"name":"KITE Foundation","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":13340000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#kiteai","language":"Solidity","description":"Sixteen wallets associated with KITE Foundation were drained simultaneously in a coordinated private-key compromise. The transfers were ordinary ERC-20 transfer() calls authorized by the affected wallets rather than an exploit of the KITE token contract. KITE Foundation subsequently paused Ethereum KITE transfers and cross-chain bridges, then deployed a replacement ERC-20 and migrated legitimate balances 1:1 from a pre-incident snapshot while excluding attacker-controlled addresses"},{"date":1732406400,"name":"Proxy_b7e1","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":8500,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 24, 2024, a proxy-based contract on BNB Chain was exploited via a logic flaw, resulting in approximately $8.5K in losses. The vulnerability was in the contract's logic implementation."},{"date":1541635200,"name":"FFGame","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":7200,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"FFGame gambling DApp suffered exploitation via mirrored-randomness vulnerability in November 2018. Attackers predicted the random outcome by leveraging information from earlier blockchain blocks. The attack was part of a coordinated assault on eight EOS gambling platforms using randomness prediction vectors."},{"date":1680480000,"name":"MEV-Boost Relay","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":20000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"A malicious Ethereum validator exploited a flaw in the mev-boost-relay implementation by crafting an invalid block header with zero parent and state roots, bypassing validation and gaining visibility of block contents. The attacker front-ran and replaced MEV bot transactions to drain approximately $20M over 24 transactions."},{"date":1636070400,"name":"Ooki","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":55000000,"chain":["Polygon","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"197","language":null,"description":"On November 5, 2021 an unknown hacker sent a phishing email containing a Word document with embedded malware to a bZx protocol developer. The developer executed the malware, allowing the attacker to exfiltrate the private key used to drain $55 million across Polygon and BSC networks."},{"date":1678233600,"name":"DKP","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":80000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"DKP token on BSC was exploited through flash loan price manipulation. The attacker leveraged the oracle's reliance on USDT-DKP pair ratios to manipulate token pricing, swapping small amounts to trigger massive price shifts and profiting from the arbitrage."},{"date":1609200000,"name":"Cover Protocol","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":9400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"165","language":"Solidity","description":"Cover Protocol's Blacksmith contract was exploited on December 28-29, 2020, due to incorrect memory/storage reference in reward calculation logic, allowing unbounded minting of approximately 40 quintillion COVER tokens. Funds were returned by a white hat hacker."},{"date":1625961600,"name":"ChainSwap Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":4400000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 11, 2021, ChainSwap bridge was exploited when attackers identified a logical flaw in the cross-chain quota code. The vulnerability allowed invalid, non-whitelisted addresses to bypass authorization and increase the on-chain bridge quota. Attackers minted new tokens for multiple protocols and stole approximately $4.4 million across Ethereum and BSC, affecting Wilder World, Antimatter, Optionroom, and others."},{"date":1660003200,"name":"Curve DEX","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":575000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":575000,"defillamaId":"3","parentProtocolId":"parent#curve-finance","language":null,"description":"On August 9, 2022, Curve Finance's DNS provider (iwantmyname) was hijacked, redirecting users to a malicious frontend that injected token approval transactions. Curve's smart contracts remained secure; the team quickly identified and reverted the issue."},{"date":1627603200,"name":"Levyathan","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Stored Publicly","amount":1500000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Levyathan developers stored private keys with minting capability on GitHub. The attacker used these to pass a timelock transaction on July 28 and execute an ownership transfer on July 30, minting 100 quintillion LEV tokens. The weak timelock controls lacked multisig authorization."},{"date":1745712000,"name":"QuantMaster","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Backdoor Contract","amount":100000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"QuantMaster smart contract drain via malicious backdoor embedded by an insider developer. The backdoor allowed the attacker to extract funds through a deliberately compromised contract."},{"date":1779148800,"name":"HermesVault","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":30000,"chain":["Algorand"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":26000,"defillamaId":null,"language":"JavaScript","description":"On May 19, 2026, HermesVault, an Algorand privacy protocol, was exploited when an attacker bypassed ZK proof verification via a flaw in the withdrawal verification script's key reset defense logic, stealing 261,000 ALGO (~$29.5K)."},{"date":1757721600,"name":"Shibarium","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":4100000,"chain":["Shibarium"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On September 12, 2025 at 18:44 UTC, an attacker compromised 10 of Shibarium's 12 validator keys and used a 4.6M BONE flash loan delegated to Ryoshi Validator 1 to push past the two-thirds threshold, then co-signed a false L2 state and drained 17 tokens worth ~$4.1M from the canonical bridge. The dev team suspects key exposure from a developer machine or the server's KMS."},{"date":1626134400,"name":"DeFiPie","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":124999,"chain":["Ethereum","Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 12-13, 2021, DeFiPie (now pieLABS) was exploited via a reentrancy vulnerability combined with an overborrowing flaw. The attacker created a malicious token contract with a modified transfer function and used reentrancy in the doTransferOut function to borrow more than their collateral, extracting approximately $125K in liquidity."},{"date":1675987200,"name":"dForce Lending","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Read-Only Reentrancy","amount":3650000,"chain":["Arbitrum","Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"123","parentProtocolId":"parent#dforce","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited read-only reentrancy in dForce's Curve vault integration on Arbitrum and Optimism. During asset withdrawal, the attacker called back into the protocol to manipulate Curve's virtual price and liquidate wstETH/ETH positions."},{"date":1681603200,"name":"Swapos V2","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":468000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Swapos V2 was exploited through a broken k-value invariant in the swap pool, allowing attackers to drain approximately $468K from the protocol by manipulating the automated market maker's core pricing mechanism."},{"date":1702684800,"name":"GoodDollar","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":2000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1429","language":"Solidity","description":"GoodDollar's reserve contract contained a reentrancy vulnerability that allowed an attacker to repeatedly call withdraw functions before state updates completed. The Protocol Guardians paused contracts and applied a 100% transaction fee to hacker-held tokens to discourage transfers."},{"date":1646784000,"name":"Pirate X","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":78000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Pirate X gaming platform staking wallet was compromised. An attacker sold 9.6M PXP tokens from the protocol, profiting approximately 212 BNB. The team acknowledged bypassing security inspection before launching a vulnerable conversion feature."},{"date":1624492800,"name":"SharedStake","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"275","language":"Solidity","description":"An insider with access to a disclosed timelock vulnerability exploited it to bypass vesting contract protections and withdraw 500K SGT governance tokens. The vulnerability had been identified on April 26 and shared with the team, but the insider used this knowledge to drain locked tokens four times on June 19-23."},{"date":1784419200,"name":"Allbridge Core","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":1650000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3944","parentProtocolId":"parent#allbridge","language":"Rust","description":"On July 20, 2026, Allbridge Core on Solana was drained of $1.65M. An attacker used a 1.12M USDC flashloan through Kamino to swap USDC/USDT and distort the pool ratio, then withdrew liquidity at the inflated rate."},{"date":1788566400,"name":"Rocket Perp","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Risk Parameter Abuse","amount":287666,"chain":["Rocket"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":287665.98,"defillamaId":"7565","parentProtocolId":"parent#rocket","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited a dormant perpetual market on Rocket by placing artificially inflated orders and trading between accounts under their control. The trades generated artificial profits in one account while bankrupting a disposable counterparty. The profitable account withdrew approximately $287,666 through Rocket’s Bridge, leaving a deficit to be socialized across platform users. Rocket subsequently confirmed the full return of the withdrawn funds"},{"date":1791417600,"name":"BitBay","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":14838.47,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BitBay’s vault contained a vulnerability in _withdraw() that transferred the contract’s entire token balance whenever liquidity == 0, without restricting withdrawals to the user’s proportional entitlement. The attacker triggered this condition through reposition() and subsequently redeemed one minimal share unit, receiving approximately 14,838.47 DAI belonging to the vault"},{"date":1785974400,"name":"Panther Protocol","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":7578,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3988","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 6, 2026, Panther Protocol on Base was exploited via a malicious governance proposal, resulting in a loss of approximately $7,578. No dedicated post-mortem has been published."},{"date":1608940800,"name":"Altilly","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"API Key Compromised","amount":750000,"chain":["Multiple"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attacker gained access to Altilly's hosting provider account via compromised API keys lacking 2FA. The attacker rebooted servers in rescue mode, created new system user accounts, deleted all backups across hosting and offsite services, and rendered encrypted wallets inaccessible. The exchange permanently shut down with no fund recovery."},{"date":1708473600,"name":"DeezNutz 404","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":170000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A calculation flaw in the DeezNutz 404 ERC-404 token contract enabled infinite minting through self-transfer exploits. Attackers minted unlimited tokens and sold them for ~$170K."},{"date":1717977600,"name":"UwU Lend","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":20000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2111","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 10, 2024, UwU Lend was exploited for approximately $19.3-20 million. Attacker used flashloans (~$3.8B) to manipulate CurveFinance pools, corrupting 5 of 11 USDe price sources. A second attack on the same protocol followed days later, extracting an additional $3.7 million."},{"date":1624320000,"name":"Eleven Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":4500000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"583","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 22, 2021, Eleven Finance's NRV vaults were drained for $4.5M via a logic flaw in emergencyBurn(). The attacker used flashloans to obtain assets, converted them to Nerve-bridged tokens, and deposited them into MasterMind. The function failed to burn shares, allowing repeated withdrawals from the same position."},{"date":1672704000,"name":"GDS","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":187000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On January 3, 2023, the GDS protocol on BSC was exploited using a flash loan attack. The attacker borrowed $2.38M USD via flash loan, manipulated the LP mining reward calculation by exploiting a flaw in the _lpRewardAmount calculation, and created multiple attack contracts to withdraw excessive rewards. The attacker profited approximately $187K before repaying the flash loan."},{"date":1702425600,"name":"OKX DEX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":2700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"OKX DEX's proxy admin private key was leaked on December 12-13, 2023. Attacker upgraded the proxy contract to a malicious implementation and stole ~$2.7M in ETH, USDT and USDC from wallets with standing approvals to the old contract."},{"date":1717459200,"name":"Lykke","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":22400000,"chain":["Ethereum","Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Lykke cryptocurrency exchange hot wallet was compromised by Lazarus Group, resulting in the theft of 158 BTC and 2,161 ETH (~CHF 22.8M / ~$22.4M). The stolen assets represented approximately one-third of Lykke's total holdings, leading to the exchange halting all trading and eventually declaring bankruptcy."},{"date":1794960000,"name":"RNT Lend","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":954703,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"9188","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker used a privileged Reental administrator account to upgrade RNT Lend's USDT0 and USDC aToken proxies to malicious implementations permitting unrestricted withdrawals. Two MEV bots exploited the upgraded contracts to drain approximately $454.8K in stablecoin reserves, while the administrator account extracted another $499.9K from Reental-associated wallets and Safes. Approximately $49.34M in property tokens was also transferred but subsequently reclaimed by Reental using its token manager"},{"date":1670025600,"name":"BTC.com","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":3000000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BTC.com's custodial systems were compromised on December 3, 2022, exposing private keys and enabling the theft of 32.5 BTC and 1964 ETH. Approximately $700K belonged to client assets while $2.3M was company-owned. Stolen funds were transferred to Tornado Cash and CEX exchanges."},{"date":1773792000,"name":"Neutrl","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6163","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 18, 2026, Neutrl DeFi protocol experienced DNS hijacking redirecting the official domain to a malicious interface. Users accessing the spoofed frontend were prompted to approve token transfers, but no funds were stolen as user assets remained in custodial wallets."},{"date":1783900800,"name":"Lumi Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":270000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3890","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 13, 2026, Lumi Finance on Arbitrum lost ~$270K through Sodium smart account ERC-1271 validation flaws. The exploit required two bugs: (1) Sodium accepted attacker-controlled contracts as valid signers and session keys, and (2) validateUserOp granted unlimited ERC-20 allowances via attacker-controlled paymasterAndData. Attackers systematically stripped tokens from user accounts, leaving persistent allowances."},{"date":1620345600,"name":"ValueDefi","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":11000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"164","parentProtocolId":"parent#value-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"ValueDefi custom-weighted pools drained on May 7, 2021. Uninitialized contracts lacked the 'initialized = true' flag, allowing attacker to re-initialize, set themselves as operator/owner, and drain vBWAP/BUSD LP tokens via governanceRecoverUnsupported()."},{"date":1673827200,"name":"LendHub","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":6000000,"chain":["Heco"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"380","language":"Solidity","description":"LendHub on Huobi Eco Chain was exploited on January 12, 2023 for ~$6M. The deprecated token remained active and priced identically to its replacement, allowing the attacker to exploit accounting flaws in mint/redeem operations."},{"date":1772409600,"name":"Curve LlamaLend","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":240000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4321","parentProtocolId":"parent#curve-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker flash-loaned 10M USDC and 15,986 WETH from Morpho Blue to manipulate sDOLA vault exchange rate, triggering liquidations of 27 borrowers in sDOLA/crvUSD market for ~$240K profit. Oracle vulnerability: CryptoFromPoolVaultWAgg used sDOLA.convertToAssets() as spot price without atomic-manipulation protection."},{"date":1682640000,"name":"0vix","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":2000000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1614","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 28, 2023, 0VIX on Polygon was exploited for $2M via flashloan-enabled oracle manipulation. Attacker obtained $6.12M flashloan, manipulated vGSHT/Curve pricing to inflate collateral value, triggered liquidation cascade ($4.33M net loss), and bridged 1,069 ETH to Tornado Cash."},{"date":1686700800,"name":"Tropykus RSK","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":150000,"chain":["Rootstock"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1464","parentProtocolId":"parent#tropykus-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 14, 2023, Tropykus RSK was exploited via a rounding error vulnerability in the redeem counter affecting interest rate calculations, resulting in $150,000 in losses."},{"date":1685577600,"name":"Cellframe","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":76112,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Cellframe suffered a flash loan attack exploiting calculation errors during liquidity migration. The attacker took flash loans to manipulate LP pools by injecting and withdrawing liquidity strategically across different pools, converting the resulting tokens through a new CELL-BUSD pool to extract value."},{"date":1665446400,"name":"Mango Markets V3","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":115000000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"286","parentProtocolId":"parent#mango-markets","language":"Rust","description":"Attacker used $5M initial capital to take a MANGO-PERP position and pumped spot price via large purchases on another account, creating artificial collateral worth $423M to borrow $110-116M. Protocol relied on liquidity-sensitive price feeds vulnerable to large single-account manipulation."},{"date":1788652800,"name":"Liquid Network","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Unbacked Cross-Chain Mint","amount":320000000,"chain":["Liquid"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"An actor exploited a software vulnerability in Elements, the software underlying Liquid, to create approximately 4,000 L-BTC without corresponding BTC backing. The unbacked L-BTC was transferred to SideSwap’s peg-out service, where it was indistinguishable from legitimately backed L-BTC. SideSwap processed a valid peg-out and burned the L-BTC, causing the Liquid Federation to release approximately 3,996 BTC from its Bitcoin reserves. Liquid and SideSwap state that SideSwap’s Peg-out Authorization Key and the federation’s other keys were not compromised"},{"date":1710115200,"name":"Blastoff","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":600000,"chain":["Blast"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4246","language":"Solidity","description":"BlastOff yield vault exploited for approximately 150 ETH (~$600K). Protocol team closed the vulnerable pool after 6 hours and offered 20% bounty for recovery. Cause under investigation and protocol being reaudited."},{"date":1690761600,"name":"GYM Network","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1193,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"GYM Network's _autoDeposit function had no transfer check, allowing users to call deposit() and create_deposit_record() without actually transferring tokens. An attacker repeatedly 'deposited' 8 million GYMNET tokens without sending any funds, then withdrew the fake deposit balance."},{"date":1575244800,"name":"Vertcoin","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":29,"chain":["Vertcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Layer 1","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Vertcoin suffered a second 51% attack on December 1, 2019, with 603 VTC blocks replaced by 553 attacker-controlled blocks in a deep blockchain reorganization. Five double-spent outputs worth approximately 125 VTC (~$29) were redirected to the attacker. Attacker rented hash power for 0.5-1 BTC despite the attack being financially unprofitable; Bittrex suspended withdrawals during the attack."},{"date":1587254400,"name":"dForce Lending","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":25000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"123","parentProtocolId":"parent#dforce","language":null,"description":"On April 19, 2020, dForce/Lendf.Me was exploited via ERC777 reentrancy; attacker repeatedly supplied and withdrew tokens before balance updates, stealing $25M. Funds were recovered by law enforcement and exchanges within days."},{"date":1747699200,"name":"IRYS AI","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Backdoor Contract","amount":69600,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"IRYS AI token on BSC deployed with a backdoor admin function that allowed the deployer to bypass standard permission checks. The _taxWallet was given privileged drain capability, enabling extraction of $69.6K directly from user wallets in a single transaction."},{"date":1703894400,"name":"Channels Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":320000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"368","language":"Solidity","description":"Channels Finance, a Compound V2 fork on BSC, suffered an inflation attack exploiting improper token accounting. The attacker manipulated the protocol's supply mechanics to mint unbacked tokens, draining approximately $320K."},{"date":1526428800,"name":"Bitcoin Gold","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":18000000,"chain":["Bitcoin Gold"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On May 16-24, 2018, Bitcoin Gold suffered a 51% attack in which attackers stole approximately 388,000 BTG (~$18M) through double-spend transactions targeting cryptocurrency exchanges. The attacker sent coins to exchanges, sold them for other assets, then reversed the initial transactions to reclaim funds."},{"date":1709683200,"name":"ALP","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":10000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"ALP contract vulnerability where a function intended to be internal was left public, allowing unauthorized calls. Documented in DeFiHackLabs vulnerability database; amount not disclosed."},{"date":1688947200,"name":"Arcadia V1","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":455000,"chain":["Ethereum","Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3210","parentProtocolId":"parent#arcadia-finance","language":null,"description":"On July 10, 2023, Arcadia Finance V1 vault was exploited via reentrancy in liquidation. Attacker registered a malicious contract as both router and whitelisted account, spoofing context to execute unauthorized withdrawals, draining ~$455-460K in LP tokens across Ethereum and Optimism."},{"date":1684540800,"name":"Swap-LP","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":1100000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Swap-LP's factory contract contained a low-level function vulnerability that an attacker exploited to manipulate liquidity pools. The attacker extracted approximately $1.1M (609 ETH) by calling restricted factory functions to drain value from the protocol's liquidity."},{"date":1699574400,"name":"Poloniex","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":126000000,"chain":["Tron","Ethereum","Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7481","language":null,"description":"Poloniex hot wallet private keys compromised on November 10, 2023, draining $126M across Ethereum, Tron, and Bitcoin. Compromise likely via malware or social engineering. Justin Sun committed to full reimbursement."},{"date":1717977600,"name":"JokInTheBox","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":34000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"JokInTheBox staking contract had an unstaking vulnerability where the state variable was not properly checked, allowing attackers to unstake multiple times from the same balance. Exploiter continuously withdrew funds, draining ~$34K from affected users."},{"date":1725321600,"name":"Penpie","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":27000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3083","parentProtocolId":"parent#magpie-ecosystem","language":"Solidity","description":"Penpie was drained of ~$27M via a reentrancy attack. The attacker created malicious SY tokens mimicking Pendle yield tokens and exploited missing reentrancy protection in _harvestBatchMarketRewards() to claim real rewards using fake token tickets."},{"date":1693958400,"name":"GMBL.COMPUTER","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":770000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On September 6, 2023, hours after launch, GMBL.COMPUTER on Arbitrum was exploited when the off-chain signature server issued valid signatures for spoofed referral claims without verifying deposits, draining ~471 ETH."},{"date":1752019200,"name":"GMX V1 EVM","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":42000000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":40000000,"defillamaId":"337","parentProtocolId":"parent#gmx","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 9, 2025, GMX V1 perpetuals on Arbitrum suffered a $42M exploit through reentrancy in executeDecreaseOrder(). Attacker exploited the assumption that _account is an EOA, using a contract to reenter, manipulate short positions, inflate GLP price, and profit via redemptions; attacker returned funds July 12, keeping a $5M bounty."},{"date":1775952000,"name":"SubQuery Network","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":134000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SubQuery Network Settings contract on Base was exploited on April 12, 2026 due to missing owner guard on functions, allowing attacker to drain 382.4M SQT from pooled staking, 272 individual staker wallets, RewardsBooster, and treasury across five transactions."},{"date":1676073600,"name":"fcdep","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":350000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On February 11, 2023, the fcdep (EPMAX) protocol on BSC was attacked using a flash loan exploit. The attacker manipulated token balances through improper balance accounting to extract approximately $350K from the protocol."},{"date":1743984000,"name":"Tenderize V2","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":10850,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4085","parentProtocolId":"parent#tenderize","language":"Solidity","description":"Tenderize V2 suffered an exploit involving its proxy upgrade mechanism, resulting in a small loss on Ethereum due to improper proxy upgrade validation."},{"date":1624233600,"name":"StakeHound / Fireblocks","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Key Brute Forced","amount":72000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"StakeHound's 38,178 ETH became inaccessible when a 3-of-4 threshold signature key backup procedure failed. Fireblocks lost custody of 2 key shards during a machine failure in March 2021, and StakeHound failed to execute disaster recovery or verify the backup through third-party services. The keys became permanently unrecoverable."},{"date":1781913600,"name":"LABUBU/OLPC","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Decimal Miscalculation","amount":1100000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Liquidity Pool","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 20, 2026, a PancakeSwap V2 pool pairing OLPC and LABUBI on BNB Chain was exploited when the OLPC token's _update function had a maliciously configured decimalsValue parameter (7326680472586200649), causing massive unintended burns. This desynchronized cached reserves, allowing an attacker to drain ~$1.115M USDT via LABUBI swaps."},{"date":1786233600,"name":"Coreum Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":200000,"chain":["XRPL","Coreum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On August 9, 2026, the Coreum Bridge connecting XRPL and Coreum was exploited via a flaw in its bridge logic, resulting in a loss of approximately $200,000. No dedicated post-mortem has been published."},{"date":1745625600,"name":"Term Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":1650000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Term Finance's tETH oracle update introduced a decimal precision mismatch between oracle components. The incorrect decimal handling caused tETH to be priced incorrectly, triggering unintended liquidations of ~918 ETH as positions were force-closed at wrong prices."},{"date":1728086400,"name":"EigenLayer","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Impersonation Scam","amount":5700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers gained access to email communications about investor token custody, then impersonated the legitimate party to direct EigenLayer team to send 1.67M EIGEN tokens to an attacker-controlled address. The tokens were swapped and moved to CEXs."},{"date":1779148800,"name":"Bankr","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Session Key Compromised","amount":170000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"AI Agent","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Bankr paused on May 19, 2026 after $170K was drained from 14 user wallets on Base. Attackers exploited phishing of session tokens or signing keys to make direct transfer() calls, bypassing token approvals."},{"date":1391731200,"name":"Mt. Gox","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":470000000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Mt. Gox, the world's largest Bitcoin exchange, collapsed when it revealed that 850,000 BTC belonging to customers and the company were missing. The exchange had been incrementally hacked since at least 2011 when attackers gained access to the hot wallet, with hackers siphoning BTC over several years."},{"date":1594425600,"name":"Cashaa","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":3100000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attackers deployed malware on an OTC transaction manager's computer at Cashaa. The malware remained dormant until the employee logged into the system, then initiated 8 separate Bitcoin transfers totaling 335.91 BTC to attacker-controlled wallets across two days."},{"date":1715644800,"name":"Predy Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":464000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Predy Finance's PredyPool contract lacked adequate access control in the take() function, allowing attackers to manipulate the liabilities array and drain liquidity from existing trading pairs via flash loans."},{"date":1789776000,"name":"NuNet","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":462730,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker possessing NuNet’s deployer/mint authority directly called mint() on the NTX token and created 408,532,878.13 unbacked NTX in a single mint. Unlike the related Fetch.ai incident, NuNet’s converter was not the exploited component. Bitquery’s on-chain reconstruction finds that the attacker held the NTX token’s own mint role, allowing the unauthorized supply to be created directly. The same attack cluster compromised multiple project authorization/deployer keys and also drained Fetch.ai’s converter"},{"date":1681171200,"name":"Paribus","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":67800,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3054","language":"Solidity","description":"Paribus was exploited through a reentrancy vulnerability in a Compound V2 fork, where the transfer occurred before storage updates. An attacker used flash loans and the reentrant redeem function to borrow against collateral twice, draining USDT, WBTC, and ETH."},{"date":1682208000,"name":"FilDA","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":700000,"chain":["Elastos","REI Network"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"348","language":"Solidity","description":"FilDA's lending protocol was exploited on the Elastos Smart Chain (ESC) and REI Network on April 23. Attackers exploited abandoned zero-balance asset pools and manipulated deposit/borrow operations to drain approximately $700K. The exploit leveraged the bridging mechanism and targeted deprecated markets that only existed on ESC and REI, which were subsequently halted pending security review."},{"date":1762473600,"name":"DIMO","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":40000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 7, 2025, DIMO token was exploited when a compromised developer key held proxy-upgrade authority over a Wormhole bridge contract with no timelock or multisig. The attacker withdrew 30M DIMO tokens (~3% supply, ~$2.49M), dumped them on the market, then the proxy was reverted and ownership moved to a multisig."},{"date":1745107200,"name":"Bitget","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Market Maker Bot Exploited","amount":100000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2352","language":null,"description":"Bitget's market-making bot on the VOXEL/USDT futures pair malfunctioned on April 20, 2025, entering a predictable buy-low/sell-high loop. Traders exploited the pattern with high leverage to extract ~$100M before Bitget froze accounts and rolled back trades."},{"date":1710201600,"name":"Polyhedra Network","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":760000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5769","language":"Solidity","description":"Polyhedra Network's private key leaked, allowing attackers to drain 1.4M THENA tokens from BNB Chain. Team attributed the breach to human theft rather than smart contract vulnerability; zkBridge security unaffected."},{"date":1788566400,"name":"Secured Finance Lending","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":104000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4197","parentProtocolId":"parent#secured-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers manipulated the market-unit price used to value lending positions by self-trading both sides of Secured Finance’s order book. getMarketUnitPrice() derived its price from blockTotalAmount / blockTotalFutureValue for orders filled in the current block, allowing attacker-controlled trades to push the reported price near par. The resulting inflated lend position was accepted as collateral, enabling assets to be withdrawn from the lending pool. A block-reliability check did not prevent manipulation performed atomically with flash-loaned liquidity"},{"date":1587772800,"name":"Hegic","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Deposit Logic Flaw","amount":28537,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"128","language":"Solidity","description":"Hegic's options contract had a typographical error using options.length instead of optionIDs.length, locking user funds after options expired. The developers ignored security audit warnings from Trail of Bits about critical flaws and rushed the contract to mainnet without fixes. Funds were recovered and users were refunded."},{"date":1787443200,"name":"warp.green","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":93000,"chain":["Chia","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Chialisp","description":"warp.green’s ERC-20 bridge was exploited through a vulnerability in the Chia-side bridge module, resulting in two malicious transactions totaling 93,000 USDC-denominated assets. The attacker subsequently converted the assets to ETH. warp.green said it verified that there were no additional malicious transactions and offered the attacker a 10% white-hat bounty in exchange for returning 90% of the funds within 48 hours"},{"date":1710460800,"name":"NFPrompt","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":3000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7613","language":null,"description":"NFPrompt's treasury and contract administrator wallets compromised, draining treasury and ecosystem fund. ~$3M net realized loss after token price impact; FBI involved; NFP price dropped 13.8% post-breach."},{"date":1616198400,"name":"Turtle Dex","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Liquidity Rug","amount":2500000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"TurtleDex on BSC executed a coordinated rugpull on March 19-20, 2021 days after raising 9K BNB (~$2.5M). Team drained liquidity from PancakeSwap and Ape Swap pools, converted to ETH, and withdrew via Binance."},{"date":1743465600,"name":"Zapper","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum","Optimism","Polygon","Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Zapper's .fi domain registrar was compromised via social engineering of Netim's support team, allowing attackers to redirect traffic to a malicious domain. Users visiting the fake zapper.fi were exposed to credential harvesting and unauthorized transactions. Zapper immediately notified users to use only zapper.xyz while working to recover the domain."},{"date":1743465600,"name":"UPCX","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Proxy Upgrade Hijack","amount":70000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 1, 2025, UPCX payment platform was exploited when an attacker used a compromised private key to upgrade the ProxyAdmin contract, enabling execution of withdrawByAdmin to drain 18.4M UPC tokens (~$70M) from three management accounts."},{"date":1650153600,"name":"Beanstalk","classification":"Governance","technique":"Flashloan Governance Attack","amount":181000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"631","parentProtocolId":"parent#beanstalk","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker flashloaned $1B+ from Aave, Uniswap, and SushiSwap to gain 2/3 governance voting power and execute malicious proposals (Bip18 to drain the protocol, Bip19 to donate to Ukraine as cover), stealing $181M in non-Bean assets."},{"date":1781913600,"name":"JaredFromSubway MEV Bot","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"MEV Bot Drained","amount":7500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 20, 2026, Ethereum's prominent MEV bot JaredFromSubway.eth was drained of $7.5M+ in WETH, USDC, and USDT when an attacker deployed 66 fake token contracts as profitable MEV opportunities. The bot automatically granted large spending approvals to malicious contracts over weeks, which were then swept in a coordinated transaction and laundered through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1788134400,"name":"Aquifer","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":2469729,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6884","language":"Rust","description":"Aquifer allowed the caller to supply the input-side token program used during swaps instead of pinning it to the canonical SPL Token Program. The attacker supplied a malicious program that accepted Aquifer’s CPI transfer instruction and returned success without transferring the required input tokens. Aquifer failed to verify the actual input-token balance increase and consequently released real output tokens from its vaults without receiving payment"},{"date":1776643200,"name":"Thetanuts Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"First Depositor Attack","amount":50000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1085","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 20, 2026 Thetanuts Finance's vault contract on Ethereum was exploited for $50,000 via a first-depositor inflation flaw: an attacker minted 1 share, donated 1,000 ETH directly to the contract, then redeemed the share for nearly all vault assets when the next user deposited."},{"date":1466121600,"name":"The DAO","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":60000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The DAO hack of June 17, 2016 was the first major Ethereum reentrancy attack. Attacker recursively called splitDAO before balance updates, extracting 3.6M ETH (~$60M)."},{"date":1738022400,"name":"DogWifTools","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Stored Publicly","amount":10000000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Move","description":"DogWifTools, a Solana rug-pull generator tool, was compromised via supply chain attack. Attackers gained control of the GitHub repository token and inserted malware into versions 1.6.3-1.6.6. Updates delivered malicious updater.exe files that acted as Remote Access Trojans, stealing cryptocurrency wallet private keys and extracting $10M from users."},{"date":1733270400,"name":"Vestra DAO","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Staking Logic Flaw","amount":500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On December 4, 2024, Vestra DAO's staking contract was exploited less than a month after launch when the unStake() function failed to validate whether a position was still active. The attacker repeatedly extracted rewards from already-unstaked positions, stealing 73.7 million VSTR tokens (~$500K)."},{"date":1785196800,"name":"Crypto DAO","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":8200000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 28, 2026, an unprotected exec() function in Crypto DAO's vault on BNB Chain allowed any caller to execute transfers, draining $8.2M USDT."},{"date":1781654400,"name":"DIP","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":111000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"DIP token on BSC was exploited on June 17, 2026 when missing return statement in _transfer function caused swap transactions through PancakeSwap to execute twice, allowing attacker to manipulate pool prices."},{"date":1657497600,"name":"Uniswap (Phishing Attack)","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":8000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On July 11, 2022, a phishing campaign targeted Uniswap users by airdropping a malicious ERC20 token to 73,399 UNI holders, promising a $2K airdrop. When users interacted with the token to claim it, they signed malicious approvals granting the attacker access to their Uniswap V3 LP tokens. The attacker siphoned 7,574 ETH (~$8M) and moved 7,500 ETH through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1787356800,"name":"TAC","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":7500000,"chain":["TAC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#tac","language":"Go","description":"An attacker exploited a vulnerability in the shared Cosmos EVM precompile layer and transferred 2,985,651,403 TAC from a single account to another account without authorization. TAC states that the incident was a drain rather than a mint: no new TAC was created and total supply remained unchanged. The network was halted at block 24,671,475 to contain the incident"},{"date":1722988800,"name":"Nexera","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":449000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers compromised Nexera's token contract credentials via BeaverTail malware on an employee machine, then transferred 47.24M NXRA. They sold 14.75M tokens for ~$449K before Nexera paused the contract and zeroed the remaining 32.5M."},{"date":1709769600,"name":"GHT","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"GHT smart contract exploited via business logic flaw. Proof-of-concept documented in DeFiHackLabs but specific vulnerability mechanism and loss amount not publicly detailed."},{"date":1603670400,"name":"Harvest Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":24000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"112","language":"Solidity","description":"Harvest Finance exploited October 26, 2020 for $24-34M via Curve oracle manipulation. Attacker deployed $50M flashloan to skew the Curve y-pool USDT/USDC balance, then repeatedly minted fTokens at depressed valuation and redeemed at normal price (~30 times in 7 minutes)."},{"date":1702252800,"name":"Venus Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":274000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Venus's snBNB oracle experienced a malfunction where Binance Oracle fed an incorrect price (snBNB spiked to $77B), allowing an attacker to buy snBNB at thin liquidity and trigger unintended liquidations. The protocol incurred a shortfall of ~$274K."},{"date":1745625600,"name":"Loopscale","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":5800000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"Loopscale was exploited two weeks after launch when an attacker manipulated RateX PT token pricing to obtain undercollateralized loans, draining 5.7M USDC and 1,200 SOL."},{"date":1605484800,"name":"CheeseBank","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":3300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 6, 2020, CheeseBank was exploited for $3.3M via price oracle manipulation. The attacker borrowed 21,000 ETH via dYdX flashloan, purchased Cheese tokens on Uniswap to pump the price, deposited LP tokens, and borrowed all available stablecoins (USDC/USDT/DAI) against the inflated collateral."},{"date":1676851200,"name":"Dexible V2","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":2047635,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2249","language":"Solidity","description":"Dexible V2's selfSwap function lacked router validation, allowing attacker to call token contracts with transferFrom targeting accounts with Dexible approvals, draining $2.047M from 17 user wallets."},{"date":1636243200,"name":"ChainSwap","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Caller Impersonation","amount":4400000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"ChainSwap bridge suffered an access control vulnerability in its cross-chain quota code. The attacker exploited a logical flaw that allowed invalid, non-whitelisted addresses to bypass authorization, take control of target projects' BSC contracts, and mint tokens directly to the attacker's address for sale."},{"date":1645142400,"name":"Rigoblock","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":464000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3002","language":"Solidity","description":"RigoBlock's Dragos contracts lacked the onlyOwner modifier on the setMultipleAllowances function, allowing attackers to modify token allowances without authorization. An attacker exploited this to drain 160.86 ETH from the protocol's liquidity pools. The attacker later returned 90% of funds, retaining 10% as a bounty."},{"date":1684800000,"name":"LunaFi","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":35000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2424","language":"Solidity","description":"LunaFi's reward claiming mechanism lacked a time lock in the claimRewards() function, allowing an attacker to repeatedly claim rewards using a malicious contract. The vulnerability enabled depositing, claiming, and withdrawing within a single transaction, generating profits while depleting the reward pool."},{"date":1744761600,"name":"R0AR","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":780000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"R0ARStaking contract contained a backdoor embedded by an external developer during deployment. The backdoor directly modified storage slots to set a falsified balance for the attacker's address, which was then extracted using the emergency withdrawal function."},{"date":1638921600,"name":"8ightDAO","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":1750000,"chain":["Harmony"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"889","language":null,"description":"On December 6, 2021, 8ight Finance (Harmony-based OHM fork) lost ~$1.75M from treasury when admin private keys transmitted via unencrypted channels (Facebook group, Google Drive) were compromised."},{"date":1782000000,"name":"Quicksilver Zone","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Unbacked Mint","amount":3500,"chain":["Quicksilver"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Go","description":"On June 21, 2026, Quicksilver Zone was exploited via unchecked ZK proof verification in the minting function. An OLPC token owner had previously set malicious parameters and renounced ownership, allowing an attacker to forge proofs and mint ~505K unbacked qATOM and ~10M qOSMO."},{"date":1778544000,"name":"IEXCBP","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":97000,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"IEXCBP's reward withdrawal logic valued USD-denominated rewards using Pancake's live spot price quotes. An attacker flash-loaned WBNB and USDT, posted WBNB as collateral on Venus to borrow larger USDT amounts, then recycled capital through helper accounts interacting with IEXCBP. Each attacker-driven IEX token sale affected subsequent accounts' payout calculations, allowing complete reward pool draining through Pancake spot price manipulation."},{"date":1658707200,"name":"LPC","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":45000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"LPC's _transfer function incorrectly calculated balances when sender and recipient addresses were the same. Attackers used a flashloan to exploit this logic error and extract value."},{"date":1733184000,"name":"BYC Token","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Fee Accounting","amount":100000,"chain":["Binance"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BYC token on BSC was exploited through a vulnerability in its autoBurnLiquidity function. The attacker manipulated the lpBurnFrequency parameter by performing large USDT-for-BYC swaps to inflate the parameter value, then called autoBurnLiquidity to reduce the BYC reserve to 1, enabling drainage of all USDT from the liquidity pool."},{"date":1792281600,"name":"Coffer","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":0.7,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7798","language":null,"description":"Coffer’s BTC pool incorrectly rounded tiny deposits to zero while still minting LP tokens, allowing an attacker to repeatedly obtain shares without providing equivalent assets. The attacker submitted thousands of minimal deposits, diluting existing liquidity providers and minting approximately $18 in illegitimate LP tokens. Coffer paused its pools on October 18, preventing further withdrawals, and deployed a fix on October 19"},{"date":1751414400,"name":"Future Protocol","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":4600000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 2, 2025, Future Protocol (FPC) on Binance Smart Chain was exploited via a flash loan attack combined with token burn manipulation. The attacker borrowed 23M USDT, swapped it all for FPC to manipulate the pool price, then leveraged the tokenomics that burned FPC from the pool to create a price imbalance and extract approximately $4.6 million."},{"date":1576281600,"name":"VeChain","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":6500000,"chain":["VeChain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Layer 1","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"VeChain's buyback wallet was compromised on December 13, 2019, at 12:27 AM GMT, resulting in theft of 1.1B VET tokens (~$6.5M). Internal misconduct was suspected, with a trojan-infected machine containing keylogging software enabling attacker access to private keys. The VeChain Foundation issued an emergency patch causing Authority Masternodes to vote and freeze the stolen funds. On December 30, the community voted to permanently destroy 727M of the frozen VET."},{"date":1788566400,"name":"Dream Health Chain","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":71800,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A flaw in Dream Health Chain’s award state machine allowed the same fixed award to be claimed repeatedly. createAward() recorded a reward without reserving collateral for that award, while participateAward() allowed an already claimed award (status=2) to be reset to claimable (status=1). The attacker repeatedly reset and reclaimed awards for as little as a 0–1 wei transfer, draining funds from the contract’s shared proxy balance"},{"date":1762128000,"name":"Balancer V2","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":128000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum","Base","Polygon","Sonic","Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2611","parentProtocolId":"parent#balancer","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 3, 2025, Balancer V2's Composable Stable Pools were exploited for $128M via a rounding-down flaw in batchSwap invariant calculation. Minuscule discrepancies in each transaction compounded across rapid successive swaps, gradually deflating pool reserves across chains."},{"date":1643328000,"name":"Qubit","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":80000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"516","language":"Solidity","description":"On January 27-28, 2022 an attacker drained $80 million from Qubit Finance's QBridge cross-chain bridge by calling the deposit function with a zero address token and no ETH, exploiting improper use of call() instead of SafeERC20 verification to bypass input validation. The attacker minted 77,162 qXETH and borrowed $37.6M in wETH, $28.5M in BTC-B, and stablecoins."},{"date":1667779200,"name":"MooCAKECTX","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":140000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 7, 2022, MooCAKECTX on BSC was exploited via a flashloan attack targeting the reward settlement logic, where the attacker borrowed 50,000 CAKE, pledged twice in the same transaction without reward settlement, and withdrew to profit approximately $143,921. The contract failed to settle previous rewards before reinvesting."},{"date":1608768000,"name":"Livecoin","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"API Key Compromised","amount":3300000,"chain":["Multiple"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attacker gained control of Livecoin's backend servers and nodes via compromised credentials. Once in control, hackers manipulated exchange rates to absurd levels (Bitcoin to $450K, ETH to $15K) and drained multiple assets from hot wallets. The exchange shut down permanently and never recovered."},{"date":1744934400,"name":"Numa","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":506000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Numa on Arbitrum was exploited when the protocol's cNuma collateral valuation logic lacked protection against spot price manipulation. The attacker flash-minted nuBTC to artificially inflate synthetic liabilities and deflate collateral valuations."},{"date":1758585600,"name":"Seedify","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":1200000,"chain":["BSC","Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1511","language":"Solidity","description":"On September 23, 2025 at 12:05 UTC, attackers linked to North Korean 'Contagious Interview' operation used a compromised developer key to reconfigure Seedify's Avalanche bridge contract, enabling unauthorized SFUND minting across Ethereum, Arbitrum, and Base. The attacker sold ~$1.2M on BNB Chain before ~$200K was frozen at an exchange."},{"date":1761782400,"name":"Garden","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":11400000,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum","Base","Solana"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4086","language":null,"description":"On October 30, 2025, one of Garden Finance's solvers was compromised, enabling an attacker to control cross-chain interactions and drain over $10M in a coordinated exploit across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, and Solana."},{"date":1747353600,"name":"Demex","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":950559,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Demex's Nitron lending market was exploited via donation-based oracle manipulation targeting a deprecated dGLP vault. An attacker donated a small amount of fsGLP to inflate the GLP redemption rate, which Nitron's oracle accepted as accurate pricing for dGLP. The attacker then used the falsely inflated dGLP value as collateral to borrow legitimate assets."},{"date":1758672000,"name":"GriffinAI","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Cross-Chain Message Spoofing","amount":3000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"GriffinAI on BSC lost $3M on September 24, 2025 when misconfigured LayerZero peer validation let attacker initialize a fake peer on Ethereum and mint 5B unauthorized GAIN tokens on BSC. Attacker swapped ~150M tokens before GAIN crashed 90%."},{"date":1720742400,"name":"Dough Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":1960000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5109","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 12, 2024 Dough Finance on Ethereum was exploited for approximately $1.96 million via unvalidated call data in the ConnectorDeleverageParaswap contract, where attackers combined a flashloan with the arbitrary external call vulnerability to manipulate data and transfer WETH. Stolen funds were swapped to ETH and 600 ETH (~$1.8M) was later deposited into Tornado Cash; a white-hat recovered 69.12 ETH."},{"date":1566000000,"name":"CoinTiger (PTT)","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":9200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"CoinTiger's cold wallet was breached on July 1, 2019, but the theft was only announced on August 17, 47 days later. Attackers stole 401,981,748 PTT tokens (~$9.2M), which they distributed across markets (120M PTT entered trading, causing the price to crash nearly 100%) while 280M were frozen by the Proton Chain project. CoinTiger's lack of multi-signature security on cold storage enabled the compromise."},{"date":1777248000,"name":"ZetaChain","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":333868,"chain":["Ethereum","Base","Polygon","Arbitrum","Avalanche","BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4556","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 26-27, 2026, ZetaChain's GatewayZEVM contract was exploited due to missing access control in call() and unrestricted external calls in GatewayEVM.execute(). Attacker drained $333,868 in USDC/USDT across four chains from team wallets by leveraging standing token approvals."},{"date":1651622400,"name":"MM Finance Cronos","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":2000000,"chain":["Cronos"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1028","parentProtocolId":"parent#mm-finance","language":null,"description":"On May 4, 2022, MM.Finance's DNS infrastructure was compromised, allowing attackers to inject a malicious contract address. Users interacting with swap, add liquidity, or remove liquidity functions had their funds siphoned to the attacker's wallet. Approximately $2M in CRO was stolen and laundered through Tornado Cash to OKX."},{"date":1677456000,"name":"LaunchZone","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":700000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On February 27, 2023, LaunchZone on BSC suffered a $700,000 exploit via missing access control on the transferFrom() function in the Bscex SwapX contract. The attacker manipulated LZ token prices and executed arbitrary token transfers from liquidity pools."},{"date":1692835200,"name":"GSS","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":25000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 24, 2023, GSS token on BSC was exploited via a vulnerability in its _transfer() function. An attacker flash-loaned 30,000 BUSDT from DODO and swapped to 725,246 GSS tokens. By transferring tokens to specific pair addresses and calling skim(), the attacker caused 707,162 tokens to be withdrawn twice from the liquidity pool, an arithmetic error in the custom transfer logic."},{"date":1780963200,"name":"NovaBox","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":107000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 9, 2026, NovaBox suffered a timing flaw where dividend calculations executed before stake balance updates were finalized, allowing an attacker to claim phantom dividends and drain 99.86% of the reward pool (~$107K)."},{"date":1725926400,"name":"Caterpillar Coin","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1400000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On September 10, 2024, the CUT token on BSC was exploited via a flashloan attack that manipulated its price on PancakeSwap. The attacker used flash-loaned USDT to repeatedly add and remove liquidity, earning rewards based on inflated CUT prices, then drained the pair for approximately $1.4M with 99% slippage."},{"date":1778371200,"name":"Renegade","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Uninitialized Proxy","amount":209000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":209000,"defillamaId":"5103","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 10, 2026, Renegade V1 on Arbitrum was exploited for $209K via unprotected initializer function and proxy version counter desynchronization. Attacker injected malicious logic via delegatecall to drain 27 ERC-20 tokens; whitehat recovered ~$190K within 45 minutes."},{"date":1749945600,"name":"FixedTokenBSwap","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":2200,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"FixedTokenBSwap swap contract was exploited on June 15, 2025 via attacker-supplied path parameters combined with a fake token's transferFrom bypass, circumventing the on-chain price check and allowing extraction of fixed RTV amounts per transaction."},{"date":1726444800,"name":"WXETA","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Uninitialized Proxy","amount":110000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On September 16, 2024, an attacker reinitialized the WXETA contract through its unguarded initialize function, granted themselves minting permissions, and drained USDT/WXETA liquidity pools for $110,000."},{"date":1604016000,"name":"EtherCrash","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":2500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"EtherCrash's cold wallet, claimed to be the most mature Ethereum gambling game, was compromised on October 27. Two large withdrawals totaling ~$2.5M were made and exchanged to DAI on Uniswap. The single-key wallet design left it vulnerable with no recovery options."},{"date":1752537600,"name":"Arcadia V2","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":2500000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4455","parentProtocolId":"parent#arcadia-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 15, 2025, Arcadia V2 RebalancerSpot was exploited through an unvalidated router address parameter. Attacker registered a malicious router, flash-loaned $1.5B from Morpho Blue, bypassed health checks, and drained LP positions for $2.5M-$3.6M profit."},{"date":1698019200,"name":"Maestro","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":465000,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"A vulnerability in the Maestro Router 2 contract behind a Telegram trading bot allowed attackers to execute arbitrary external calls, pulling tokens from user wallets that had granted the router approvals. Maestro identified and fixed the exploit within about 30 minutes and paused trading."},{"date":1463184000,"name":"Gatecoin","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Between May 9-12, 2016, Hong Kong-based Gatecoin suffered a breach where attackers exploited a server reboot disruption to reroute deposits from cold multi-signature wallets to a vulnerable hot wallet. Approximately 250 BTC and 185,000 ETH (~$2M) were stolen, representing 15% of exchange assets."},{"date":1782345600,"name":"Ocean Protocol","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Deposit Logic Flaw","amount":127861,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Ocean Protocol's SideStaking-managed BPool clones on Polygon were exploited via asymmetric join/exit math. An attacker flash-borrowed mOCEAN tokens, cycled them through eight BPool clones, and extracted a net profit by exploiting the single-sided liquidity operation calculations."},{"date":1424131200,"name":"BTER","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":1750000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BTER's cold wallet storage system was breached, resulting in the theft of 7,170 BTC. The fact that offline cold storage was compromised suggested a possible insider threat, though the full mechanism was never disclosed. The exchange suspended operations immediately."},{"date":1713139200,"name":"Grand Base","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":1700000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 15, 2024, Grand Base, a real-world asset tokenization platform on Base, was exploited when a developer PC was hacked, exposing the deployer wallet with token minting and LP control. The attacker minted 808.57 ETH worth of GB tokens (~$1.7-2.5M) and sold them, causing a >99% price crash."},{"date":1789776000,"name":"MultiversX","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":0,"chain":["MultiversX"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#elrond","language":"Go","description":"An attacker exploited a VM-level atomicity issue in MultiversX that allowed invalid state changes to occur because of an order-of-operations error in edge cases. Validators paused network progression to contain the incident. MultiversX prepared a protocol correction and coordinated hard-fork recovery from a known-good checkpoint. A September 23 restart attempt failed because insufficient Shard 1 validators synchronized and transitioned into the new epoch within the activation window, so the mainnet remained paused while recovery software was updated for another restart attempt"},{"date":1677456000,"name":"MyAlgo","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"CDN Compromise","amount":9200000,"chain":["Algorand"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"JavaScript","description":"Between February 19-21, 2023, MyAlgo wallet on Algorand suffered a breach where 19.5M ALGO and 3.5M USDC (~$9.6M) were stolen from high-value accounts. The root cause was unclear: either the website was compromised to exfiltrate private keys or users' seed phrases were compromised via phishing. ChangeNow froze an additional $1.5M."},{"date":1637280000,"name":"Phantom Galaxies","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":1100000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Hackers compromised Phantom Galaxies' Discord server using malware that bypassed 2FA on admin accounts. Attackers created a fake NFT minting page charging 0.1 ETH as a 'minting fee' that directed funds to their wallet. In three hours, fraudsters stole 265 ETH before Animoca Brands discovered and halted the scam, later covering all losses."},{"date":1792627200,"name":"WAX Multi-Chain Bridge","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":90500,"chain":["Solana","Ethereum","WAX"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"WAX’s eth.token::withdraw function failed to validate that max_fee was nonnegative. By setting max_fee = -quantity, the attacker reduced the total account debit to zero while retaining the full withdrawal amount. Because the configured withdrawal fee was zero, the fee check did not reject the transaction. The resulting withdrawal logs triggered real payouts from the bridge on Solana and Ethereum"},{"date":1718323200,"name":"AutoChain Global","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":113000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"AutoChain Global smart contract was exploited on June 14, 2024, resulting in ~$113K in losses. Technical details of the vulnerability remain limited in public sources."},{"date":1754956800,"name":"Odin.Fun","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":7000000,"chain":["ICP"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Motoko","description":"On August 12-13, 2025 Odin.Fun (Bitcoin-based memecoin launchpad on ICP) lost 58.2 BTC (~$7 million) to attackers who deposited worthless tokens (SATOSHI, ODINPEPE), used overweighted deposits and self-trading to artificially inflate token value in the protocol's internal AMM logic (which lacked external oracle validation), and drained the pool."},{"date":1638403200,"name":"Badger DAO","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"CDN Compromise","amount":120000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"173","language":null,"description":"On December 2, 2021, Badger DAO suffered a $120M hack when an attacker used a compromised Cloudflare API key to inject malicious code into the frontend. Users unknowingly approved token transfers via spoofed UI, allowing the attacker to drain approximately 2,100 BTC and 151 ETH from ~200 accounts."},{"date":1614902400,"name":"Paid Network","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":27000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"PAID Network's token contract was compromised on March 5, 2021 when an attacker gained access to the deployment wallet's private key. The attacker upgraded the contract to enable unlimited token minting, creating 59.4M unauthorized PAID tokens."},{"date":1524355200,"name":"BeautyChain","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 22, 2018, BeautyChain token suffered an integer overflow in the batchTransfer function, allowing attackers to generate 10^58 BEC tokens. Though face value was astronomical, the actual loss was limited by exchanges halting BEC/SMT trading on April 25 in response to the vulnerability."},{"date":1651363200,"name":"Rari Capital","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":80000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"136","language":"Solidity","description":"Rari Capital's Fuse lending pools were exploited via a reentrancy vulnerability in exitMarket() when an attacker used a Balancer flashloan to deposit collateral, then recursively borrowed assets and withdrew collateral before borrow records were updated, stealing approximately 28,380 ETH and related assets."},{"date":1583971200,"name":"MakerDAO","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Stale Oracle Price","amount":8320000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"During the March 12 ETH crash (43% in one day), the Maker Medianizer oracle failed to update due to network congestion and high gas fees, leaving the system with stale prices. Liquidators exploited this by bidding zero DAI for collateral worth millions, acquiring 62K ETH for free. 36% of liquidations resulted in zero-bid auctions, causing a $6M DAI shortfall and $4M bad debt before governance intervention."},{"date":1774051200,"name":"Resolv USR","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":24500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5655","parentProtocolId":"parent#resolv","language":"Solidity","description":"Resolv's AWS KMS-hosted SERVICE_ROLE private key was compromised, enabling the minting of 80M unbacked USR stablecoins. The attacker swapped USR to wstUSR and then to ETH, extracting $24.5M before the protocol depeg."},{"date":1716940800,"name":"MetaDragon","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":181000,"chain":["BNB"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MetaDragon's NFT contract lacked ownership verification on minted NFTs, allowing attackers to claim and convert over 4,000 NFTs belonging to other users. The attacker sold the stolen META tokens for 321.5 BNB."},{"date":1500336000,"name":"CoinDash","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Frontend Compromise","amount":7700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"ICO","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"CoinDash's ICO website was compromised on July 17-18, 2017 within 13 minutes of launch. Attacker replaced the deposit address with their own; 2,000+ investors sent 37K ETH (~$7M) to the attacker before the ICO was pulled. Hacker retained ~13.4K ETH (~$11.7M)."},{"date":1742256000,"name":"four.meme","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":80000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5174","language":"Solidity","description":"Four.Meme's launch feature improperly restricted token transfers before public listing. An attacker used a low-level function to bypass MODE_TRANSFER_RESTRICTED, creating unauthorized trading pairs for pre-launch tokens and extracting liquidity at attacker-controlled prices."},{"date":1545177600,"name":"EOS Max","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"EOS Max gambling DApp was exploited via a rollback attack on December 19, 2018, where attackers used EOS's blacklist functionality to revert blockchain transactions after betting outcomes were determined. The attack allowed players to recover bets even after losing. Multiple EOS gambling DApps were targeted simultaneously via this vector."},{"date":1713916800,"name":"XBridge","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1440000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"XBridge cross-chain bridge built by SaitaChain was exploited on April 24, 2024 on Ethereum and BNB Chain when unprotected listToken and withdrawTokens functions allowed attacker to register as token owner and drain bridge-held assets."},{"date":1717113600,"name":"DMM Bitcoin","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":305000000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":305000000,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On May 31, 2024, DMM Bitcoin lost 48 billion yen ($305M) in bitcoin when North Korean Lazarus Group attackers compromised an employee, intercepted legitimate transactions, and drained the hot wallet. The exchange ultimately shut down and transferred to SBI VC Trade."},{"date":1785369600,"name":"Swan Treasury","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":625000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 30, 2026 an attacker used Swan Treasury's leaked off-chain signer key to generate valid signatures with the discount parameter set to 1, buying ~687,000 STY on BNB Chain at roughly 1/100 of intended price using a ~19,700 USDT PancakeSwap flash loan, then dumping the tokens for a ~$625K protocol loss."},{"date":1569628800,"name":"Chain Fusion","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":6400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3948","language":"Solidity","description":"Fusion's swap wallet (0x8e6bDa71f3f0F49dDD29969De79aFCFac4457379) was compromised on September 28, 2019, with attackers stealing 10M native FSN and 3.5M ERC20 FSN tokens (~$6.4M total). Investigation determined the private key was stolen and suggested potential inside involvement. Some stolen tokens were wash-traded across exchanges before being frozen, causing FSN price to crash 50% within hours."},{"date":1719014400,"name":"BtcTurk","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":54000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BtcTurk lost $54-55M on June 22, 2024 when attackers compromised private keys to 10 hot wallets targeting Avalanche holdings. Binance froze $5.3M of recovered funds."},{"date":1604620800,"name":"Ledger","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":271000,"chain":["Multiple"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Phishing campaign targeting Ledger users with fake data-breach alert emails claiming security compromise and urging firmware updates. Attackers used Punycode domain spoofing (e.g., ledģėr.com) to disguise malicious URLs and trick users into compromising their hardware wallet recovery phrases."},{"date":1776643200,"name":"Transit Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":257800,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Transit Finance, a cross-chain aggregation protocol, suffered an exploit draining approximately $257.8K via an unauthenticated swap callback mechanism. The exploit allowed unauthorized parties to trigger callback functions during swap operations without proper authorization, enabling fund extraction from the protocol."},{"date":1731196800,"name":"BGM","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":450000,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 10, 2024, BGM token on BNB Chain was exploited via a price manipulation attack. The contract's reliance on spot price allowed the attacker to manipulate the price oracle and extract over $450K."},{"date":1714176000,"name":"BNBX","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":null,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 27, 2024, the BNBX token on BSC was exploited via a precision loss vulnerability in arithmetic operations, allowing attackers to manipulate token accounting and extract value. The exact amount extracted was not publicly disclosed."},{"date":1744588800,"name":"KiloEx","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":7500000,"chain":["BSC","Base","Taiko"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":6750000,"defillamaId":"3329","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 14, 2025, at 18:53 UTC, KiloEx was exploited for $7.5M via ETH/USD price oracle manipulation across Base, BSC, and opBNB. The attacker opened positions at artificially low prices and closed at real high prices without the oracle system validating feed freshness or enforcing rate limits."},{"date":1670025600,"name":"Ratio Finance","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Key Brute Forced","amount":null,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1841","language":"Rust","description":"On December 3, 2022, Ratio Finance on Solana experienced a developer private key compromise. Attacker accessed protocol accounts and drained user collateral; exact loss not specified. Incident disclosed January 17, 2023."},{"date":1790208000,"name":"Duelbits","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":7000000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Bitcoin","Tron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gambling Platform","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Duelbits suffered unauthorized transfers from hot wallets across Ethereum, BSC, Bitcoin, and Tron. Stolen assets were rapidly moved, bridged and largely consolidated into ETH and DAI on Ethereum. Duelbits took its platform offline while investigating and stated that user funds were safe. Security researchers suspect compromise of hot-wallet private keys, but Duelbits has not yet published a technical root cause"},{"date":1541980800,"name":"AurumCoin","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Risk Parameter Abuse","amount":500000,"chain":["AurumCoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Layer 1","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"AurumCoin suffered a 51% attack in November 2018 where an attacker gained majority network hashpower. The attacker performed a double-spend attack, sending 15,752.26 AU to the Cryptopia exchange worth approximately $500,000, selling them for other cryptocurrencies, then rolling back the transaction. The attack rendered the blockchain inactive as of November 29, 2018."},{"date":1666656000,"name":"ULME","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":250000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 25, 2022, ULME on BSC was exploited via a parameter validation flaw that lacked access control, allowing an attacker to use a flashloan, iterate through authorized spenders, drain their BUSD, manipulate ULME price, and extract approximately 50,646 BUSD (~$250K) before repaying the loan."},{"date":1767225600,"name":"PRXVT","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Staking Logic Flaw","amount":97000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On January 1, 2026, attacker exploited PRXVT staking contract on Base via Sybil attack; deployed numerous CREATE2 addresses to bypass per-address limits and farm rewards, draining 32.8 ETH (~$97K). No cost/identity constraints protected the per-address logic."},{"date":1624147200,"name":"Polydex","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":500000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"396","language":"Solidity","description":"A reentrancy vulnerability in the PLX Locker smart contract exploiting ERC777 token callbacks allowed an attacker to recursively call withdraw functions and drain 500K worth of assets. The attacker bridged stolen funds to Ethereum before the team could patch the timelock-delayed fix."},{"date":1547424000,"name":"Cryptopia","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":16000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On January 14, 2019, Cryptopia's hot wallet private keys were compromised, enabling theft of approximately 10 percent of platform holdings in ERC-20 tokens across 17,000 customer accounts."},{"date":1693612800,"name":"DAppSocial","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":16000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"DAppSocial's lockTokens() function lacked validation that tokens were actually transferred, allowing an attacker to call deposit and create_deposit_record without sending funds. The attacker deployed a helper contract, deposited 2 USDT, set lock duration to 0, and withdrew without depositing tokens, exploiting the broken balance check."},{"date":1622937600,"name":"Fetch.ai","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":2600000,"chain":["Multiple"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Unknown fraudsters gained access to Fetch.ai's Binance account and sold FET tokens at significantly reduced prices to associated entities for profitable resale. On June 6, 2021, approximately 2.6M USD worth of tokens were extracted. Fetch.ai successfully obtained a London High Court order requiring Binance to trace and freeze the attacker's accounts."},{"date":1673913600,"name":"OmniEstate","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":70705,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On January 17, 2023, the OMNI Real Estate Token (ORT) staking pool on BSC was exploited due to insufficient parameter validation. The StakingPool contract's _Check_reward function returned an incorrect value when durations was 0. An attacker invested 1 Wei with durations set to 0, bypassing verification, and repeatedly called withdrawAndClaim to extract 236 BNB (~$70.7K)."},{"date":1631664000,"name":"NowSwap","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":1069000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"NowSwap DEX on Ethereum was exploited on September 15, 2021 when K constant value mismatch (updated in 2 of 3 code locations during upgrade) allowed attacker to swap 1 wei for 98% of pool reserves."},{"date":1782259200,"name":"DLMC","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":222600,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"DLMC on BSC was exploited via flash loan price manipulation. The attacker used a flash loan to manipulate the protocol's internal token price, allowing redemption of referral rewards at an inflated rate. Referral rewards were minted and immediately sellable, providing efficient value extraction without holding positions."},{"date":1648252800,"name":"Auctus","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":726000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"216","language":"Solidity","description":"Auctus options protocol had a beta contract allowing arbitrary low-level calls with controlled calldata. An attacker exploited this to drain approved user funds from wallets, targeting those who had granted unlimited approval to the contract."},{"date":1729728000,"name":"Ramses Exchange","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":93000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Ramses' reward distribution mechanism failed to decrease tokenTotalSupplyByPeriod after reward claims, allowing attackers to claim rewards repeatedly across multiple NFT positions and drain accumulated incentives and fees."},{"date":1706140800,"name":"Saga","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":65800,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4639","language":null,"description":"Saga DAO, a community-run fan club for Solana's mobile phone, lost ~$60,000 (750 SOL) when zkRedDevil's personal wallet was compromised, allowing unauthorized drainage of both personal and DAO treasury funds. The multisig wallet had never been properly activated, requiring only 1 of 12 confirmations for fund transfers."},{"date":1780272000,"name":"Gnosis Pay","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":1500000,"chain":["Gnosis Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7364","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 1, 2026, Gnosis Pay's Zodiac modules were exploited via a flawed ERC-1271 signature verification check that failed to validate contract call success. The attack affected 5,281 wallets, but Gnosis detected it within 2 hours and refunded users 100%."},{"date":1774656000,"name":"VTSwapHook","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":null,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"VTSwapHook on Uniswap V4 was exploited through a pricing curve approximation error where the hook used midpoint averages instead of proper logarithmic curve integration, combined with fee accounting bugs that inflated virtual reserves."},{"date":1787961600,"name":"Full Sail","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":null,"chain":["Sui"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6413","language":"Move","description":"Full Sail’s automated vaults suffered losses following abnormal or compromised Switchboard oracle data on Sui. Full Sail uses Switchboard as an external oracle and has safeguards intended to cross-check oracle prices against on-chain pool prices, but it has not yet disclosed how the compromised feed bypassed or interacted with those protections"},{"date":1777593600,"name":"Sharwa.Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":32850,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6876","language":"Solidity","description":"Sharwa.Finance lost $32.85K on May 1, 2026 on Arbitrum via oracle price manipulation. Attack leveraged incorrect oracle price data to extract value from the protocol."},{"date":1794787200,"name":"Lighter Perps","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"API Key Compromised","amount":10393057,"chain":["zkLighter"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6751","parentProtocolId":"parent#lighter","language":null,"description":"On November 16, 2026, an attacker exploited a leaked API key belonging to a trader on Lighter, enabling unauthorized activity that resulted in the withdrawal of approximately 10.39 million USDC from the platform. The stolen funds were transferred to an attacker-controlled Ethereum wallet, exchanged for ETH through CoW Swap, and partially routed to Hyperliquid. Lighter confirmed that its protocol and smart contracts were not compromised, temporarily suspended withdrawals and liquidity pool creation, and activated Guardian mode to prevent further unauthorized withdrawals. An additional attempted withdrawal remained under investigation, with the full scope and recovery status unconfirmed"},{"date":1787011200,"name":"Maya Protocol","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":1700000,"chain":["Mayachain"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3791","language":"Go","description":"A multi-bug interaction in MayaChain’s outbound/slashing and pool-accounting flow caused a staged ARB.LINK pool to be credited with approximately 49.45M CACAO that was never actually transferred into the pool. Multiple messages sharing one native transaction ID caused the final DONATE message to overwrite outbound tracking state, making legitimate LINK outbounds appear missing. MayaChain consequently treated them as unauthorized vault outbounds and invoked slashing. During the resulting subsidy calculation, pool state was updated with an uncapped CACAO credit before the corresponding Reserve-to-Asgard transfer was attempted. That transfer failed because the Reserve lacked sufficient CACAO, but the inflated pool state was not rolled back. The attacker then added liquidity to the effectively asset-empty ARB.LINK pool, obtained nearly all pool ownership, and withdrew approximately 48.87M CACAO from Asgard liquidity"},{"date":1692057600,"name":"RocketSwap Base","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":865000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3314","language":"Solidity","description":"RocketSwap's farm contract on Base was drained of 471 ETH ($865K) when attackers used brute force to compromise server-hosted private keys and gain control of the proxy contract with overly permissive transfer permissions."},{"date":1783296000,"name":"BonkDAO","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":20000000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"On July 6, 2026, attacker purchased enough BONK to control ~99.88% of governance votes, then passed proposal BIP #76 to drain 4.43T BONK from treasury. Missing timelocks and 1% quorum threshold enabled the attack."},{"date":1700611200,"name":"Heco Bridge","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":86600000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 22, 2023, the HECO Chain bridge to Ethereum was drained of $86.6M when the operator's account was compromised, enabling unauthorized asset withdrawals."},{"date":1629849600,"name":"Dot.Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":429724,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 25, 2021, Dot.Finance on BSC was exploited via a flash loan attack that manipulated the VaultPinkBNB contract's token pricing. The attacker injected Cake tokens to inflate the performanceFee parameter, enabling the mintFor function to create excessive pink tokens worth approximately $429.7K."},{"date":1713139200,"name":"Chainge Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":716000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"704","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 15, 2024, ChaingeFinance on BSC was exploited via arbitrary external call in the swap function. Both the target contract and callData parameters were controllable, allowing attackers to execute unauthorized transferFrom calls on victim accounts, draining all approved tokens."},{"date":1774224000,"name":"BCE","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":679000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BCE token's flawed burn mechanism was exploited to manipulate AMM reserves via malicious contracts that triggered burns inside the PancakeSwap pool, distorting the BCE-USDT balance and enabling reserve extraction."},{"date":1795046400,"name":"CALC","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":26900,"chain":["Ethereum","Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2439","language":null,"description":"CALC reported that its operational treasury was almost entirely drained during the Web3Auth/Keplr social-login wallet compromise. A vulnerability in Web3Auth's legacy infrastructure exposed wallet signing credentials, enabling unauthorized withdrawals from affected accounts. CALC used a Keplr hot wallet to fund its off-chain infrastructure expenses and reported losing 99.9888% of its treasury, with only a small amount identified by the recovery operation"},{"date":1424217600,"name":"KipCoin","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":728000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"KipCoin's Linode-hosted servers were compromised when attackers gained access to the wallet.dat file in May 2014. The attacker remained dormant until December 2014, when they began moving the 3,000+ stolen BTC."},{"date":1777161600,"name":"Scallop Lend","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":142000,"chain":["Sui"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1961","parentProtocolId":"parent#scallop","language":"Move","description":"Attacker exploited deprecated V2 contract from November 2023; uninitialized 'last_index' variable in rewards logic allowed unbounded claims. Using flashloan and oracle manipulation, attacker drained the sSUI rewards pool."},{"date":1792886400,"name":"Yapeswap","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":21900,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"478","language":"Solidity","description":"YapeSwap’s WorkersUnion governance contract allowed proposals to pass with zero quorum, enabling an attacker controlling approximately 0.000055% of voting power to transfer YapeFactory’s feeToSetter role to themselves. The attacker then installed a malicious Registry that returned fake vault addresses through latestVault(), while vaults() continued listing legitimate vaults. This redirected deposits into attacker-controlled destinations while YapePair incorrectly accounted for them as farming assets, resulting in approximately $21,900 in losses"},{"date":1780272000,"name":"TesseraDAO","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2400000,"chain":["BNB"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker gained control of TesseraDAO's core contract and used ownership privileges to mint 99M TSR tokens from nothing, swapping them for $2.49M USDT. The attacker reassigned roles, seized ownership, and drained the treasury by dumping the freshly-minted tokens on Uniswap before withdrawing through Tornado Cash. The exploit went undetected for 19 hours after the mint."},{"date":1704326400,"name":"Gamma","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":4500000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"355","language":"Solidity","description":"On January 4, 2024, Gamma Strategies' hypervisors on Arbitrum were exploited for ~$4.5M via flashloan-induced price manipulation. The vault deposit thresholds were set too high (-50% to +100% price swings), allowing attackers to manipulate underlying asset prices and drain vault positions."},{"date":1789084800,"name":"ether.fi Liquid","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":43260,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4429","parentProtocolId":"parent#ether-fi","language":"Solidity","description":"Veda’s AtomicQueue allowed the caller of solve() to supply an arbitrary solver address without authenticating that the address had consented to participate as the solver. The settlement logic then executed want.safeTransferFrom(solver, user, amount). The attacker created a worthless token, submitted a self-request offering that token in exchange for liquidETH, and supplied existing liquidETH holders as the solver. Because those holders had previously approved AtomicQueue, the contract used their allowances to pull liquidETH directly from their wallets and transfer it to the attacker’s request. Eleven users were drained in a single transaction"},{"date":1690329600,"name":"AlphaPo","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":60000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Tron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"AlphaPo's hot wallets were drained of ~$60M across Ethereum, Tron, and Bitcoin on July 23, 2023 after private key exposure."},{"date":1684886400,"name":"Local Traders","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":118000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On May 23, 2023, Local Traders protocol on BSC was exploited when an attacker called an unprotected function (0xb5863c10) to become the contract owner, then manipulated token pricing to purchase LCT tokens at artificially low prices and resell them."},{"date":1775347200,"name":"Denaria vAMM","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":165618,"chain":["Linea"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7339","parentProtocolId":"parent#denaria","language":"Solidity","description":"Denaria's perpetual exchange was exploited through virtual AMM manipulation where an attacker used a flash loan to provide one-sided liquidity, skew the price ratio, and execute oversized trades that inflated PnL calculations without any manipulation guard."},{"date":1782172800,"name":"Royal.io","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":263000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Royal.io's legacy royalties contract (Royal1155LD) on Polygon was exploited via a flash loan combined with 100 zero-value ERC1155 transfers that manipulated the beforeLdaTransfer reward accounting hook through a logic flaw in the pro-rata royalty accounting function."},{"date":1703980800,"name":"Orbit Bridge","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":81700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1981","language":"Solidity","description":"Orbit Bridge was drained for ~$81.5M across its Ethereum vault when 7 of 10 multisig signer private keys were compromised, enabling fraudulent withdrawal signatures."},{"date":1654387200,"name":"Wintermute","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":17600000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On June 5, 2022, Wintermute lost 20 million Optimism governance tokens when an Ethereum L1 multisig address was provided for L2 deposit but had not been pre-deployed on Optimism. An attacker deployed the Gnosis Safe contract and took control of the address before Wintermute could recover the tokens."},{"date":1736640000,"name":"Unilend V2","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Redeem Logic Flaw","amount":197600,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4288","parentProtocolId":"parent#unilend","language":"Solidity","description":"Unilend V2 lost $197.6K when attacker used a flash loan to deposit 60M USDC, then exploited stale balance references in the userBalanceOfToken function to manipulate health factor calculations and withdraw 60 stETH."},{"date":1656633600,"name":"Quixotic","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":100000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 1, 2022, Quixotic NFT marketplace on Optimism was exploited due to a missing signature check in the fillSellOrder() function. The attacker minted NFTs, listed them for sale, and used the vulnerability to swap any victim's wallet tokens for the attacker's NFTs. The team paused all activity and reimbursed affected users."},{"date":1780099200,"name":"Gravity Bridge","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":5400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3293","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 30, 2026, Gravity Bridge suffered a $5.4 million exploit via compromised validator signing key. Stolen assets included $4.3M USDC, 274 ETH (~$553K), and $434K USDT; attacker laundered most through ChangeNow and Binance."},{"date":1633651200,"name":"Mirror","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":90000000,"chain":["Terra"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"260","language":"Rust","description":"Mirror Protocol was exploited from October 8, 2021 through May 17, 2022 (discovered) via duplicate ID vulnerability in collateral unlock logic, allowing excessive unlocks without proportional validation. Over seven months, attackers siphoned $89.7M before detection due to limited Terra monitoring."},{"date":1630281600,"name":"CREAM Lending","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":18800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"121","parentProtocolId":"parent#cream-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 30, 2021, CREAM Finance suffered a reentrancy attack losing 418M AMP tokens and 1,308 ETH (~$18.8M). Using a 500 ETH flash loan as seed capital, the attacker exploited a reentrancy vulnerability in the AMP token callback handler to self-liquidate and withdraw more collateral than deposited."},{"date":1763596800,"name":"GANA Payment","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":3100000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 20, 2025, an attacker obtained GANA Payment's private keys, manipulated reward rates and the unstake function to drain approximately $3.1 million in tokens, then laundered 1,140 BNB and 346 ETH through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1670976000,"name":"FPR","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":29000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"FPR protocol on BSC suffered an access control vulnerability allowing unauthorized calls to privileged functions. The exploit drained $29K in protocol assets through improper permission checks."},{"date":1767571200,"name":"USDGambit and TLP","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":1500000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers compromised a shared deployer account that managed both USDGambit and TLP contracts, likely through key theft or credential compromise. This allowed them to deploy a new ProxyAdmin contract with full control over both protocols, draining $1.5M before moving funds to Ethereum and depositing into Tornado Cash."},{"date":1662595200,"name":"Ragnarok Online Invasion","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":44000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Ragnarok Online Invasion's ROI token contract on BSC was exploited on September 8, 2022 when an attacker called the unprotected transferOwnership function. Despite the contract having an onlyOwner modifier, it was not applied to the ownership transfer function, allowing unauthorized ownership changes and theft of ~158 BNB."},{"date":1659398400,"name":"Slope Wallet","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Stored Publicly","amount":4100000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On August 2-3, 2022, attackers drained 9,231 Solana wallets when Slope Finance's mobile apps shipped user seed phrases in plaintext to an external logging service, exposing credentials outside the device. Every affected address had been created, imported, or used in the Slope iOS/Android apps."},{"date":1612483200,"name":"Yearn Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":11000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"113","parentProtocolId":"parent#yearn","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 4, 2021, attacker used flashloans to acquire 215,000 ETH, then deposited borrowed USDC/DAI into Yearn's yDAI vault at manipulated exchange rates without sufficient slippage protection. The vault lost $11M; attacker profited ~$2.7M after $3.5M in fees."},{"date":1647129600,"name":"Paraluni Masterchef","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":1700000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1520","parentProtocolId":"parent#paraluni","language":"Solidity","description":"Paraluni MasterChef lost $1.7M on March 13, 2022 to a flashloan-funded reentrancy attack. Attacker borrowed 157K USDT and 157K BUSD via PancakeSwap, exploited depositByAddLiquidity's missing pool ID validation, and triggered reentrancy via malicious transferFrom before state updated."},{"date":1714003200,"name":"FENGSHOU","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":191000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 25, 2024, the FENGSHOU (NGFS) token on BSC was exploited via a public delegateCallReserves function with insufficient access control. An attacker set their own contract as the UniSwap proxy and executed arbitrary code within the vulnerable contract, extracting approximately $191K."},{"date":1789862400,"name":"BV-7X","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":null,"chain":["Robinhood Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"8759","language":null,"description":"Two BV7X team wallets were compromised through phishing approvals on September 20, allowing an attacker to transfer approximately 6.18 million BV7X using Permit2 and an unlimited token allowance. One approval remained active for 27 days, enabling the attacker to steal another 149.06 million BV7X after liquidity was withdrawn into the affected wallet on October 17. The team subsequently deployed a replacement token contract and initiated a migration intended to exclude the stolen holdings"},{"date":1652832000,"name":"QANX Bridge","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":707000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Bridge authority credentials were compromised, allowing extraction of 4.4M QANX tokens (370 ETH, ~$707K at time of exploit). The attacker traded stolen tokens through DEX, achieving significant liquidation of the position."},{"date":1762732800,"name":"DRLVaultV3","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":100000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"DRLVaultV3, a USDC-WETH rebalance vault, was exploited by an attacker who manipulated the Uniswap spot price. The attacker first borrowed 14M USDC from Morpho Blue and bought WETH to spike its price, then triggered the vault's swapToWETH function to force it to buy WETH at the inflated price, and finally sold the pre-purchased WETH back into the pool to capture the profit spread. A whitehat hacker (c0ffe.babe.eth) captured the approximately $100K in USDC that should be recoverable."},{"date":1733011200,"name":"Spectral Labs","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":250000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On December 1, 2024, Spectral Labs' Syntax V2 was exploited for 14,793 SPEC (~$250K) via an unintended infinite ERC-20 approval in AgentToken.sol's tax-calculation path. The attacker used a flashloan and an insufficiently restricted deposit() function to shift token balances and misprice the XYK bonding curve, extracting disproportionate value from the pool."},{"date":1690243200,"name":"EraLend","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Read-Only Reentrancy","amount":3400000,"chain":["zkSync Era"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2746","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 25, 2023, EraLend on zkSync suffered a read-only reentrancy attack in code borrowed from SyncSwap, where an attacker repeatedly called a vulnerable function to manipulate asset prices via the internal oracle, draining $3.4M. Only USDC deposits were affected."},{"date":1763769600,"name":"Raga Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":18500,"chain":["Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"No credible sources found documenting a specific Raga Finance hack on November 22, 2025. Raga Finance operates on Hyperliquid L1, but no evidence of a direct exploit was found."},{"date":1774915200,"name":"WhaleBit","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":10500,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"WhaleBit's staking system was exploited through same-transaction spot price depression via flash loan, where the attacker dumped CES tokens into the Algebra pool to depress price and inflated staking redemption payouts by 14.4-15.7%."},{"date":1685059200,"name":"Patricia","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Database Breach","amount":2000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Nigerian crypto exchange Patricia suffered a security breach compromising Bitcoin and Naira assets, resulting in $2M in losses. Although the breach occurred in January 2022, it was only disclosed in May 2023. Patricia committed to a 2-5 year repayment plan for affected users starting December 2024."},{"date":1679961600,"name":"Safemoon","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":8900000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On March 28, 2023, SafeMoon suffered an $8.9 million exploit via a publicly-accessible burn function left unprotected after an upgrade. The attacker destroyed SFM tokens to inflate their value, deposited, and withdrew disproportionate BNB. The attacker returned 80% of the funds ($7.2M) on April 20, keeping 20% as a claimed bug bounty."},{"date":1632873600,"name":"Compound V2","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":147000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"114","parentProtocolId":"parent#compound-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"Compound V2's Comptroller had a conditional logic bug when Proposal 62 activated on September 29-30, 2021. An off-by-one error (> instead of >=) in the COMP distribution calculation allowed users to claim far more tokens than intended."},{"date":1740787200,"name":"Hegic(old contract)","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":80000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A deprecated Hegic WBTC Puts Pool contract (deployed January 4, 2022) was drained through its unprotected withdrawWithoutHedge() path, which did not decrement share balances. The attacker deposited liquidity, bought put options, withdrew the liquidity, then exercised the options."},{"date":1734393600,"name":"GemPad","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":1900000,"chain":["Ethereum","Base","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On December 17, 2024, GemPad's token launchpad was exploited via reentrancy in the collectFees function across Ethereum, Base, and BNB Chain. Attacker stole $1.9 million from multiple liquidity locker instances using a vulnerable template that 27 projects had deployed."},{"date":1393718400,"name":"Flexcoin","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":600000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Flexcoin's exchange had a race condition in its transfer code. An attacker sent thousands of simultaneous transfer requests between user accounts, moving coins from one account to another until the sending account was overdrawn before balances were updated, stealing 896 BTC."},{"date":1731542400,"name":"vETH","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":447000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 14, 2024, vETH on Ethereum was exploited through a vulnerable price dependency mechanism. The protocol's reliance on a manipulable oracle allowed attackers to extract value."},{"date":1794441600,"name":"Edel","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7578","language":null,"description":"In November 2026, Edel Finance reported that approximately $300,000 worth of EDEL tokens had been stolen and sold on the market. The team began investigating the theft and coordinating with authorities and cryptocurrency exchanges to trace the stolen assets and block the attackers. The source of the stolen tokens, initial attack method, affected blockchain and recovery status remain undisclosed."},{"date":1722384000,"name":"Monoswap","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":1300000,"chain":["Blast"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MonoSwap developer was lured on July 24-25, 2024 by fake venture capitalists into installing a malicious 'Kakao' video-call app that stole private keys. Attacker used the keys to withdraw ~$1.3M in staked liquidity and protocol funds from the Blast-based DEX."},{"date":1715299200,"name":"Galaxy Fox","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":330000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Galaxy Fox token's setMerkleRoot function was publicly accessible without access control, allowing attackers to manipulate the merkle root and falsely claim 108 ETH from the contract's funds."},{"date":1757808000,"name":"Yala","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":7640000,"chain":["Solana","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6147","language":"Rust","description":"During Yala's deployment of its Solana Layer Zero OFT bridge, attackers compromised temporary deployment keys. They used this access to create unauthorized bridge contracts and establish a backdoor for later exploitation. Over a month later, the attacker deployed this infrastructure to mint 120M unauthorized $YU tokens and extract $7.64M in real value. Thai authorities arrested the attacker approximately 45 days after the exploit, and most funds were clawed back."},{"date":1794182400,"name":"Ankr Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Cross-Chain Message Spoofing","amount":304500,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 9, 2026, an attacker exploited Ankr's cross-chain bridge on Ethereum by submitting five forged withdrawal receipts referencing a single Optimism deposit that had already been redeemed. The attacker modified the recipients, assets, and withdrawal amounts, while presenting valid signatures from the bridge's trusted consensus signer. The bridge accepted the falsified receipts and released approximately $304,500 in assets, including ankrETH, ankrPOL, ANKR, and other staking tokens. The origin of the unauthorized signatures remains under investigation"},{"date":1728864000,"name":"Kalax","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":350000,"chain":["Blast"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4677","language":"Solidity","description":"On October 14, 2024, Kalax founders executed a $350K rugpull by suddenly draining vaults, deleting the website and social accounts, and abandoning the protocol."},{"date":1688428800,"name":"Rodeo","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":90000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2841","language":"Solidity","description":"Rodeo Finance suffered first exploit on July 5, 2023 via a logic flaw in the mintProtocolReserves function, losing ~$89K. A second exploit on July 11 via TWAP oracle manipulation resulted in an additional $1.53M loss (810+ ETH). Stolen funds bridged to Ethereum then partially mixed via Tornado Cash."},{"date":1642464000,"name":"Crypto-com","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Session Key Compromised","amount":33700000,"chain":["Ethereum","Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2270","language":null,"description":"Crypto.com's 2FA system vulnerability allowed attackers to bypass authentication and withdraw $33.7M (4,836 ETH + 444 BTC + $66.2K USD) from 483 user accounts without entering 2FA codes."},{"date":1742860800,"name":"Abracadabra Spell","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Liquidation Logic Flaw","amount":13000000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"347","parentProtocolId":"parent#abracadabra","language":"Solidity","description":"Abracadabra.Money suffered a $13M exploit on March 25, 2025 via a flash loan attack on cauldrons accepting GMX V2 LP tokens as collateral. The attacker manipulated liquidation logic to self-liquidate and extract liquidation incentives."},{"date":1476316800,"name":"Bitcurex","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":1500000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On October 13, 2016, Poland's largest Bitcoin exchange Bitcurex shut down after losing 2,300 BTC (~$1.5M) to attackers. The platform cited 'external interference in automated data collection' but later investigation revealed security compromises. The exchange attempted to restart but permanently closed weeks later."},{"date":1794960000,"name":"K3 Capital","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":3420000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6205","language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers exploited an accounting discrepancy in K3 Capital's sBOLD vault that excluded WETH collateral below a configured threshold from share valuations. Using flash-loaned capital, they minted sBOLD shares while the collateral was undervalued, triggered swaps that converted the uncounted collateral into BOLD, and redeemed their shares at the increased valuation. Repeating this process across 97 transactions drained approximately $3.42M in BOLD from the vault."},{"date":1785024000,"name":"Garden","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Database Breach","amount":450000,"chain":["Ethereum","Base","Arbitrum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4086","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 26, 2026, Garden Finance lost $450K across Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, and BSC when an attacker breached an independent solver's off-chain database and inserted fraudulent transaction records to trigger unauthorized HTLC fund releases."},{"date":1657584000,"name":"Citizen Finance","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":94300,"chain":["BSC","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 12, 2022, Citizen Finance suffered an attack where an unauthorized party obtained access to private keys for BNB and Polygon chains. The attacker transferred 244 BNB (~$55K), 57,637 MATIC (~$32.3K), and 7,000 USDC for a total of ~$94.3K, causing the CIFI token to plummet over 50%."},{"date":1726790400,"name":"OcelotDex","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":980000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4095","language":"Solidity","description":"Shezmu's vault contract vulnerability allowed unauthorized minting of ShezUSD stablecoin without collateral, bypassing required checks and enabling attackers to mint unlimited ShezUSD and borrow assets to drain $4.9M. After negotiation, 80% was recovered."},{"date":1553385600,"name":"DragonEx","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":7000000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum","EOS","Ripple","NEM","ETC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Lazarus Group compromised DragonEx infrastructure through phishing attacks using a fake Worldbit-bot trading software, obtaining private keys and API access to drain 20 cryptocurrency wallets including 135 BTC, 2,738 ETH, and other assets."},{"date":1706572800,"name":"Abracadabra Spell","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":6500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"347","parentProtocolId":"parent#abracadabra","language":"Solidity","description":"Abracadabra's MIM stablecoin exploited for $6.5M via precision loss in collateral calculations. An attacker used rounding errors to bypass collateral validation, inflating borrow amounts. Funded with 1 ETH from Tornado Cash, the attack caused MIM to depeg to $0.76."},{"date":1659312000,"name":"ZB Exchange","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":4800000,"chain":["Multi-Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"ZB Exchange's hot wallet was compromised, resulting in the theft of multiple cryptocurrencies including USDT and others. The attacker converted stolen tokens to approximately 2,224 ETH on decentralized exchanges."},{"date":1793059200,"name":"Zilliqa X-Bridge","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":null,"chain":["Zilliqa"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Zilliqa confirmed a security incident affecting its X-Bridge and ZRC2 proxy contracts associated with certain liquidity pools, including PlunderSwap. The affected assets include zUSDT, SEED, kUSD, and Zoge, while native ZIL and the Zilliqa EVM network reportedly remain unaffected. X-Bridge remains paused while operational keys are rotated and investigations continue"},{"date":1639353600,"name":"Vulcan Forged","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":140000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On December 13, 2021, Vulcan Forged's NFT marketplace suffered a $140M hack affecting 96 high-value wallets when Venly's semi-custodial servers were compromised. The attacker extracted credentials and exfiltrated ~4.5M PYR tokens from customer wallets. Vulcan Forged refunded 100% of losses within 24 hours."},{"date":1757635200,"name":"Kame Aggregator","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":1300000,"chain":["Sei"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On September 13, 2025 Kame Aggregator on the Sei network was exploited due to missing validation in the swap() function that allowed arbitrary executor calls, affecting 830 users who had granted unlimited token spend permissions to Kame contracts and draining approximately $1.325 million in total value."},{"date":1747267200,"name":"Zunami Protocol","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1201","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 15, 2025, Zunami Protocol's stablecoin collateral (zunUSD and zunETH) was drained for $500K via the god-mode withdrawStuckToken() function using a compromised admin key. The exploit occurred 7 minutes after the admin role was granted on May 14, suggesting key theft. Stolen funds were laundered through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1652486400,"name":"SpiritSwap V3","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":18000,"chain":["Fantom"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4470","parentProtocolId":"parent#spiritswap","language":null,"description":"Attacker socially engineered a GoDaddy employee to hijack SpiritSwap's domain, then deployed a phishing site with modified swap parameters. Before detection and shutdown on May 14, ~$18K was extracted (from 252 BNB total redirected)."},{"date":1733788800,"name":"LABUBU Token","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":12000,"chain":["Binance"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"LABUBU token's transfer function allowed the same address to be both sender and receiver, enabling balance inflation. The attacker borrowed tokens via a PancakeSwap V3 flash loan, repeatedly executed this flawed transfer to compound their balance, then swapped through multiple chains and mixed the proceeds."},{"date":1638489600,"name":"Polygon","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2040000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"White-hat hackers discovered a critical vulnerability in Polygon's PoS genesis contract MRC20 token where the transfer function lacked balance/allowance checks. This would have allowed stealing ~9.3 billion MATIC tokens. Before the fix was deployed, threat actor stole 801,601 MATIC tokens. White hat received $2.2M bug bounty for the disclosure."},{"date":1778976000,"name":"MetaSea","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":110000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MetaSea's redeemPosition function overpaid SEA yield from a shared distributor without blocking just-in-time openings and redemptions in the same block. An attacker used Aave flash loans to atomically deposit USDT into the settlement adapter, redeem disproportionately large SEA amounts (17-27M vs 1.2M input), and sell the SEA back for USDT. Running 8 identical attacks back-to-back, the attacker extracted $110K aggregate across multiple blocks."},{"date":1718841600,"name":"OKX NFT Aggregator","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":14000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"OKX's NFT aggregator on BSC was exploited on June 20, 2024 due to an access control vulnerability in withdrawal/transfer functions that had existed for approximately one year. $14K in user funds were stolen."},{"date":1652227200,"name":"Drift Trade","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Risk Parameter Abuse","amount":14500000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":14500000,"defillamaId":"970","parentProtocolId":"parent#drift","language":"Rust","description":"On May 11, 2022, Drift Protocol on Solana experienced three interconnected bugs: users could withdraw positive PnL without realizing losses, leverage increased with long-short imbalance, and insurance funds weren't isolated per market. LUNA collapse exposed these issues, causing $8.72M net withdrawal and $14.5M shortfall."},{"date":1689033600,"name":"Libertify","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":230,"chain":["Ethereum","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A reentrancy vulnerability in LibertiVault's deposit function allowed attackers to mint excess shares by re-entering before totalSupply was updated. The attacker used flash loans to deposit funds, called deposit() recursively, and claimed inflated rewards before the state was finalized."},{"date":1742256000,"name":"Voltage V3","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":322113,"chain":["Fuse"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4188","parentProtocolId":"parent#voltage","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker compromised the SimpleChefStaking proxy contract, replacing its implementation with a malicious one. The attacker then used the forceWithdraw function to drain collateral from the Simple Staking pools, extracting USDCE and WETH. Voltage offered a $50k bounty for recovery of the remaining funds."},{"date":1637971200,"name":"Lever","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Borrow Logic Flaw","amount":652000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker exploited Lever's liability calculation to execute a flash loan attack using two malicious contracts. Contract A borrowed 2,100 BNB and deposited 2,000 into Lever's vault for interest-bearing tokens, then borrowed 1,500 BNB. Contract B received the collateral without Lever verifying that the xWBNB wasn't already used as collateral, allowing repayment with uncollateralized borrowed funds."},{"date":1784073600,"name":"TeleSwap","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":735000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5350","language":null,"description":"TeleSwap's Bitcoin hot wallet was compromised, resulting in suspicious outflows of over $735K. The wallet ceased processing transactions shortly after discovery, with stolen funds subsequently moved toward Tornado Cash mixer."},{"date":1785628800,"name":"LOOPSDAO","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":693500,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Liquidity Pool","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 2, 2026, LpdFi (LOOPSDAO's lending product on BNB Chain) was drained of ~$690K when an attacker flash-borrowed USDC and manipulated the PancakeSwap LPD/USDC pair price via donate-and-sync. The inflated price was used to compute interest owed, which the protocol paid by burning its own LP position and forwarding 99% of the USDC proceeds to the attacker."},{"date":1744675200,"name":"ZKsync","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":5000000,"chain":["zkSync Era"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Vyper","description":"ZKsync airdrop contracts were compromised on April 15, 2025 when attacker obtained admin private key with inadequate key management. Attacker minted 111M ZK tokens ($5M) via sweepUnclaimed() function; core protocol and user funds remained unaffected."},{"date":1696550400,"name":"Galxe","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":270000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"An attacker impersonated a Galxe team member and contacted Dynadot, the domain registrar, with forged documentation to gain access to the Galxe.com domain account. The attacker redirected the domain to a phishing site and induced approximately 1,120 users to sign transactions to malicious contracts, resulting in $270K in losses before the domain was recovered."},{"date":1666310400,"name":"Bond Protocol","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2697","language":"Solidity","description":"On October 21, 2022, attacker deployed counterfeit bond tokens on Bond Protocol's OlympusDAO market and redeemed them for legitimate OHM collateral, draining $300K before returning funds hours later. Fixed-Expiry Teller lacked token validation."},{"date":1626307200,"name":"THORChain DEX","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":5000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"412","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 16, 2021, an attacker exploited an override function in THORChain's Bifrost bridge, wrapping the router contract to repeatedly extract value from liquidity pools by manipulating reported deposit amounts, draining approximately $4.9-7.4 million."},{"date":1740787200,"name":"Zoth ZeUSD","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":285000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5615","parentProtocolId":"parent#zoth","language":"Solidity","description":"Zoth's collateral accounting incorrectly calculated LTV (Loan-To-Value) after swapping collateral via Uniswap V3. An attacker used flash loans to manipulate V3 exchange rates, making a minimal deposit swap for far fewer tokens than should be received, then minting ZeUSD against the phantom collateral difference."},{"date":1699228800,"name":"TheStandard.io","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":290000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"TheStandard.io was exploited when an attacker initiated a CDP with 10 WBTC collateral to mint 290K EUROs, then forced a manipulated swap in the WBTC/PAXG pool. Lack of slippage protection (amountOutMinimum = 0) combined with low liquidity enabled the attack."},{"date":1626220800,"name":"ApeRocket","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":1260000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"401","language":null,"description":"On July 14, 2021 ApeRocket (DeFi yield farming aggregator) suffered two coordinated flashloan attacks on BSC and Polygon within hours when attackers borrowed massive amounts of AAVE and CAKE (representing >99% of vault holdings), deposited them to inflate share counts, and dumped minted SPACE tokens for profit, causing SPACE to crash 63% because reward calculation lacked flashloan protection."},{"date":1699660800,"name":"Samudai","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":1250000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Samudai's multisignature wallets and founder's personal wallet were compromised, draining 1.25M USD in ETH. The attacker moved funds through Tornado Cash mixer to obfuscate the theft."},{"date":1738368000,"name":"Sirio Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":2000000,"chain":["Hedera"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5706","language":"Solidity","description":"Sirio Finance, the first lending protocol on Hedera, exploited for $2M on February 1, 2025 via flashloan attack. Specific technical details of the vulnerability are not publicly available."},{"date":1707955200,"name":"Miner","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":466000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A double-transfer vulnerability in the Miner ERC-X token allowed attackers to bypass validation on destination addresses. The lack of input validation enabled transfers of 168.8 ETH from the project."},{"date":1653868800,"name":"Mirror","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2000000,"chain":["Terra"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"260","language":"Rust","description":"Mirror Protocol was exploited starting October 8, 2021, via inadequate access control on collateral unlock functions, allowing attackers to withdraw ~$90M over 7 months before discovery in May 2022. A follow-up $2M exploit in May 2022 exploited oracle misalignment during the LUNC-LUNA2 transition."},{"date":1615680000,"name":"Roll","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":5700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On March 14, 2021, an attacker obtained Roll's hot wallet private key and stole approximately $5.7 million in social tokens (WHALE, RARE, PICA), selling them on Uniswap and laundering proceeds through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1779926400,"name":"ONTR","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Ownership Takeover","amount":98200,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"When ONTR's creator renounced ownership to signal trustworthiness, the onlyOwner modifier contained a flawed require statement that treated owner == address(0) as permission rather than denial. This turned the ownership renunciation into a backdoor, allowing anyone to reclaim ownership and drain the contract of $98.2K in funds within minutes."},{"date":1788912000,"name":"Balancer V1","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":250000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"116","parentProtocolId":"parent#balancer","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited a previously disclosed pricing vulnerability in deprecated Balancer V1 pools, extracting approximately $250,000. The attack was financed through flash loans and temporary collateral positions across three Aave V3 lending markets"},{"date":1785888000,"name":"Unistreets","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":17750,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 5, 2026, Unistreets on Ethereum was exploited via an arbitrary external call vulnerability, resulting in a loss of approximately $17,750. The exploiter address and transaction were identified on-chain."},{"date":1697068800,"name":"BlackHole Token","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1275000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BlackHole Token on BSC was exploited when an attacker used a flash loan to manipulate liquidity pool prices. The attacker swapped 22 million USDT through the trading pair to artificially inflate the token price before draining funds from the protocol."},{"date":1676851200,"name":"Hope Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":2000000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On February 20, 2023, Hope Finance (Arbitrum stablecoin protocol) was exploited by an insider who modified the TradingHelper contract to redirect GenesisRewardPool funds to an attacker address. ~$2M was stolen; ~$1.86M was laundered through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1392595200,"name":"Picostocks","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":4430000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Picostocks lost 5,896 BTC from both hot and cold wallets. Because the offline cold storage was somehow accessed, the theft was suspected to be an inside job or the result of compromised key storage, suggesting an internal actor or breach of key management."},{"date":1700611200,"name":"HTX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":13600000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2276","language":null,"description":"On November 22, 2023, Huobi HTX suffered a breach of three hot wallets when an attacker gained access to private keys stored on exchange servers. User assets and reserves were converted to Ether and transferred out, with initial hot wallet losses of $13.6M and additional impact from related HECO Chain bridge losses."},{"date":1793059200,"name":"Predict Fun","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Frontend Compromise","amount":400000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Prediction Market","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5129","language":null,"description":"Several Predict.fun users experienced unauthorized wallet transfers totaling approximately 400,000 USDT. Preliminary findings suggest a possible compromise of the project’s API documentation website, which was hosted by a third-party provider. Predict.fun took the documentation site offline as a precaution and committed to reimbursing affected users"},{"date":1794873600,"name":"B18 TimeBank","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":404540,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 17, 2026, an attacker exploited B18 TimeBank's level-reward voucher redemption mechanism on Base, withdrawing approximately $404,540 in USDC from the protocol's settlement contract. The attacker redeemed signed reward vouchers to trigger the unauthorized withdrawal in a single identified transaction"},{"date":1662076800,"name":"ShadowFi","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":301000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"ShadowFi's SDF token contract had flaws allowing unauthorized token burning. Attackers exploited the access control vulnerability in a two-phase attack to burn all SDF tokens in the liquidity pool and drain liquidity."},{"date":1766620800,"name":"Trust Wallet Wallet","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Supply Chain Attack","amount":8500000,"chain":["Ethereum","Bitcoin","Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5577","parentProtocolId":"parent#trust-wallet","language":null,"description":"The Shai-Hulud npm worm compromised developer accounts and harvested Trust Wallet's Chrome Web Store API key. On December 24, 2025, the attacker published a malicious Trust Wallet Browser Extension v2.68 to the Chrome Web Store, exfiltrating private keys from users until December 26 at 11:00 UTC."},{"date":1608249600,"name":"Warp Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":7800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"601","language":"Solidity","description":"On December 17-18, 2020, an attacker exploited Warp Finance's gameable oracle by flash loaning 2.9M DAI and 344.8K WETH from dYdX to manipulate DAI/Uniswap prices, inflating LP collateral value to borrow 3.86M DAI and 3.9M USDC, draining $7.76 million total."},{"date":1786752000,"name":"Fox Market","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":120000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 15, 2026 Fox Market was exploited through its FoxLpBondsPool.stake() bond minting path. The contract read the FOX spot price from the PancakeSwap V2 FOX/USDT pool before allowing the same transaction to move that pool. The attacker used flash liquidity to buy almost all FOX from the pool, while the mint calculation continued using the pre-swap price snapshot, resulting in approximately 88.66M sFOX and 91.3M FOX of reported issuance. The attacker then sold an immediately unlocked ~2.66M FOX referral allocation into the USDT-heavy pool, repaid the flash liquidity, and retained approximately $120K in realized profit"},{"date":1655942400,"name":"Harmony Bridge","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":100000000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Harmony's Horizon Bridge was hacked on June 23, 2022, stealing ~$100M across ETH, BNB, USDT, USDC, and DAI on Ethereum and BSC. Lazarus Group / APT38 (North Korea-affiliated) compromised validator private keys; the insufficient 2-of-5 validator quorum enabled the theft."},{"date":1686787200,"name":"Hyperliquid","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Risk Parameter Abuse","amount":37000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2862","language":null,"description":"In June 2023, an attacker manipulated SNX prices on centralized exchanges to exploit Hyperliquid's vault system through its reliance on easily-manipulated CEX spot prices, leveraging the discrepancy between real and inflated prices."},{"date":1756166400,"name":"BetterBank","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":5000000,"chain":["PulseChain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6611","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 26-27, 2025, BetterBank on PulseChain was exploited via its reward mechanism using flash loans to manipulate liquidity pools, create a fake ERC20 paired with PDAIF, and trigger ESTEEM minting. ~$5M was stolen; the attacker later returned $2.7M, leaving net losses of ~$1.4M. The issue had been flagged during audit but dismissed."},{"date":1670371200,"name":"AES","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":61608,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"AES, a deflationary token on BSC, was exploited through abuse of its skim function. The attacker repeatedly sent AES tokens to the AES-USDT pair to break the pool balance, then called skim to extract surplus tokens. Each cycle burned additional AES tokens, allowing profitable conversion of small token amounts into large USDT payouts."},{"date":1620950400,"name":"flash.sx / vaults.sx","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":13000000,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"A reentrancy vulnerability in vaults.sx's flashloan contract allowed an attacker to recursively extract 1.18M EOS and 462K USDT. The attacker distributed funds across 246 accounts attempting to evade recovery. EOS BPs froze accounts by supermajority consensus and the attacker was social-engineered into nulling their keys; all users were made whole."},{"date":1778544000,"name":"BoostHook","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":187000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BoostHook was exploited via a flash loan attack that manipulated the ETH/PERP Uniswap v4 pool price. An attacker used a 120 WETH Morpho flash loan to temporarily push the pool price upward, opened nine leveraged long positions at the inflated price through BoostHook.openLong(), then reversed the price move. The protocol's hard-capped MAX_LIQS_PER_BLOCK limit prevented liquidation of all toxic positions, leaving four 8 ETH-debt positions open and causing significant bad debt."},{"date":1699574400,"name":"Raft","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":3300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3068","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 10, 2023, an attacker exploited a precision error in Raft's divUp function during share token minting to mint ~$6.7M unbacked R tokens via a 6000 cbETH flash loan from Aave, causing a ~$3.3M net loss."},{"date":1781395200,"name":"Aztec Connect","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":2100000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1016","language":"Solidity","description":"Aztec Connect's proof verification failed to match L1 state updates, letting attacker submit unvalidated transactions crediting themselves with value. They withdrew $2.1M in ETH, DAI, wstETH and other tokens."},{"date":1690156800,"name":"Palmswap","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":900000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3279","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 24, 2023, Palmswap's PLP vault was exploited for $901,000. The attacker used flashloans to purchase USDP at 1:1, inflated the pool value, then redeemed at the manipulated 1:1.9 rate by exploiting incorrect exchange rate calculations in PlpManager."},{"date":1573171200,"name":"VinDAX","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":500000,"chain":["Ethereum","Multiple"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"VinDAX, a Vietnamese exchange launched in March 2019, was hacked on November 5, 2019, with attackers stealing $500K in digital assets across 23 small-cap cryptocurrencies from insecure hot wallets. After discovery, VinDAX immediately contacted the projects involved and froze or recovered the stolen tokens due to the small-cap nature of the assets. The platform later fully recovered the stolen value through coordination with affected projects."},{"date":1523491200,"name":"Coinsecure","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":3300000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"In April 2018, Coinsecure's chief security officer Dr. Amitabh Saxena exposed the exchange's private keys while attempting to distribute Bitcoin Gold to customers. The keys were exposed online for over 12 hours, allowing attackers to steal 438 BTC (~$3.3M). Saxena was arrested as a prime suspect."},{"date":1691539200,"name":"Earning.Farm","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":540000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 9, 2023 Earning.Farm (yield farming platform on Ethereum) was exploited for approximately $528,000-$540,000 via a reentrancy vulnerability in the withdraw() function where flawed share-burning logic allowed the attacker to reenter the contract and drain additional funds."},{"date":1548460800,"name":"LocalBitcoins","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":27000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"A third-party discussion forum platform running on LocalBitcoins was compromised and used to phish user credentials including 2FA codes. Attackers gained access to six user accounts and transferred 7.9 BTC before the forum was disabled."},{"date":1717718400,"name":"SteamSwap","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":105000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SteamSwap (STM) on BNB Chain was attacked via price manipulation allowing the attacker to abuse reserve balance calculations and drain approximately $105K from the DEX."},{"date":1671840000,"name":"Defrost","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":12000000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":6000000,"defillamaId":"913","language":"Solidity","description":"On December 24, 2022, Defrost Finance on Avalanche suffered two coordinated attacks: V2 flashloan drained $173K via LSWUSDC price manipulation; V1 admin key compromise allowed minting 100M H20 and draining ~$12M USDT via fake oracle. All funds were later returned."},{"date":1630195200,"name":"Bilaxy","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":21700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On August 28-29, 2021, cryptocurrency exchange Bilaxy's hot wallet was compromised, resulting in the theft of approximately $21.7 million in various ERC20 tokens including USDT, USDC, and UNI. The attacker transferred 200 ETH to Tornado Cash to mix the stolen funds."},{"date":1721260800,"name":"WazirX: India","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Signer Phishing","amount":234900000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"WazirX Indian exchange was hacked on July 18, 2024, losing $234.9M in 190+ tokens from a Liminal-custodied multisig wallet. Attackers created a fake WazirX account, accessed the hot wallet, then exploited the smart contract controlling the multisig to gain full control without the original keys."},{"date":1644278400,"name":"Superfluid","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":8700000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"693","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 8, 2022 Superfluid (money streaming protocol on Polygon) suffered an exploit of approximately $8.7 million via a vulnerability in the CTX (context) validation mechanism where the attacker injected a forged context containing an arbitrary sender address, allowing agreement contracts to execute transfers on behalf of other accounts."},{"date":1690848000,"name":"LeetSwap","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":620000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2745","language":"Solidity","description":"LeetSwap on Base lost ~$624K (~342 ETH) on August 1, 2023 when an attacker exploited the _transferFeesSupportingTaxTokens function lacking access controls to move LP fees and manipulate pool prices."},{"date":1730764800,"name":"RPP","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":14100,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 5, 2024, RPP protocol on BNB Chain was exploited through a logic flaw, resulting in approximately $14.1K in losses."},{"date":1593561600,"name":"Vether","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":450000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker paid a 128 Vether exclusion fee and exploited an access control flaw in the V3 contract to gain control of all remaining Vether. They claimed 900,000 Vether and liquidated 150,000 on Uniswap for approximately 15 ETH."},{"date":1659830400,"name":"EGD Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":36000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"EGD Finance's reward calculation directly relied on token price without flash loan protection. Attackers used a flashloan to manipulate the USDT/EGD ratio in the PancakeSwap pool, artificially inflating EGD price and claiming excessive rewards."},{"date":1768867200,"name":"SynapLogic","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":144000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A business logic flaw in SynapLogic's referral system allowed attackers to mint 144k SYP tokens without proper validation. The exploit involved 193 suspicious transactions where attackers repeatedly called the referral function with flashloan-backed ETH, receiving 10% referral rewards for each fraudulent transaction."},{"date":1740096000,"name":"Bybit","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Signer Phishing","amount":1400000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":1400000000,"defillamaId":"2286","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 21, 2025, Lazarus Group phished Bybit's DevOps engineer and spoofed the Safe UI to trick signers into blind-signing a masked transaction that deployed a rogue hot-wallet policy. This drained approximately $1.4-1.5 billion in ETH and assets."},{"date":1789948800,"name":"The Internet Token","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":16380,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The Internet Token’s privileged LiquidityUnifier contract had INT minting authority and exposed a permissionless swapV3(token, pool) function accepting a caller-supplied pool. Its validation only required the supplied address to contain code, not be excluded, and report INT and the requested token through token0()/token1(). The attacker supplied a malicious fake pool satisfying these checks. swapV3() stored that address as currentPoolV3 and called its swap(), allowing the fake pool to invoke uniswapV3SwapCallback() with an attacker-selected amount. Because the callback trusted currentPoolV3, it caused the privileged contract to mint INT to the fake pool. The attacker bypassed the surrounding supply-increase check by converting the newly minted INT through the project’s Convertor during the call, reducing supply before the check, and converting it back afterward. Approximately 161.3M counterfeit INT was then sold into the genuine INT/WETH pool for 5.85 WETH"},{"date":1754265600,"name":"CrediX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":4500000,"chain":["Sonic"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 4, 2025, CrediX on Sonic suffered $4.5M loss when attacker gained admin access via ACLManager, minting unbacked acUSDC and draining pools. Funds were moved to Ethereum via Tornado Cash. The team vanished August 8."},{"date":1553817600,"name":"TronCrush","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":null,"chain":["Tron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"TronCrush's transfer function did not validate that the 'to' and 'from' addresses must be different, allowing an attacker to create tokens without foundation through self-transfers. Over 20 smart contracts and dapps were vulnerable to this same pattern."},{"date":1788912000,"name":"Nomic","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Unbacked Cross-Chain Mint","amount":3150000,"chain":["Nomic"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"A vulnerability in Nomic’s custom forwarding mechanism allowed an attacker to double-spend nBTC and generate false cross-chain vouchers that were sent to Osmosis. These vouchers resulted in unbacked nBTC entering Osmosis and becoming part of Alloyed BTC’s backing. Osmosis and IBC were not compromised. After detecting the issue, Osmosis froze Nomic and Alloyed BTC inflows and outflows and coordinated an emergency upgrade with validators that froze 22.65 BTC in the attacker’s address"},{"date":1701302400,"name":"Florence Finance","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Address Poisoning","amount":1450000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3197","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 30, 2023, user sent 1,456,162 USDC to poisoned address 0xB087... instead of Florence Finance's legitimate address. Attackers had seeded the user's address book with lookalike addresses; victim relied on autofill. Funds were bridged to Ethereum and swapped for ETH."},{"date":1697155200,"name":"WiseLending","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":260000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"WiseLending was exploited through a flash loan attack that leveraged rounding errors in the _calculateShares function. The attacker used strategic deposits and withdrawals to artificially inflate share prices, with a white-hat MEV bot front-running the exploit to recover funds."},{"date":1667347200,"name":"Rubic","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":1200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1282","language":null,"description":"On November 2, 2022, an attacker compromised an administrator's private key for Rubic's bridge, which controlled the RBC/BRBC bridge and staking rewards. The attacker stole approximately 34M RBC tokens and sold them on Uniswap and PancakeSwap, with realized losses estimated at ~$1.2M. The token price collapsed 98% following the mass liquidation."},{"date":1773273600,"name":"AM","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":131572,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"AM token's deferred burn mechanism was exploited where accumulated toBurnAmount caused unbounded burns on the next sell transaction. Flash loan-funded attackers inflated pair USDT reserves before triggering the deferred burn to sell at exaggerated effective prices."},{"date":1784160000,"name":"DefiTuna Lending","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":580000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6653","parentProtocolId":"parent#defituna","language":"Rust","description":"DefiTuna Lending on Solana exploited for $580K on July 16, 2026. Attackers created a highly illiquid TUNA/USDC pool and routed borrowed USDC through it. The negligible swap output caused position value to round to zero, bypassing the solvency check."},{"date":1665446400,"name":"QANplatform","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Weak Key Generation","amount":2000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"QANplatform's bridge deployer wallet was compromised on October 11, 2022 due to the profanity vulnerability in the vanity address generator. The attacker recovered the private key and drained ~$2M from the Ethereum and BNB cross-chain bridges in multiple withdrawals."},{"date":1666569600,"name":"QuickSwap Market","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":220000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 24, 2022, QuickSwap's Market XYZ lending market on Polygon was exploited for $220K via a read-only reentrancy vulnerability in the Curve LP Oracle. An attacker used a flash loan to manipulate spot prices, inflating collateral values to drain assets from the market. The exploit affected LDO, MATIC, and staked MATIC tokens, leading QuickSwap to shut down its lending service."},{"date":1788912000,"name":"Zentra Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":140030,"chain":["Citrea"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7419","language":"Solidity","description":"Zentra’s Aave V3-based lending implementation contained a boundary-condition accounting flaw in repayWithATokens. The attacker borrowed assets and requested repayment of the outstanding debt plus exactly one base unit. The debt-token path’s ceil-rounding cleared the debt in full, while the aToken burn path’s rounding safeguard reduced the required burn to the caller’s available aToken balance. Because the attacker held no corresponding aTokens, the burn was reduced to zero. The Pool therefore recorded the debt as repaid without receiving equivalent value, allowing the attacker to withdraw the original flash-funded collateral while retaining the borrowed reserve assets. The sequence was repeated against ctUSD and USDC.e"},{"date":1710979200,"name":"AirDAO","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":1050000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"AirDAO partner compromised via malicious email attachment carrying malware. Attackers gained access to liquidity pool keys and drained AMB tokens and ETH from Uniswap LP, netting approximately 125.51 ETH at realized prices."},{"date":1661212800,"name":"SudoRare","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Liquidity Rug","amount":800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SudoRare NFT AMM platform operated for 6 hours before founders used admin privileges to drain 519 ETH ($800K) from the liquidity pool and disappeared."},{"date":1778630400,"name":"ShapeShift FOX Colony","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":132700,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited the EtherRouterCreate3 contract's meta-transaction mechanism by abusing the arbitrary self-call capability combined with DSAuth's automatic authorization logic for address(this). The attacker bypassed the auth modifier, replaced the contract's core routing component (resolver) with a malicious version, then used delegatecall to drain all ERC20 assets. A second related exploit shortly after brought total losses to $182.7K."},{"date":1720656000,"name":"OPSEC","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":100000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A private key controlling the OPSEC staking contract was compromised, allowing the attacker to change ownership from the team wallet to attacker-controlled addresses. Although $800K in tokens were accessible, the attacker was only able to convert ~59 ETH (~$100K at time of sale) to cash due to illiquid pool conditions."},{"date":1784851200,"name":"Triple-A","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":9700000,"chain":["Ethereum","Tron","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Payments","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 24-25, 2026, Triple-A's hot wallets were drained across 7 blockchains (TRON, Ethereum, Arbitrum, TON, Solana). The initial $9.7M loss was revised to $11.8M as attackers maintained access for 31+ hours."},{"date":1681344000,"name":"Yearn Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":11539000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"113","parentProtocolId":"parent#yearn","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 13, 2023, Yearn Finance's yUSDT vault was exploited through a misconfigured oracle reference pointing to Fulcrum's USDC contract instead of USDT. Attacker exploited the incorrect contract pointer to manipulate share prices, minting 1.2 quadrillion yUSDT by depositing only 10,000 USDT, then selling for $11.54 million."},{"date":1628812800,"name":"NEKO","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2200000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3896","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 13, 2021, Neko Network's MainPool smart contract was exploited via an improper access control vulnerability. The attacker exploited a mismatch between the account being mortgaged for a loan (onBehalfOf) and the account receiving borrowed funds, allowing them to mortgage other users' assets while receiving funds to their own address, stealing over $2.2M in stablecoins."},{"date":1647302400,"name":"Agave","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":5500000,"chain":["Gnosis Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"696","language":"Solidity","description":"On Gnosis Chain, attackers exploited xDAI's non-standard _callAfterTransfer() callback reentrancy; using flashloans to stack borrows before balance updates, they withdrew amounts far exceeding collateral value."},{"date":1666915200,"name":"FriesDAO","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Weak Key Generation","amount":2300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On October 28, 2022, FriesDAO's deployer wallet generated using the Profanity vanity-address tool was compromised, allowing an attacker to calculate the private key and steal approximately $2.3M in FRIES governance tokens and other assets from the staking pool. Profanity had a known critical flaw enabling private key derivation for vanity addresses."},{"date":1784246400,"name":"Across","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Spoofed Event Log","amount":4500000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1207","language":"Rust","description":"Between 05:07 and 06:14 UTC on 17 July 2026 an attacker submitted 1,627 forged Solana deposits (face value ~$41.7M) from single-use wallets across 18 destination chains; Risk Labs' relayer filled 581 of them, paying out roughly $4.5M of its own capital before Solana was disabled as an origin chain. No user funds were affected."},{"date":1780963200,"name":"Asterix","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":40000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Asterix exploited June 9, 2026 for ~$40K, replicating the same DN404 vulnerability that hit Flooring Protocol the day before. The vulnerability stems from DN404's inherent design flaw in interlinked ERC20/ERC721 mechanics. Downstream forks inherited this flaw without re-auditing."},{"date":1550620800,"name":"Coinbin","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":26000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Coinbin's former CEO (previously from acquired exchange Youbit) used his new position to steal over 100 ETH from an Ethereum wallet, claiming the key had been lost. The employee embezzlement forced the exchange into bankruptcy."},{"date":1625184000,"name":"ChainSwap","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":800000,"chain":["Ethereum","Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 2, 2021, ChainSwap, an Ethereum-BSC bridge protocol, was exploited via a bridge logic flaw where attackers bypassed signature verification by exploiting incorrect authQuotaOf implementation, allowing them to mint tokens across multiple protocols using the bridge and steal approximately $800K."},{"date":1649289600,"name":"WonderHero","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":320000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"WonderHero's hot wallet private keys were compromised, likely via phishing targeting the seed phrase, resulting in theft of approximately $320,000 in BNB."},{"date":1783728000,"name":"Bonzo Lend","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":9050000,"chain":["Hedera"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5287","parentProtocolId":"parent#bonzo-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 11, 2026 at 00:51 UTC, an attacker deposited 250 SAUCE tokens (~$5 worth) as collateral on Bonzo Lend on Hedera. Attacker pushed a fabricated SAUCE price into Supra's oracle inflated by ~12 orders of magnitude, then borrowed 6.63M USDC and 34.5M WHBAR. Bonzo's TVL fell 77%; Hedera's network TVL dropped 40% within 24 hours."},{"date":1671148800,"name":"Raydium AMM","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":4400000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"214","parentProtocolId":"parent#raydium","language":"Rust","description":"On December 16, 2022, Raydium AMM private keys were compromised by trojan malware; attacker gained admin access and modified SyncNeedTake pool parameters to extract $4.4M without burning LP tokens. Raydium patched within 4 hours and recovered governance."},{"date":1620172800,"name":"ValueDefi","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":10000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"164","parentProtocolId":"parent#value-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"ValueDefi's vSwap pool on BSC was exploited via reinitialization vulnerability in access control. Attacker re-initialized pool, set themselves as operator, called governanceRecoverUnsupported() to drain 10,839.16 vBWAP/BUSD LP tokens and associated collateral."},{"date":1790208000,"name":"Bitget","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":387000000,"chain":["Ethereum","XRP","Tron","Zcash"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2352","language":null,"description":"Bitget detected unauthorized transfers involving a limited number of hot wallets at 18:31 UTC on September 24. Subsequent tracing identified approximately $387.5M transferred to attacker-controlled addresses across Ethereum and other EVM networks, XRP Ledger, Zcash and Tron. Bitget states that the incident has been contained and no further unauthorized transfers are possible"},{"date":1772755200,"name":"SolvBTC","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":2700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4620","parentProtocolId":"parent#solv-protocol","language":"Solidity","description":"Solv Protocol BRO vaults were exploited on March 6, 2026 when ERC-3525 NFT deposit triggered callbacks that minted tokens before parent transaction completed, allowing double-minting. 135 BRO inflated to 567M tokens (~38 SolvBTC, ~$2.7M)."},{"date":1784937600,"name":"Projekt","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":560000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Projekt reward vault attacked July 25, 2026 for $560K via flashloan exploit. Attacker flash-loaned 14K WETH from Morpho to create fake purchase records in the unvalidated trackPurchase function, inflating reward allocations and draining ~301.7 ETH via massWithdraw."},{"date":1673308800,"name":"BRA","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":225000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On January 10, 2023, the BRA token on BSC was exploited through a tax-sharing loophole in the transfer mechanism. The attacker exploited a logic flaw where if sender and recipient formed a pair, the transfer function would double rewards. This created 1.6 million additional BRA tokens that were sold for approximately 819 WBNB (~$225K)."},{"date":1777334400,"name":"Quant","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":138000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A QNT reserve pool on Ethereum was drained of 1,988.5 QNT (~54.93 ETH, ~$138K) on 28 April 2026 via an EIP-7702 delegation chain: the pool's admin EOA delegated its code to a BatchExecutor which trusted an open, permissionless BatchCall helper; BatchCall.batch() had no caller check, allowing any address to execute arbitrary calls with admin authority."},{"date":1762214400,"name":"Moonwell Lending","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1000000,"chain":["Base","Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1853","parentProtocolId":"parent#moonwell","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 4, 2025, Moonwell on Base and Optimism was exploited for $1 million when the Chainlink oracle incorrectly priced wrapped restaked Ethereum (wrstETH) at ~$5.8M instead of actual value, allowing a flash loan attack to repeatedly borrow against false collateral."},{"date":1662595200,"name":"New Free DAO","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":1250000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"New Free DAO was exploited via flash loans when the reward calculation relied solely on deposited balance without protection. The attacker repeatedly flash-loaned funds to claim disproportionate rewards and drain ~$1.25 million in WBNB."},{"date":1635897600,"name":"Squid Games","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Liquidity Rug","amount":3380000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SQUID token (November 1, 2021) was a honeypot that allowed buying but blocked most holder sells. Price rose to $2,800, but developers withdrew the ~$3.38M SQUID/BNB pool and abandoned the project, leaving 43,000+ buyers with unsellable tokens."},{"date":1787961600,"name":"Permapod","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["ZIGChain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7205","language":null,"description":"Permapod confirmed that an exploit affected its smart contracts and subsequently secured the affected contracts and halted the protocol. The team has not yet disclosed the vulnerability, exploitation mechanism, affected markets, or amount lost"},{"date":1789603200,"name":"Nostra Money Market","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":3500000,"chain":["Starknet"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2825","parentProtocolId":"parent#nostra","language":"Cairo","description":"An attacker manipulated the price of NSTR in an illiquid onchain market, causing the manipulated price to enter NSTR’s Pragma oracle response. The attacker then used NSTR at the inflated valuation as collateral in Nostra’s money market to borrow approximately $3.5M of other assets. Pragma says NSTR had limited liquidity and source coverage, the affected oracle response had only two contributing sources, and the manipulated input reflected an onchain pool price rather than a decimals or median-calculation error. Nostra paused its money market following the incident"},{"date":1643760000,"name":"Portal","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":326000000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":326000000,"defillamaId":"1541","language":"Rust","description":"On February 2, 2022, attackers exploited Wormhole Portal by using a deprecated insecure signature verification function to mint 120,000 wrapped ETH on Solana without locking equivalent collateral on Ethereum, then redeemed for real ETH."},{"date":1648598400,"name":"BasketDAO","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":1200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"250","language":"Solidity","description":"BasketDAO's BMIZapper contract lacked input validation in the _primitiveToBMI function, allowing arbitrary external calls. The attacker passed a malicious address to drain all approved crypto assets held by the contract."},{"date":1716681600,"name":"NORMIE","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":881686,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"NORMIE meme coin was exploited through a flash loan attack that manipulated the contract's tax logic. The attacker extracted 224.98 ETH by disabling taxes and triggering automatic token dumps. The exploiter offered 90% recovery."},{"date":1781827200,"name":"mySwap CL","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":305000,"chain":["Starknet"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Cairo","description":"On June 19, 2026, at 7:15 AM UTC, mySwap's concentrated liquidity pools were exploited when an attacker created a fake EVIL token to manipulate pool accounting and share calculations. The attacker drained approximately $305K in liquidity (137.96 ETH, 45K USDC, 19.9K USDT, 230K STRK)."},{"date":1752019200,"name":"Texture","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2200000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"Texture's Solana lending protocol lost $2.2M to a vault access control vulnerability. Attacker returned $1.98M after being offered a 10% bounty."},{"date":1734480000,"name":"HarryPotterObamaSonic10Inu","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":243000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"A liquidity pool attack on HarryPotterObamaSonic10Inu 2.0 token exploited price manipulation via the pool reserves. The attacker stole 84.7 ETH through manipulation of the pool's price function."},{"date":1660089600,"name":"XSTABLE Protocol","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"XSTABLE Protocol suffered an exploit due to incorrect logic checks in its smart contract. The attack caused the XST token price to drop 98.4% and led to the protocol's website and social media channels being taken down."},{"date":1634169600,"name":"Indexed Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":16000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"188","language":"Solidity","description":"On October 14, 2021, Indexed Finance's DEFI5 and CC10 pools were drained of $16M via a sophisticated flashloan attack. The attacker used massive flashloans to knock pool balances out of equilibrium, purchased component assets at heavily discounted rates, and executed the entire attack within a single transaction."},{"date":1781827200,"name":"JB","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":50000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"JB token gateway contract on BNB Chain was drained of 49,958 USDT on June 18-19, 2026. Attacker flash-borrowed WBNB, borrowed 70M USDT from Venus as collateral, and exploited poolTransferToDeadAndSync/tradeRouterBurnPool/poolRewardTransfer functions that sync the PancakeSwap pair after each manipulation, allowing repeated arbitrage of skewed reserves until USDT released exceeded costs. Venus loan was repaid in the same transaction."},{"date":1721088000,"name":"LiFi Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":9730000,"chain":["zkSync Era","Linea","Metis"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 16, 2024 LI.FI protocol was exploited via insufficient input validation in GasZipFacet.sol, where the depositToGasZipERC20 function allowed user-controlled _swapData parameters to reach low-level calls with malicious transferFrom() calldata, draining $8-11M from 153 wallets with infinite approvals across Ethereum and Arbitrum."},{"date":1779667200,"name":"New Market Trading","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":3980000,"chain":["Ethereum","Base","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On May 25, 2026, New Market Trading's SquidRouterModule was exploited across 88 user Gnosis Safes on Ethereum, Base, and Arbitrum. The module validated permissions against caller-supplied delegate addresses instead of msg.sender, allowing attackers to route assets through attacker-controlled pools, stealing ~$3.98M."},{"date":1639785600,"name":"Grim Finance","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":30000000,"chain":["Fantom"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"493","language":"Solidity","description":"Grim Finance's GrimBoostVault lacked reentrancy guards. Attackers exploited this via nested calls during safeTransferFrom to accumulate false collateral through repeated deposits."},{"date":1794960000,"name":"Peapods Finance","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":null,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4063","language":"Solidity","description":"Peapods Finance reported a suspected compromise of its deployer key, which was used to assign minting permissions on L2 PEAS contracts. The attacker minted unauthorized PEAS, bridged the tokens to Ethereum mainnet, and sold them into market liquidity. The team removed approximately 98–99% of L2 liquidity to limit further losses and warned users to withdraw LP and leveraged yield farming positions while investigating the compromise"},{"date":1513728000,"name":"EtherDelta","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":1400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Between December 19-26, 2017, EtherDelta suffered DNS hijacking attacks by Anthony Nashatka and Elliott Gunton. Users were redirected to a phishing site where credentials were captured. The attackers stole ~$600K from Dec 19-21 and an additional $800K from a single user on Dec 26, totaling ~$1.4M."},{"date":1728864000,"name":"LeadBlock's Morpho Blue Market","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":250000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Morpho Blue PAXG/USDC market October 13-14, 2024 misconfigured oracle SCALE_FACTOR to value gold at 10^12x. Attacker deposited $350 in PAXG and withdrew ~$250K via decimal mismatch (USDC 6 vs PAXG 18 decimals)."},{"date":1608508800,"name":"Exmo","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":10500000,"chain":["Multiple"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5254","language":null,"description":"EXMO detected suspicious withdrawal activity on December 21, with attackers stealing approximately 5% of the exchange's total assets from compromised hot wallets. Multiple cryptocurrencies including BTC, ETH, XRP, ETC, ZEC, and USDT were transferred out during a coordinated withdrawal."},{"date":1752105600,"name":"Kinto Bridge","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Uninitialized Proxy","amount":1550000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4336","parentProtocolId":"parent#kinto","language":"Solidity","description":"Kinto K token contract on Arbitrum was exploited on July 10, 2025 via hidden/uninitialized proxy implementation slot (CPIMP-class vulnerability), allowing attacker to mint ~110K counterfeit tokens and drain ~577 ETH from lending pools; K token lost ~95% value."},{"date":1709078400,"name":"Smoofs","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":null,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A reentrancy vulnerability in the Smoofs staking contract allowed attackers to drain funds through unsafe external calls that enabled state to be manipulated during transaction execution."},{"date":1745452800,"name":"ACB","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":22804,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"ACB token exploited through staking reward manipulation via spot price oracle manipulation on Binance Smart Chain. Attacker manipulated oracle prices to artificially inflate reward calculations."},{"date":1750809600,"name":"Silo Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":546000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 25, 2025, Silo Finance lost $546,000 when an experimental leverage contract was mistakenly deployed to mainnet. Attacker exploited unchecked borrow() return values, using a malicious token (MalCoin) that reported constant balance=1 to drain ETH without repaying."},{"date":1671926400,"name":"Rubic","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":1410000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1282","language":"Solidity","description":"Rubic lost $1.4M on December 25, 2022 when USDC was mistakenly added to the router whitelist and routerCallNative lacked input validation. Attacker exploited user pre-approvals to RubicProxy by calling arbitrary contracts, draining USDC directly from user wallets."},{"date":1787356800,"name":"The Sandbox","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":675000,"chain":["Base","BSC","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1065","language":"Solidity","description":"The Sandbox’s SAND cross-chain bridge was exploited after an attacker abused approveAndCall on the Base SAND OFT contract to hijack LayerZero delegate permissions. The attacker changed trusted cross-chain configuration, minted unbacked SAND on Base and BNB Chain, and used the compromised bridge path to extract approximately 14.75M backed SAND from the Ethereum OFT adapter. The Sandbox disabled bridging on Base and BNB Chain and stated that SAND on Ethereum and Polygon was unaffected at the token-contract level"},{"date":1622678400,"name":"Hunny Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":null,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"402","language":"Solidity","description":"An incorrect calculation in the Hunny Minter contract allowed an attacker to execute a malicious contract 91 times, locking 1.1M in tokens via incorrect accounting logic. While the team disputed token theft, significant value was locked and dumped to markets."},{"date":1541894400,"name":"EOS.WIN","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":9180,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"EOS.WIN gambling DApp was exploited on November 12, 2018 via a randomness prediction attack. An attacker conducted 165 test transactions the day prior, then executed 10 successful attacks in one minute gaining 9,180 EOS. The attacker predicted the random number by controlling the ref block num parameter."},{"date":1794528000,"name":"Pennysia","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":5131,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"8575","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 12, 2026, an attacker exploited an arbitrary external call vulnerability in Pennysia's Settlement contract on Ethereum, stealing approximately $5,131 from four users. The attacker deployed malicious tokens to bypass spending checks in the executeSwap() function, then abused existing ERC-20 allowances to transfer USDC, wstETH and YUNO directly from users' wallets through the vulnerable contract"},{"date":1685750400,"name":"Atomic Wallet","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Supply Chain Attack","amount":100000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Tron","BSC","Bitcoin","Polkadot","Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On June 3, 2023, Atomic Wallet users lost over $100 million when attackers compromised the wallet application through a supply chain attack that injected malicious code to exfiltrate private keys. Approximately 5,500 wallets were affected across multiple chains."},{"date":1614816000,"name":"Meerkat Finance","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":31000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Meerkat Finance was drained one day after launch on March 4, 2021 when vaults containing $31M were compromised. The attacker exploited permissionless proxy initialization to gain admin control and drain funds, with the team later launching a 95%+ refund program."},{"date":1686355200,"name":"Atlantis Loans","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2500000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"745","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 7, attacker exploited weak governance controls to pass malicious proposal ID 52, gaining admin access to token proxy. Attacker modified ABep20Delegate with backdoor to extract funds from users with active token approvals."},{"date":1729814400,"name":"AARK (Aark Digital)","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Decimal Miscalculation","amount":1900000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 25, 2024, AARK (a perpetual DEX on Arbitrum) suffered a $1.9M exploit through a conversion-script decimal inflation vulnerability in its vault contracts. The protocol offered a 15% bounty for the return of stolen funds."},{"date":1791849600,"name":"Gamdom","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":4208000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Polygon","Arbitrum","Optimism","Solana","TRON","Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gambling Platform","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Gamdom suffered a multichain hot-wallet compromise following unauthorized access to an automation server. Investigators traced approximately $4.21M in stolen assets across eight networks. The attacker subsequently bridged, swapped, and distributed funds through multiple wallets and services, including Mayan, Hyperliquid, and THORChain. The precise mechanism used to obtain control of the wallets remains unconfirmed"},{"date":1642204800,"name":"Float Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1160000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"497","language":"Solidity","description":"Float Protocol's pool on RariCapital was exploited through oracle manipulation of the FLOAT/USDC Uniswap V3 pool. Insufficient liquidity in the pool allowed an attacker to create a fake position marking FLOAT at trillions of USDC per token. The exploited Uniswap V3 oracle reported this manipulated price, allowing the attacker to use FLOAT as infinite collateral to borrow all available assets."},{"date":1763596800,"name":"Dexmax AI","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":130000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attackers exploited the DMT token airdrop claiming process by tricking users into signing additional authorization transactions. After users claimed the airdrop, attackers triggered secondary signatures to approve asset transfers. Thieves stole from thousands of users and cross-chain bridged over $130K in assets to Ethereum, with most funds flowing through HitBTC."},{"date":1793577600,"name":"Mercado Bitcoin","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":40000000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum","Solana","TRON","Polygon","Arbitrum","Avalanche","BSC","Stellar","XDC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 2, 2026, attackers compromised a system at Mercado Bitcoin and transferred more than $40 million in crypto from exchange-associated wallets across various blockchains. The exchange contained the incident and temporarily suspended deposits and withdrawals while investigating the transfers. Tether froze more than $4.5 million USDT associated with the theft. Mercado Bitcoin stated that customers would not incur losses and that no customer data was exposed"},{"date":1759017600,"name":"dTRINITY","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":56000,"chain":["Sonic"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The dTRINITY swap adapter suffered a missing authorization check in its swapLiquidity() function. The attacker called the swap function using addresses of victims who had previously approved the adapter during testing. Malicious swap routes sent collateral deposits directly to attacker-controlled addresses while returning minimal amounts to pass validation, draining $56K."},{"date":1658707200,"name":"Audius","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":6000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 23-25, 2022, Audius governance contracts were compromised when an attacker exploited a missing initialization guard allowing repeated invoke() calls. The attacker drained 18 million AUDIO tokens (~$6M) from the treasury and attempted to delegate 10 trillion tokens to controlled wallets."},{"date":1793145600,"name":"zkLink Nova","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Cross-Chain Message Spoofing","amount":783100,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4335","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited zkLink’s Arbitrator contract, which failed to clear a previously authenticated message hash after processing a claim. By reusing that hash through the publicly accessible SyncL2TxHashRelayer, the attacker impersonated an authorized gateway message and installed a malicious L2 logs root. The attacker then submitted forged withdrawal proofs against the compromised root to drain approximately $783,100 from zkLink’s Ethereum bridge"},{"date":1763856000,"name":"Port3 Network","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":166000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Port3 Network's CATERC20 bridge from NEXA was exploited on November 22, 2025, via missing signature verification on mint function and unset owner address, allowing attacker to mint 1 billion PORT3 tokens."},{"date":1656201600,"name":"XCarnival","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Deposit Logic Flaw","amount":3800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1982","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 26, 2022, XCarnival NFT lending protocol was exploited via a vulnerability in collateral tracking where the orderID remained open after withdrawal. The attacker generated multiple contract addresses, used the same BAYC NFT as collateral, and repeated the deposit-borrow-withdraw cycle to obtain an infinite number of loans, siphoning 3,087 ETH (~$3.8M)."},{"date":1713830400,"name":"Magpie Protocol","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":129000,"chain":["Ethereum","Polygon","BSC","Blast","Avalanche","Arbitrum","Optimism","Base","zkSync Era","Polygon zkEVM"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 23, 2024, Magpie Protocol's MagpieRouterV2 was exploited for $129K affecting 221 wallets. The router validated selector presence but not position, allowing attackers to embed selectors in call data to bypass access controls."},{"date":1776902400,"name":"Giddy","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Incomplete Signature Coverage","amount":1300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 23, 2026, GiddyVaultV3 on Ethereum was exploited for $1.3M via incomplete EIP-712 signature coverage. Unvalidated parameters (aggregator, fromToken, toToken, amount) in SwapInfo structure allowed attackers to manipulate transaction approvals."},{"date":1779235200,"name":"MAP Protocol","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":110000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On May 20, 2026 MAP Protocol's Butter Bridge suffered a critical exploit enabling attackers to mint 1 quadrillion MAPO tokens via a collision in the bridge's retry message verification using keccak256(abi.encodePacked). The attacker triggered unauthorized minting on Ethereum and BSC, extracting approximately 52.2 ETH (~$110,000) in value before the MAPO token crashed 96%."},{"date":1670803200,"name":"BGLD","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":18000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BGLD, a deflationary token on BSC, was exploited through a flash loan price manipulation attack. The attacker used a flash loan to artificially inflate the token price, enabling a profitable swap on PancakeSwap."},{"date":1713484800,"name":"Hedgey","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":44700000,"chain":["Arbitrum","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Hedgey Finance drained for $44.7M (USDC, NOBL, MASA, BONUS) from Arbitrum and Ethereum vaults. Attacker exploited missing validation in createLockedCampaign, using flashloans to bypass access controls and create fraudulent approvals."},{"date":1526169600,"name":"MonaCoin","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":90000,"chain":["MonaCoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Between May 13-15, 2018, MonaCoin suffered a selfish mining attack where the attacker commanded up to 57% of hashrate. By mining blocks secretly and releasing them strategically, the attacker invalidated legitimate blocks and stole approximately $90K in MONA coins through exchange manipulation."},{"date":1683849600,"name":"LW Token","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":50000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited the LW token on BSC using a flashloan-based price manipulation attack. The marketAddr account held 173,272 USDT which was used to artificially manipulate the LW price on the PancakeSwap LW-BUSD pair, enabling the attacker to extract approximately 48,415 USDT through price distortion. The LW token price collapsed 69% following the exploit."},{"date":1439596800,"name":"BTER","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":1650000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BTER's servers were compromised and 50 million NXT tokens (valued at ~$1.65M) were stolen from the exchange's hot wallets. The exchange suspended operations and implemented security partnerships to prevent further losses."},{"date":1682899200,"name":"Level Perps","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":1100000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2395","parentProtocolId":"parent#level-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"Level Finance on BSC lost $1.1M in May 2023 when attackers exploited missing epoch reuse prevention in the referral claims contract. Flashloans inflated reward tiers, allowing multiple claims per epoch via the unprotected claimMultiple() function."},{"date":1788134400,"name":"Ankr","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Unbacked Mint","amount":410000,"chain":["Flow"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"278","language":"Solidity","description":"A vulnerability in Ankr’s ankrFLOW liquid-staking contract allowed an attacker to create approximately 8.6M unbacked ankrFLOW. The attacker supplied the unbacked tokens as collateral on MORE Markets and borrowed approximately 15.5M WFLOW from its lending reserve. MORE Markets’ contracts operated as designed; Flow identified the originating vulnerability as Ankr’s ankrFLOW contract"},{"date":1716854400,"name":"EXcommunity","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":37000,"chain":["BNB"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"EXcommunity was attacked through an undisclosed smart contract vulnerability, resulting in $37,000 in losses. The project team continued operations and announced plans for enhanced security measures."},{"date":1705017600,"name":"Wise Lending V1","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":464000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3491","parentProtocolId":"parent#wise-lending","language":"Solidity","description":"On January 12, 2024, Wise Lending was drained of $464K via a flashloan that exploited precision loss in _calculateShares() (division before multiplication), allowing accumulation of excess shares to withdraw more than deposited."},{"date":1554940800,"name":"TronBank","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":null,"chain":["Tron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"TronBank's invest() function did not validate that msg.tokenId was the legitimate BTT token, allowing attackers to use counterfeit tokens and artificially inflate their BTT balance. Nearly 200M counterfeit BTTs were minted."},{"date":1615766400,"name":"PancakeSwap / Cream Finance","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":null,"chain":["BSC","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Both Cream Finance and PancakeSwap had their GoDaddy-hosted DNS records hijacked simultaneously. Attackers redirected users to phishing sites requesting seed phrases and private keys. Both teams regained DNS control within hours on March 15, 2021 (by 17:30 UTC for PancakeSwap)."},{"date":1794787200,"name":"MORE Markets","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":308000,"chain":["Flow"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5320","parentProtocolId":"parent#more-markets","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 16, 2026, an attacker exploited MORE Markets on Flow EVM, draining approximately $308,000 in WFLOW from its lending reserve. The attacker used flash loans to establish e-mode positions involving ankrFLOW and WFLOW, then repeatedly self-liquidated those positions, leaving unbacked WFLOW debt in the protocol"},{"date":1794614400,"name":"Hyprearn Perps","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7289","parentProtocolId":"parent#hyprearn","language":null,"description":"On November 14, 2026, HyprEarn disclosed reports of unauthorized trading activity affecting a small number of Hyperliquid accounts that had previously authorized its API agent wallets. The team revoked its existing trading agents on its side and instructed affected users to remove their approvals directly through Hyperliquid before authorizing replacement agents. Because the agents could execute trades but not withdraw assets, any financial impact would have resulted from unauthorized trading activity rather than direct wallet withdrawals. The cause of the activity, number of affected accounts and total losses remain undisclosed."},{"date":1516924800,"name":"Coincheck","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":534000000,"chain":["NEM"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On January 26, 2018, Coincheck announced hackers stole 523 million NEM coins from its internet-connected hot wallet, which lacked adequate security controls. The exchange began reimbursing approximately 260,000 affected users."},{"date":1757462400,"name":"Evoq Finance","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":420000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5959","language":"Solidity","description":"On BNB Chain, Evoq Finance's smart contract was compromised when an attacker stole the owner's private key. The attacker transferred contract ownership, deployed a malicious upgrade, and drained approximately $420K from the protocol and user-approved token accounts."},{"date":1625184000,"name":"XDX Swap","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":176000,"chain":["Huobi Eco Chain"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 2, 2021, XDX Swap on the HECO chain was exploited via a suspected backdoor in the cross-chain decentralized exchange code, allowing an attacker to extract approximately $176K (85.17 ETH). Most funds were subsequently recovered with support from Star Labs and the HECO White Hat Security Alliance."},{"date":1774915200,"name":"LML/USDT staking protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":950000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 1, 2026, the LML/USDT staking protocol on BSC was exploited for $950K via price manipulation. Attacker purchased nearly all LML supply from PancakeSwap using 309.5M USDT, burned tokens, and manipulated TWAP to claim rewards at artificially inflated rates, causing LML to crash 99.6% to $0.1758."},{"date":1787097600,"name":"BounceBit","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":3000000,"chain":["BounceBit"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#bouncebit","language":"Go","description":"BounceBit Chain was exploited through an authorization flaw in a protocol-level module inherited from the Evmos stack. A function supporting vesting/lockup operations allowed the caller to specify another account as the source of funds without correctly verifying that the source account had authorized the debit. The attacker used this flaw to transfer 286.54M BB from nine accounts without stealing private keys or forging signatures. BounceBit subsequently halted the chain and decided to retire its Layer 1 and reissue BB on BNB Chain from a pre-exploit snapshot"},{"date":1678838400,"name":"Poolz Network","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":390000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4385","parentProtocolId":"parent#poolz-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"Poolz Finance was exploited through an integer overflow vulnerability in the unaudited LockedControl contract. The attacker manipulated the CreateMassPools function and GetArraySum method to trick the vesting contract into believing large amounts were deposited while actually depositing minimal tokens."},{"date":1790035200,"name":"Drop","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":4400000,"chain":["Neutron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4993","language":"Rust","description":"Neutron governance proposal 9 reassigned administration of Drop’s dATOM converter and withdrawal-manager contracts to the attacker. After the proposal passed, the attacker migrated both contracts to previously uploaded malicious code exposing a withdraw_all function and swept their entire balances. Drop’s liquid-staking or redemption logic itself was not exploited; the contracts were taken over through Neutron chain governance"},{"date":1715212800,"name":"Bloom","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":540000,"chain":["Blast"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3466","language":"Solidity","description":"Bloom was exploited through a mint vulnerability on the Blast blockchain, resulting in $540,000 in losses. The team negotiated with the exploiter who offered a 10% bug bounty, recovering 90% of stolen funds for redistribution to liquidity providers."},{"date":1723420800,"name":"iVest","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":190000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 12, 2024, iVest token on BSC was exploited via a business logic flaw in its custom ERC20 transfer function. The __MakeDonation function, invoked during token transfers, had vulnerabilities that allowed attackers to manipulate token prices and extract value through the donation mechanism."},{"date":1710460800,"name":"Mozaic","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":2000000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3531","language":"Solidity","description":"Rogue developer stole a core team member's private key, gaining access to the bridgeViaLifi function. Attackers drained $2.4M, with 90% recovered after funds were frozen on MEXC exchange."},{"date":1636934400,"name":"Nerve","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":537000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"301","language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker exploited the same MetaPool vulnerability in Nerve Finance that previously affected Synapse Bridge. Using flash loan attacks on fUSDT and UST MetaPools, the attacker exhausted pool liquidity by exploiting the inconsistent calculation of LP token value between swap and swapUnderlying functions."},{"date":1384128000,"name":"Bitcash","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":100000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Bitcash.cz was compromised and bitcoins from up to 4,000 customer wallets were stolen. The attack appeared to use phishing emails sent from compromised Bitcash staff accounts to lure victims into sending BTC for supposed recovery."},{"date":1685491200,"name":"unshETH","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Stored Publicly","amount":375000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2539","language":"Solidity","description":"A developer leaked private deployment keys to GitHub, which an attacker exploited to drain $375K from the unshETH staking protocol. The attacker transferred ownership of smart contracts to themselves before the protocol emergency-paused withdrawals and the keys were secured."},{"date":1791504000,"name":"Ledger (Supply Chain)","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Supply Chain Attack","amount":93000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attackers purchased genuine Ledger hardware wallets, installed concealed components capable of capturing recovery phrases, and redistributed the modified devices through resellers. The implants monitored the wallets’ displays during initialization and transmitted captured recovery phrases through cellular connections. Attackers subsequently derived users’ private keys and drained their cryptocurrency holdings. Ledger confirmed that its Secure Element, operating system, and internal infrastructure were not compromised"},{"date":1643673600,"name":"BNS","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":7500000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BitBNS exchange in India was hacked on February 1, 2022, via AWS cloud storage misconfiguration exposing private key backups. Attacker drained hot wallets for $7.5-8M; incident was concealed until March 2023."},{"date":1758153600,"name":"New Gold Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1900000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"New Gold Protocol (NGP) was exploited on its launch day when the attacker exploited a flashloan-powered price oracle manipulation. The protocol relied on DEX pair reserves to calculate the NGP token price, allowing a single Uniswap pool to be manipulated. The attacker used a flash loan to distort pool balances, artifically lowering the reported price to bypass transaction limits and acquire massive amounts of tokens at unrealistic prices. Stolen assets were bridged to Ethereum through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1767657600,"name":"IPOR Fusion","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":336000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":336000,"defillamaId":"5145","parentProtocolId":"parent#ipor","language":"Solidity","description":"On January 6, 2026, Fusion PlasmaVault on Arbitrum was exploited via EIP-7702 delegation; missing instantWithdraw validation allowed malicious fuse contracts to execute arbitrary code and drain $336K USDC. ~$267K was moved to Tornado Cash."},{"date":1692921600,"name":"Magnate Finance","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Treasury Misappropriation","amount":6500000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3342","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 25, 2023, Magnate Finance team rug-pulled Base depositors by deleting communication channels (Telegram/website), manipulating the price oracle, and draining all assets. The deployer had previously executed Solfire rug ($4.8M) in 2022."},{"date":1540512000,"name":"EosRoyale","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":60000,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"EosRoyale gambling platform was exploited via a prior-block randomness vulnerability on October 26, 2018. Attackers calculated future random numbers by analyzing information from previous blocks, predicting game outcomes. 11,000 EOS were stolen from the operational wallet, valued at approximately $60,000 at the time."},{"date":1693267200,"name":"EAC","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":6376,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"EAC token on BSC was exploited via a flash loan attack. The attacker used a DODO X flash loan to artificially inflate EAC price, executed large swaps on Pancakeswap to increase token price beyond fair value, then sold the inflated position for profit after repaying the loan."},{"date":1776729600,"name":"Volo Vault","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":3500000,"chain":["Sui"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3711","parentProtocolId":"parent#navi-protocol","language":"Move","description":"On April 21, 2026, Volo Protocol on Sui was exploited when a high-privilege admin key was compromised, likely via social engineering. The attacker drained three vaults: WBTC (~$2.1M), XAUm (~$0.9M), and USDC (~$0.5M). The team recovered ~$3.44M (90%) of funds after blocking a $500K bridge attempt."},{"date":1785974400,"name":"Hyperliquid Malaysia","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":null,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"On August 6, 2026, a wallet associated with Hyperliquid Malaysia was exploited via a compromised private key on Solana. The exploiter address was identified on-chain; the loss amount was not disclosed and no dedicated post-mortem has been published."},{"date":1731715200,"name":"DEXX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":21000000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 16, 2024, DEXX memecoin trading terminal suffered a security breach affecting at least 900 users when attackers gained access to private keys and drained wallet contents across Solana. Post-investigation estimates reached $30M, with SlowMist linking 8,620+ wallets to the attacker and one user losing over $1M."},{"date":1723420800,"name":"PolyNetwork","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":5000000,"chain":["PolyNetwork"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 12, 2024, an undisclosed vulnerability in Poly Network's Cross-Chain Management Contract drained $4-5M in wrapped assets on Neo N3, de-pegging Flamingo's f- and p-assets. Poly Network suspended the bridge and Flamingo paused cross-chain features; Neo Global Development relaunched and took over in September. This was the third Poly Network compromise."},{"date":1735257600,"name":"Bizness","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":15700,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Standing on Bizness protocol on Base was exploited via a reentrancy vulnerability in its contract logic. The attacker repeatedly called functions before state was properly updated, enabling them to drain funds through reentrant calls."},{"date":1735948800,"name":"Sorra Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":41000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Sorra Finance's staking contract had a critical flaw in the getPendingRewards() function that failed to track and deduct previously claimed rewards. The attacker deposited 122,868 SOR tokens with a 14-day lockup, then repeatedly called withdraw() to claim the same rewards multiple times before the state was updated."},{"date":1621209600,"name":"FinNexus","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":7000000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"170","language":"Solidity","description":"The private key to the FinNexus contract deployer account was compromised, allowing the attacker to assume contract ownership. The attacker minted 323M FNX on Ethereum (~$6M) and 60M FNX on BSC (~$1.6M), then immediately dumped tokens on markets. FNX price collapsed from $0.356 to $0.0272 (92% decline)."},{"date":1623024000,"name":"88mph","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"157","language":"Solidity","description":"A critical initialization bug in the 88mph NFT contract allowed anyone to call initialize() multiple times, enabling arbitrary contract owner takeover and unrestricted NFT minting. An attacker could have stolen all underlying assets by minting/burning user NFTs. Reported via Immunefi with $42,069 bounty; 88mph patched within 2 hours."},{"date":1635465600,"name":"AnubisDAO","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":60000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"AnubisDAO collected 13,556 ETH (~$60M) from investors in October 2021 but redirected all funds to attacker wallets within 20 hours. Funds were later laundered through Tornado Cash in July 2023."},{"date":1618185600,"name":"PancakeSwap","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1800000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An insider with admin lottery access exploited a predictable block-hash-based RNG by orchestrating multiple transactions in the same block with varied gas prices. This allowed manipulation of the random number generator to predict winning tickets and withdraw 59,765 CAKE (~$1.8M) from the lottery prize pool."},{"date":1721001600,"name":"Minterest","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":1400000,"chain":["Mantle"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker flash loaned USDY tokens, triggering a reentrancy attack during the transfer fallback function. Exchange rate updates executed immediately after borrow operations, allowing the attacker to manipulate rates and liquidate user positions for mETH and WETH."},{"date":1669939200,"name":"Overnight Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5710","language":"Solidity","description":"OverNight protocol on Avalanche suffered a flash loan attack on December 2, 2022. The attacker exploited protocol logic to drain funds using a flash loan."},{"date":1748217600,"name":"Dexodus Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Stale Oracle Price","amount":300000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":300000,"defillamaId":"5428","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 26, 2025, Dexodus Finance's leverage module was exploited for ~$291K via a stale Chainlink oracle report. The attacker used the valid but outdated data to enter a 100x leveraged long position at artificially low ETH price, then closed at the correct price within the same transaction. Dexodus recovered 100% of affected liquidity within 24 hours."},{"date":1775260800,"name":"BSC TMM/USDT","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1665000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 4, 2026, attacker used flashloans to burn ~850M TMM tokens, reducing the TMM reserve to 1 token in the TMM/USDT pool. This price distortion allowed swapping for 272M USDT, netting $1.665M profit after flashloan repayment. Inadequate access controls enabled the large-scale burn."},{"date":1774137600,"name":"Cyrus Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":5000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On March 22, 2026, Cyrus Finance on BSC was exploited through price manipulation. Attacker abused reliance on live PancakeSwap V3 spot price in withdrawal logic, with no TWAP or oracle resistance, to extract liquidity and tokens."},{"date":1667952000,"name":"Brahma Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":89343,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 9, 2022, Brahma Finance's TopGear vault on Ethereum was exploited via an arbitrary external call vulnerability in the Zapper contract, where the swapTarget parameter was not validated, allowing an attacker to construct malicious call data and drain 89,343 USDC from three authorized user accounts."},{"date":1646784000,"name":"Fantasm Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":2622097,"chain":["Fantom"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Fantasm Finance's mint function validated msg.value instead of the actual FTM amount transferred, allowing attackers to mint XFTM without collateral. The attacker drained the reserve of 1,008.5 ETH (~$2.62M), swapped it through Tornado Cash, and XFTM fell ~98%."},{"date":1708560000,"name":"Swarm Markets","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":472892,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"956","language":"Solidity","description":"A vulnerability in Swarm Markets' xTokenWrapper contract allowed unauthorized access to withdraw assets. While a MEV bot intercepted most of the attacker's attempts, the first hacker secured 472.8K SMT plus DAI and USDC."},{"date":1470096000,"name":"Bitfinex","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":72000000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2275","language":null,"description":"Bitfinex suffered a security breach when an attacker compromised hot wallet private keys, stealing 119,756 bitcoins (~$72 million). The exchange halted trading and withdrawals while investigating."},{"date":1554940800,"name":"TronWow","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Tron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"TronWow gambling game's random number generation was exploitable, allowing attackers to predict game outcomes. Attackers launched 1,203 attacks and extracted 2,167,377 TRX in profits."},{"date":1645056000,"name":"TopGoal","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":1100000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"TopGoal's hot wallet was compromised, leading to the theft of over 4.8 million TMT tokens used for TopPrize rewards distribution. The attacker swapped TMT tokens for BNB on PancakeSwap and used Tornado Cash to obscure the transfer. User assets and NFTs remained secure as they were stored separately."},{"date":1597708800,"name":"OKEx","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":5600000,"chain":["Ethereum Classic"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attackers conducted a 51% attack on Ethereum Classic to execute a double-spend against OKEx. They deposited ETC, withdrew it, then reorganized the blockchain to erase the deposit transaction while keeping their funds, resulting in a net $5.6M theft via unconfirmed transaction reversal."},{"date":1743292800,"name":"SIR","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Proxy Upgrade Hijack","amount":355000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5842","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 30, 2025, SIR.trading on Ethereum was exploited for $355K via callback validation flaw. Vault contract's callback did not validate Uniswap pool address, allowing replacement with attacker-controlled address via transient storage manipulation (one of first Dencun-targeted exploits)."},{"date":1765843200,"name":"Yearn Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"113","parentProtocolId":"parent#yearn","language":"Solidity","description":"Yearn Finance's legacy V1 TUSD vault was exploited for $300K via a donation attack. Attackers deposited Fulcrum sUSD tokens to artificially inflate share price, allowing Yearn TUSD tokens to be minted at minimal cost before the price collapsed."},{"date":1781049600,"name":"Raydium AMM","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":1340000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"214","parentProtocolId":"parent#raydium","language":"Rust","description":"Raydium on Solana lost $1.34M on June 10, 2026 in its deprecated AMM V3 program when attacker bypassed LP token validation using a fake token address. Attacker drained inactive pools containing USDC, SOL and RAY by bypassing proportion checks."},{"date":1785974400,"name":"RRWallet","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Weak Key Generation","amount":2000000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"On August 6, 2026, RRWallet was exploited via weak key generation on Bitcoin, allowing an attacker to derive private keys and steal approximately $2,000,000. Flagged by Coinspect; no dedicated post-mortem has been published."},{"date":1648684800,"name":"Ola Finance","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":4670000,"chain":["Fuse"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Voltage Finance on Fuse was drained of ~$4.67M via a reentrancy attack. The attacker funded a flash loan, borrowed against collateral, then used ERC677's transfer callback to reenter and withdraw collateral without repaying, repeating until markets were empty before bridging to Ethereum and BNB Chain."},{"date":1666828800,"name":"UvToken","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1500000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 27, 2022, UvToken's mining pool contract on BSC was exploited via a logic error in the withdrawal mechanism where input validation failed to authenticate the caller, allowing an attacker to make malicious calls and seize approximately 1,078 BNB and 1,161,991 BUSD (~$1.5M) from the vault."},{"date":1780790400,"name":"Ambient","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Deposit Logic Flaw","amount":110600,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3104","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited Ambient Finance's single-contract architecture by transferring 50 ETH to a newly created contract and extracting ~83.72 ETH via insufficient access controls in the deposit/withdrawal logic."},{"date":1647302400,"name":"DEUS Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":3000000,"chain":["Fantom"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1387","language":"Solidity","description":"Deus Finance derivatives platform was exploited via oracle manipulation. A flash loan was used to move prices in Solidly and Spirit pools, causing the Muon oracle to report inflated prices. This triggered cascading liquidations rendering users insolvent."},{"date":1789516800,"name":"Flamincome","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":595000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"243","language":"Solidity","description":"Flamincome’s VaultYUSDT strategy valued its Convex-staked Curve USDP LP position using the strategy’s BaseRewardPool.balanceOf() multiplied by Curve’s spot get_virtual_price(). The attacker used approximately $18M USDT of Morpho flash liquidity to acquire USDP and imbalance-mint USDP metapool LP, then permissionlessly staked LP for the strategy through Convex. This temporarily increased the strategy’s reported holdings/NAV. VaultYUSDT immediately incorporated the manipulated valuation into its share price, allowing the attacker to redeem shares at an inflated value and force the strategy to withdraw real aUSDT liquidity from Aave"},{"date":1629331200,"name":"Liquid Global","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":91350000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On August 19, 2021, Japanese cryptocurrency exchange Liquid Global's warm wallets were compromised, resulting in the theft of approximately $91-97 million in various cryptocurrencies including BTC, ETH, TRX, and XRP. The attack leveraged data from a prior November 2020 breach to compromise the MPC wallet system."},{"date":1688688000,"name":"Multichain","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":126000000,"chain":["Moonriver","BSC","Fantom"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"591","language":null,"description":"Multichain lost ~$126M on July 6-7, 2023 from bridge reserves on Fantom, Moonriver and Dogechain (WBTC, WETH, USDC, USDT, DAI, LINK and more). CEO Zhaojun, who held the MPC signing keys, had been detained since May 2023; project shut down days later."},{"date":1717113600,"name":"MixedSwapRouter","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":16000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MixedSwapRouter on Arbitrum was exploited through an arbitrary external call vulnerability that allowed unauthorized token transfers from the protocol."},{"date":1639440000,"name":"NerveBridge","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":537000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2561","language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker exploited a flaw in Nerve Bridge's MetaPool swap function where the swap function underestimated LP token value compared to swapUnderlying. Using a flash loan attack, the attacker received inflated LP tokens for deposited fUSDT, then removed BUSD liquidity and used swapUnderlying to extract additional fUSDT for a total profit of 900 BNB."},{"date":1793923200,"name":"Keplr Wallet (Web3Auth)","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":null,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"In November 2026, attackers exploited a vulnerability in Web3Auth's infrastructure that exposed private keys belonging to Keplr wallets created using Google or Apple login, allowing unauthorized transactions from affected accounts. Web3Auth and Keplr suspended the affected services and initiated a recovery operation using the same vulnerability to transfer approximately $5.6 million from exposed wallets into secure addresses before attackers could steal the funds. The total amount stolen before the recovery operation remains undisclosed, and the teams are working to return the secured assets to their owners"},{"date":1580688000,"name":"LuckLambo104","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":1500,"chain":["Tron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A rollback attack exploited the LuckLambo104 smart contract on February 3, 2020, one day after deployment. Attackers created attack contracts that executed transaction rollbacks, causing 6,588 TRX to be improperly redistributed from the contract. The attack highlights the importance of thorough security testing before mainnet deployment."},{"date":1767830400,"name":"Truebit","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":26400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Truebit Protocol suffered $26.44M exploit on January 8, 2026 from integer overflow in token purchase logic (Solidity 0.6.10 unpatched). Attacker minted TRU at negligible cost and sold to bonding-curve for ~$26M; TRU crashed 99.9%."},{"date":1736812800,"name":"The Idols","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":324000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1596","language":"Solidity","description":"The Idols NFT contract had a flaw in the _beforeTokenTransfer function that incorrectly handled reward distribution when sender and recipient were the same address. By repeatedly calling safeTransferFrom with identical from/to addresses, an attacker exploited the logic flaw to drain 97 stETH from the reward pool."},{"date":1792108800,"name":"Affluent","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Unbacked Mint","amount":1053000,"chain":["TON"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5726","language":null,"description":"Affluent’s lending vaults reportedly suffered unauthorized share minting that allowed attackers to redeem vault assets without providing corresponding deposits. The supplied analysis identifies suspicious transactions on September 30, October 12, and October 16, 2026, involving multiple wallets. Extracted assets were reportedly transferred through exchanges, swaps, and cross-chain services"},{"date":1654646400,"name":"ApolloX","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":2150000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 8, 2022, ApolloX on BSC was exploited when a hacker accumulated 255 signatures using a flaw in the Trading Rewards Contract and used them to withdraw 53 million APX tokens from the Withdrawal Contract without proper verification. The tokens were swapped for ~$2.15M BUSD via PancakeSwap."},{"date":1752624000,"name":"BigONE","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Supply Chain Attack","amount":27000000,"chain":["Bitcoin","BSC","Ethereum","Solana","TRON"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4928","language":null,"description":"On July 16, 2025, BigONE crypto exchange suffered a supply chain attack where an attacker gained access to production infrastructure and modified critical backend logic to automatically approve fraudulent withdrawal requests. The attack drained approximately $27 million across five blockchains before being detected."},{"date":1791417600,"name":"Ethervista","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":18600,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5092","language":"Solidity","description":"EtherVista’s EtherVistaPair.swap() contained an integer overflow vulnerability in its constant-product invariant check. Because the contract multiplied two uint112 reserves without sufficient overflow protection, the calculation could wrap around and incorrectly validate swaps that reduced the pool’s actual reserve product. An attacker registered a malicious contract as an authorized router and executed two crafted swaps to withdraw WETH and VISTA from the pool"},{"date":1790121600,"name":"Meter","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Meter","BSC","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#meter","language":"Go","description":"On September 23 at 21:14 UTC, an attacker exploited a block-validation flaw on Meter mainnet that allowed unbacked MTR and MTRG to be created. The attacker dumped the counterfeit assets through DEXs and bridged proceeds out of Meter. Meter paused both mainnet and its bridge and warned that transactions after block 100731417 may not be honored. The team preserved chain state and is determining a recovery method"},{"date":1697155200,"name":"Beluga","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":175000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1330","language":"Solidity","description":"Beluga Protocol's multichain AMM on Arbitrum was exploited through pool balance manipulation, resulting in approximately 175K USD in losses. Beluga is a Layer 3 infrastructure aggregating liquidity across multiple chains."},{"date":1781481600,"name":"Thetanuts Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":105471.5,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1085","language":"Solidity","description":" A deprecated Thetanuts Finance Index Vault was exploited through an integer-division rounding flaw in its mint accounting. Using a flash loan, the attacker reduced the index token supply to a minimal level and repeatedly minted replacement shares while required underlying-token deposits rounded to zero, allowing the attacker to retain assets redeemed from the vault. The attacker extracted 105,471.499078 USDC plus residual option-token positions. About one hour later, a whitehat used the same vulnerability to secure approximately $2M of assets from another vulnerable legacy vault"},{"date":1686528000,"name":"Keep3r Network","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Weak Key Generation","amount":200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"636","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 12, 2023, an attacker compromised Keep3r Network's governor private key (an insecure vanity address). Attacker reset pool governors and launched a reentrancy attack, harvesting ~4,084 KP3R (~$200K); attacker was funded via Tornado Cash."},{"date":1700265600,"name":"SpookySwap","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Frontend Compromise","amount":5000,"chain":["Fantom"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"SpookySwap's frontend domain was compromised on November 18, 2023, with malicious phishing code injected to impersonate legitimate contract interactions. Users accessing the compromised domain were tricked into signing transactions draining their wallets. The attack resulted in $5K in realized losses before the team identified and removed the malicious code."},{"date":1752019200,"name":"ZKSwap","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":5000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 9, 2025, ZKSwap's Ethereum Layer 1 bridge was exploited through its emergency withdrawal mechanism (Exodus Mode). The attacker exploited a critical flaw where the verifyExitProof() function failed to perform actual cryptographic verification of zero-knowledge proofs. By forging withdrawal proofs, the attacker artificially inflated their balance and withdrew approximately $5 million in assets."},{"date":1653782400,"name":"Anchor","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Stale Oracle Price","amount":800000,"chain":["Terra"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"294","language":"Solidity","description":"After Luna 2.0 launch, Chainlink froze LUNC price updates while the oracle maintained a hardcoded $0.10 minimum. An attacker deposited bLUNA at vastly inflated collateral value and borrowed 40M UST for a net $800K profit. Anchor froze markets immediately upon discovery."},{"date":1645315200,"name":"OpenSea","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":2000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"OpenSea users received phishing emails impersonating the platform and requesting wallet connection for a contract migration. Attackers tricked users into approving malicious transactions that transferred NFTs to attacker-controlled wallets. The attack stole approximately 640 ETH worth of NFTs from 28 wallets."},{"date":1725926400,"name":"Indodax","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":25200000,"chain":["Ethereum","Polygon","Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6443","language":null,"description":"On September 10, 2024, Indodax Indonesian crypto exchange suffered a $25.47 million hack affecting its hot wallet. Attackers obtained approximately 5,204 ETH ($12.37M) along with Polygon, Tron, Bitcoin and various ERC-20 tokens without compromising private keys, suggesting the breach involved the withdrawal protocol itself."},{"date":1628380800,"name":"Zerogoki","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":670000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 8, 2021, Zerogoki was exploited for approximately $670K when an attacker provided a price oracle signed by legitimate private keys but containing crafted token swap amounts, bypassing normal validation and allowing unauthorized fund extraction."},{"date":1773100800,"name":"Movie Token","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":242000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Movie Token's extractFromPoolForLpMining function burned tokens directly from the PancakeSwap MT/WBNB LP pair without the pair's knowledge. Combined with a flash swap callback, this allowed the attacker to collapse the pool's MT reserve from 6.76M to 21K, enabling massive sell orders at inflated prices."},{"date":1527897600,"name":"ZenCash","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":550000,"chain":["ZenCash"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On June 2, 2018, ZenCash (now Horizen) suffered a 51% attack resulting in double-spend losses of over $500K. The attacker gained majority hashrate control and reorganized 38 blocks, executing double-spends of 13,000 and 6,600 ZEN across exchanges. The attack likely involved rented hashpower from NiceHash."},{"date":1792800000,"name":"X100","classification":"Governance","technique":"Flashloan Governance Attack","amount":4750000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"X100’s governance system allowed an attacker to obtain two of three Senate seats using flash-loan-funded X tokens. The attacker immediately used this majority to approve and execute a malicious treasury proposal within the same transaction. The proposal forced the Freezer to swap 400,000 X tokens into an attacker-controlled liquidity pool with zero minimum output, allowing the attacker to extract treasury value through a manipulated trade"},{"date":1689811200,"name":"FFIST","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":110000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"FFIST's _airdrop() function used predictable randomness via manipulable parameters (last airdrop address, block number). Fixed airdrop amounts (1 token) created pool imbalances, collapsing FFIST price to $1 and allowing attackers to swap small token amounts for disproportionate USD value."},{"date":1740700800,"name":"Wemix","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":6220000,"chain":["Wemix"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"An attacker stole authentication credentials for Wemix's Nile NFT platform service monitoring system and used them to gain access to the Play Bridge Vault. The attacker executed 13 successful withdrawals over two months of preparation, extracting 8.65 million WEMIX tokens and selling them on external exchanges. Wemix delayed disclosure by one week citing precautionary measures."},{"date":1776038400,"name":"Dango","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":1900000,"chain":["Dango"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":410000,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 13, 2026, Dango Protocol was exploited for $1.9M via missing validation on donation amounts. Attackers donated negative amounts to manipulate protocol balances, cashing out $410K before the team recovered $1.49M in tokens."},{"date":1786060800,"name":"Ravencoin","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":null,"chain":["Ravencoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"On August 7, 2026, the Ravencoin network was affected by a missing input validation issue. Flagged by the Ravencoin project; the loss amount was not disclosed and no dedicated post-mortem has been published."},{"date":1742428800,"name":"BBXToken","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":12000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BBXToken's transfer function includes a burn mechanism that transfers liquidity pool tokens to a dead address before calling sync(). An attacker exploited this to artificially manipulate PancakeSwap's pool reserves, creating an imbalance that allowed extraction of value from the pool."},{"date":1641600000,"name":"LCX","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":7940000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On January 8, 2022 at 10:23 PM GMT, attackers compromised LCX's Ethereum hot wallets and transferred $7.94 million in assets including ENJ, LINK, SAND, and stablecoins. Funds were converted within 45 minutes; LCX recovered ~60% through law enforcement."},{"date":1779062400,"name":"Echo Bridge","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":821000,"chain":["Monad"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4956","parentProtocolId":"parent#echo-protocol","language":"Solidity","description":"Echo Protocol's Monad bridge was compromised on May 18, 2026 when attacker obtained admin key with minting privileges, minting 1,000 eBTC and executing swaps to extract 385 ETH (~$821K realized)."},{"date":1536883200,"name":"NewDex","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":58000,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"542","language":"C++","description":"Newdex decentralized exchange was exploited on September 14, 2018 when hackers created one billion fake EOS tokens named 'EOS'. The platform's lack of smart contract validation and reliance on personal accounts for settlement allowed attackers to purchase real EOS (4,028) and other tokens (BLACK, IQ, ADD) using the counterfeit tokens. The exchange compensated all users."},{"date":1667433600,"name":"pNetwork","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":4300000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"547","language":"Solidity","description":"A governance key leaked in pNetwork's pGALA bridge contract on BSC allowed 55.6B pGALA tokens to be minted and sold on PancakeSwap. The pNetwork team executed a white-hat intervention to drain $4.3M from PancakeSwap and limit losses."},{"date":1775692800,"name":"Aethir","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":400000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5591","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 9, 2026, attacker took over AethirOFTAdapter on BNB Chain and drained ~423K ATH via unprotected ownership/admin function with no multisig or timelock. Funds were bridged to TRON via Symbiosis; Aethir disconnected contracts and coordinated blacklisting with major exchanges."},{"date":1642464000,"name":"Crosswise","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":879000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Crosswise's MasterChef contract had public exposure of privileged functions, allowing an attacker to gain unauthorized access. The hacker exploited this to set a trusted forwarder, compromise owner privileges, and withdraw 692K CRSS tokens. After swapping to WBNB, the attacker laundered 547 WBNB through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1792195200,"name":"Qubic","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Weak Key Generation","amount":1300000,"chain":["Qubic"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#qubic","language":"JavaScript","description":"An attacker exploited predictable wallet seeds generated with insufficient randomness in Qubic’s wallet software, compromising 1,404 user wallets and stealing approximately 2.94 trillion QU. The vulnerability affected certain wallets created on Apple devices and Safari browsers. Qubic halted its network at tick 85,371,949, while MEXC froze the account receiving the remaining stolen funds. Seed generation was corrected in wallet version 4.26.4"},{"date":1675036800,"name":"BEVO","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":45000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On January 30, 2023, the BEVO reflection token on BSC was exploited. The attacker took a flash loan of 192.5 WBNB, swapped for BEVO tokens, and invoked the deliver function which decreased the _rTotal value. This manipulation of the deflationary mechanism allowed the attacker to profit approximately $45K."},{"date":1674086400,"name":"Thoreum Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":65540,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1068","language":"Solidity","description":"On January 19, 2023, Thoreum Finance on BSC was exploited through a logic flaw in the transfer mechanism. An attacker deposited BNB to gain WBNB, then used the swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens function to exchange for THOREUM tokens, exploiting a branch in the transfer logic to profit approximately 2,260 BNB (~$65.5K)."},{"date":1706400000,"name":"Goledo","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1700000,"chain":["Conflux"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2576","language":"Solidity","description":"Goledo Finance, a lending protocol on Conflux eSpace, was exploited when an attacker borrowed 11M CFX via flash loan and purchased 24.6M PPI tokens to artificially inflate the price. The attacker then used the inflated PPI price as collateral to borrow 7.9M CFX from Goledo's lending pool. The attacker later contacted Goledo to negotiate."},{"date":1648339200,"name":"Revest Finance","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":2010000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"830","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 27, 2022, Revest Finance was exploited via ERC1155 reentrancy when the fnftId counter was incremented after the external callback. The attacker re-entered the mint function to create multiple FNFTs pointing to the same pool, then redeemed all to drain ~$2M in BLOCKS, ECO, and RENA tokens."},{"date":1787270400,"name":"MANTRA Chain","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":0,"chain":["MANTRA"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#mantra","language":"Go","description":"MANTRA Chain halted its network after detecting an exploit involving its Cosmos EVM module. The incident was isolated to two MANTRA-controlled wallets and was traced to a vulnerability in an upstream dependency. MANTRA contained the immediate threat, prepared a patched release, and stated that no user funds were exploited"},{"date":1619913600,"name":"Spartan","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":30500000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1246","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 1, 2021, Spartan Protocol on BSC suffered the first flashloan attack on the chain, losing $30M. An attacker obtained a 100k WBNB flashloan, inflated the liquidity pool's asset balance through multiple transactions, then burned pool tokens to withdraw an unfair share because the contract checked current balance instead of cached balance."},{"date":1732147200,"name":"Matez","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":80000,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 21, 2024, the Matez protocol on BNB Chain was exploited via an integer truncation vulnerability in its arithmetic operations, resulting in approximately $80K in losses."},{"date":1712620800,"name":"xBlast","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":84500,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On April 9, 2024, the xBlast protocol's main wallet was compromised and the attacker transferred XBL tokens worth approximately 22 ETH (~$84.5K) to an alternate address and sold them. xBlast responded with plans to deploy new XB tokens and provide fair compensation to affected users."},{"date":1788998400,"name":"Dominion","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":null,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"An attacker exploited Dominion’s treasury wallet associated with SILV, Dominion’s tokenized silver product on Solana. Sunrise confirmed the incident originated with Dominion and was not a compromise of Sunrise infrastructure. Sunrise subsequently removed the SILV market from its UI and warned users not to interact with the SILV token while Dominion and its security partners investigate. The exact mechanism through which the treasury wallet was compromised has not yet been disclosed"},{"date":1705363200,"name":"Bungee","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":3300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Socket's Bungee bridge aggregator was exploited on January 16, 2024 when missing validation of the swapExtraData parameter allowed over 700 users to lose $3.3M via injected unauthorized transferFrom calls."},{"date":1778112000,"name":"TrustedVolumes","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Caller Impersonation","amount":6700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited missing access control in TrustedVolumes' RFQ swap proxy to add themselves to the order signer allowlist, forge trade orders, and drain funds across 85 transactions in WETH, WBTC, USDT, and USDC."},{"date":1601251200,"name":"Eminence","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":15000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Eminence, an incomplete unaudited DeFi project by Andre Cronje, was exploited less than 3 hours after launch. The attacker borrowed 15M DAI from Uniswap, bought EMN, burned half for eAAVE to artificially inflate the price, then withdrew from the bonding curve at the manipulated price, draining the protocol."},{"date":1712880000,"name":"Sumer.money","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":350000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3814","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 12, 2024, SumerMoney (a Compound fork) on Base was exploited via reentrancy vulnerability. An attacker used a flashloan and reentrancy call to manipulate exchange rates and redeem collateral at inflated rates, extracting approximately $310K worth of assets while bypassing proper accounting."},{"date":1670630400,"name":"MU&MUG","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":57000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MU&MUG tokens on Avalanche were exploited through a flash loan price manipulation attack. The attacker used a flash loan to artificially inflate the token price, enabling profitable swaps that drained $57K."},{"date":1777334400,"name":"YieldCore-3rd-deal","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":398764,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"YieldCore's RWAVault overrode ERC4626 withdraw() and redeem() functions but removed the standard authorization check when msg.sender ≠ owner. Any caller could specify an arbitrary depositor as owner and direct withdrawn assets to an arbitrary receiver. An attacker drained 392,764 USDC of principal from eight depositors across multiple calls."},{"date":1773705600,"name":"dTRINITY dLEND","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"First Depositor Attack","amount":257000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5590","parentProtocolId":"parent#dtrinity","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 17, 2026, dTRINITY dLEND was exploited for ~$257K through an empty market vulnerability. The attacker manipulated the liquidityIndex via repeated flashloan premium accrual on a newly-deployed cbBTC reserve with near-zero liquidity, inflating collateral valuations and enabling borrowing of the entire dUSD supply."},{"date":1709942400,"name":"Juice Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":54000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4208","language":"Solidity","description":"Juice staking contract drained of 1.3M tokens via exploit of reward distribution logic. Attacker swiftly sold tokens on Uniswap, netting ~54 ETH. Team recovered by airdropping stakers their stake plus 10% bonus."},{"date":1308441600,"name":"Mt. Gox","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":8750000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Mt. Gox's auditor's computer was compromised, giving attackers access to the exchange's admin credentials. Attackers manipulated the exchange price to $0.01 BTC and used the access to drain customer accounts, transferring approximately 2,000 BTC while 650 more were purchased at the artificially low price."},{"date":1581984000,"name":"Ooki","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":650000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"197","language":null,"description":"On February 18, 2020 during ETHDenver, bZx was exploited via multi-protocol oracle manipulation across Kyber, Uniswap, dYdX, and Compound in a single transaction. Attacker manipulated sUSD pricing and front-ran liquidations, resulting in ~$645,000 in losses from dependence on unvalidated on-chain price oracles."},{"date":1674691200,"name":"Robinhood","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Social Account Takeover","amount":8200,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3732","language":null,"description":"On January 25, 2023, Robinhood's social media accounts (Twitter, Instagram, Facebook) were compromised and used to promote a fake RBH token on the BNB Chain. Attackers made off with 26.95 BNB (~$8,200) from users who fell for the scam, with the account believed to have been compromised via a third-party vendor."},{"date":1738627200,"name":"Ionic Protocol","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Impersonation Scam","amount":8600000,"chain":["Mode"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4070","language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers impersonated Lombard Finance members to trick Ionic Money into listing counterfeit LBTC. Attackers then minted 250 fake LBTC as collateral to borrow $8.6-8.8M in legitimate tokens, bridging ~$3.5M to Ethereum. Inadequate identity verification enabled the social engineering."},{"date":1771632000,"name":"Veil Cash","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Proof Verifier Bug","amount":5000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6117","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 20-21, 2026, Veil Cash on Base was exploited for 2.9 ETH (~$5.7K). Attacker exploited a misconfigured Groth16 SNARK verifier with identical delta and gamma parameters, breaking the soundness equation and enabling proof forgery to withdraw 29 times from the privacy pool without depositing."},{"date":1697587200,"name":"MicDao","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":13000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MicDao was exploited when an attacker manipulated token supply by burning tokens to artificially reduce total supply and inflate the token price, then sold MicDao tokens for profit and converted the funds to BSC."},{"date":1652486400,"name":"Quickswap V3","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":107600,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2239","parentProtocolId":"parent#quickswap","language":null,"description":"Attackers hijacked QuickSwap's GoDaddy DNS, redirecting swaps to their address. Users unknowingly traded through the attacker's proxy contracts, losing $107.6K before the domain was recovered on May 18."},{"date":1677456000,"name":"DungeonSwap","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":728000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"877","language":"Solidity","description":"DungeonSwap and Launch Zone protocols were exploited through excessive user permissions in the implementation contract. An attacker abused insufficient access controls to manipulate DND token pricing and drain approximately $728K from liquidity pools."},{"date":1741305600,"name":"1inch Swap","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":5000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"189","parentProtocolId":"parent#1inch","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 5, 2025, 1inch disclosed a $5M exploit in Fusion v1 resolver contracts when a buffer overflow in _settleOrder() allowed an attacker to trigger integer underflow and hijack control flow to impersonate resolvers and execute unauthorized swaps. Most funds were recovered after negotiation."},{"date":1721606400,"name":"ETHTrustFund","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Treasury Misappropriation","amount":2100000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"ETHTrustFund, an Olympus DAO fork on Base, suffered a rug pull on July 20-22, 2024 when the developer transferred the entire treasury (607 ETH, $2.1 million) to Tornado Cash and Railgun mixers and deleted all project websites and social media, executing an exit scam."},{"date":1767052800,"name":"Unleash Protocol","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":3900000,"chain":["Story"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5793","language":"Solidity","description":"On December 30, 2025, Unleash Protocol was exploited when an attacker compromised the multisig governance system and deployed a malicious contract. The attacker siphoned $3.9M in assets, bridged them to Ethereum, and laundered them via Tornado Cash."},{"date":1784678400,"name":"Verus-Ethereum Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":7530000,"chain":["Verus"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 23, 2026 (second of two exploits in 66 days), Verus-Ethereum Bridge was drained of $7.54M via the import path; a small 0.01 VRSC transaction triggered unbacked ETH/tBTC payouts due to missing deposit verification. The vulnerability repeated from May and was never patched."},{"date":1688860800,"name":"CivFund","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":180000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1949","language":"Solidity","description":"CivFund had unrestricted token approvals that allowed an attacker to drain users' approved funds. The exploit abused callback functions to execute unauthorized fund transfers to Uniswap for liquidation."},{"date":1702684800,"name":"NFT Trader","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":3000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"NFT Trader's old smart contracts contained reentrancy vulnerabilities that allowed attackers to drain NFT collateral. Multiple actors exploited the flaw to steal 13 Mutant Apes, 37 Bored Apes, and other high-value NFTs worth ~$3M total."},{"date":1651276800,"name":"Saddle Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":11000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"202","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 30, 2022, Saddle Finance metapool was exploited via flash loan-assisted swaps manipulating LP token pricing. The attacker exploited inconsistencies in price calculations in the sUSD/saddleUSD-V2 metapool, which used the incorrect MetaSwapUtils library, enabling extraction of ~$11M."},{"date":1793404800,"name":"Sovryn Lend","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":914000,"chain":["Rootstock"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2843","parentProtocolId":"parent#sovryn","language":null,"description":"On October 31, 2026, attackers exploited Sovryn's lending and margin contracts on Rootstock through three transactions, extracting approximately $914,000 in XUSD and WRBTC. Sovryn paused its core protocol and lending pools after detecting the incident. A 24-hour withdrawal delay enabled the team to block seven additional withdrawals totaling approximately 66,134 XUSD before the funds reached the attackers. The underlying vulnerability remains undisclosed while the team completes security repairs and reconciles affected positions"},{"date":1674259200,"name":"Omm","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Redeem Logic Flaw","amount":1891000,"chain":["Icon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"546","language":"Java","description":"On January 21, 2023, Omm protocol on Icon was exploited for $1.891M when the Redeem function accepted arbitrary collateral addresses without ownership validation. The attacker could withdraw collateral from any pool regardless of whether they owned positions in it."},{"date":1775952000,"name":"Hyperbridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":2500000,"chain":["Ethereum","Base","BSC","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 13, 2026, Hyperbridge's Token Gateway was exploited via unbound Merkle proof verification and a zero-second challenge period. Attacker forged a cross-chain message, minted 1 billion bridged DOT, and liquidated for approximately $2.5M in ETH and incentive pool losses; funds traced to Binance and partially frozen."},{"date":1675296000,"name":"Orion Pools","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":3000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"496","parentProtocolId":"parent#orion-protocol","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 2, 2023, Orion Protocol on BSC and Ethereum was exploited via reentrancy in swapThroughOrionPool. Attacker created a fake token (ATK) and used reentrancy to hijack deposit logic, extracting $3M."},{"date":1689897600,"name":"Conic Finance","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Read-Only Reentrancy","amount":3300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2616","language":"Solidity","description":"Conic Finance exploited twice on July 21, 2023 for ~$4.2M ($3.3M ETH Omnipool, $934K crvUSD Omnipool) via read-only reentrancy in CurveLPOracleV2. Price manipulation extracted value from asset pools; audit findings hadn't covered this contract."},{"date":1792540800,"name":"Swell","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum","Base","Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker gained control of approximately 30 Swell operational keys across multiple networks, including the swETH/rswETH oracle bot. The attacker drained wallet balances, artificially increased swETH and rswETH exchange rates by submitting unbacked reserve values, and redirected EigenLayer reward claims. They also deployed malicious upgrade contracts capable of draining approximately 2,513 ETH, although these upgrades had not been approved or executed when the investigation was published"},{"date":1727308800,"name":"Onyx V2","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Liquidation Logic Flaw","amount":3800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5180","parentProtocolId":"parent#onyx","language":"Solidity","description":"On September 26, 2024, Onyx Protocol (Compound v2 fork) was exploited for $3.8M via decimal precision vulnerability in its low-liquidity VUSD market. Attackers used a Balancer flashloan to manipulate exchange rates by minting and redeeming oETH, then exploited missing validation in the NFTLiquidation contract to drain value through self-liquidation rewards."},{"date":1746662400,"name":"BitoPro","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":11500000,"chain":["Ethereum","Tron","Solana","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BitoPro exchange hot wallets compromised through malware deployment on a cloud operations team member via social engineering. Unauthorized withdrawals executed across multiple blockchains during a system update. Attackers attributed to North Korean Lazarus group based on attack patterns and methodology."},{"date":1771632000,"name":"IoTeX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":4400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5486","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 21, 2026, ioTube bridge's Ethereum-side Validator contract private key was compromised via social engineering targeting an employee. The attacker performed a malicious upgrade bypassing validation and signature checks, gaining control of TokenSafe and MintPool. Approximately $4.3M in USDC, USDT, IOTX, WBTC, and BUSD were drained within hours. Attackers were credited to the same group behind the Infini exploit."},{"date":1647820800,"name":"One Ring Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"One Ring Finance was exploited via flash loan price manipulation when the protocol's LP token price calculation lacked time-weighted averaging. The attacker pre-positioned assets through Celer Network's cBridge and deployed a contract to drain liquidity."},{"date":1524268800,"name":"Gate","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":235000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2314","language":null,"description":"Gate.io lost ~$230M on April 21, 2018 when North Korean hackers compromised exchange private keys. Attacker drained ~10.8K BTC, ~219K ETH, ~100M DOGE and other tokens. Gate concealed the breach until ZachXBT revealed it in 2024."},{"date":1683331200,"name":"Melo","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":90000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The Melo protocol on BSC was exploited via an access control vulnerability. An attacker gained unauthorized access to critical protocol functions, draining approximately $90,000 from user accounts. The incident highlighted insufficient access control checks on sensitive contract functions."},{"date":1694044800,"name":"Fortress Trust","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":12000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attackers executed a phishing campaign against ReTool, a third-party vendor providing portal access for Fortress Trust customers to manage cryptocurrency custody. The compromise leaked Fortress operator credentials, allowing attackers to initiate unauthorized fund transfers from customer accounts."},{"date":1648857600,"name":"Inverse Finance Frontier","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":15600000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"338","parentProtocolId":"parent#inverse-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 2, 2022, an attacker injected ~$3M in ETH into SushiSwap INV/ETH to artificially inflate the Keep3r price feed, then borrowed $15.6M (DOLA, ETH, WBTC, YFI) from Inverse Finance's Anchor market using inflated INV collateral."},{"date":1654387200,"name":"Elrond","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":113000000,"chain":["Elrond"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"A newly deployed VM function executeOnDestContextByCaller allowed attackers to steal 1.65M EGLD (~$113M) and convert 917k to WEGLD, creating unbacked WEGLD in circulation. The team recovered the illegal WEGLD and burned it, restoring the 1:1 backing ratio with two mainnet upgrades."},{"date":1784678400,"name":"AFX Bridge","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":24150000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"8006","parentProtocolId":"parent#afx-protocol","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 22, 2026, AFX Trade's Arbitrum bridge was exploited when the attacker obtained 5 of 7 validator private keys, bypassing the 2/3 multisig threshold and draining $24.15M in USDC. The attacker converted funds to ETH and consolidated them in a single wallet. AFX offered a 30% bounty for fund recovery."},{"date":1699228800,"name":"TrustPad","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":155000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"TrustPad's receiveUpPool() function on BNB Chain failed to verify msg.sender, allowing an attacker to repeatedly call the function and harvest pending rewards by manipulating lock periods through untrusted external calls."},{"date":1690329600,"name":"Carson DeFi","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":150000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Carson DeFi token on BSC was exploited via a flash loan-based price manipulation attack. The attacker used borrowed assets to artificially move prices on connected pools, then captured value from the temporary price imbalance."},{"date":1722384000,"name":"Terra 2.0","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":6400000,"chain":["Terra2"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Go","description":"A June 2024 upgrade to Terra Phoenix reintroduced an unpatched ibc-go 7.3.x fork, reintroducing a reentrancy bug in ibc-hooks timeout callback. An attacker exploited this to mint tokens and swap them through Astroport before the chain halted."},{"date":1779753600,"name":"SKP","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":212000,"chain":["BNB"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited SKP's transfer hook that called pair.sync() prematurely during token transfers, before the router completed the corresponding swap. This allowed the attacker to manipulate reserve ratios mid-transaction by calling sync() from inside the transfer flow. The attacker assembled $204M in capital from flash loan sources and nearly completely drained the SKP/USDT pair, extracting $212K."},{"date":1666742400,"name":"N00dleSwap","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":29000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 26, 2022, N00dleSwap on Ethereum was exploited via a reentrancy vulnerability in the token's ERC777 callback mechanism, allowing an attacker to drain approximately $29K in tokens by reentering during token transfers."},{"date":1727222400,"name":"Truflation","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":5200000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Malware exfiltrated private keys from Truflation's operational systems, enabling attacker to drain treasury and personal wallets across Ethereum and seven other blockchains for $3.89M in TRUF tokens, $1.07M ETH, and $236K DAI from multisig and personal accounts."},{"date":1793577600,"name":"BitMart","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":391000,"chain":["Base","Arbitrum","Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3577","language":null,"description":"On November 2, 2026, attackers breached BitMart and transferred approximately $391,000 in cryptocurrency from exchange-associated wallets on Base, Arbitrum, and Optimism. Blockchain investigators traced portions of the stolen funds to addresses associated with the Mercado Bitcoin exploit, which occurred on the same day. BitMart founder Sheldon Xia confirmed the breach and said the exchange had investigated the incident and strengthened its security measures. The initial access method remains unidentified"},{"date":1779667200,"name":"WUSD.fi/Glove","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Liquidity Pool","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"WUSD.fi's GLOVE reward system lacked Sybil protection. On May 25, 2026, attackers created Sybil wallets and used flashloans to repeatedly collect rewards, draining ~$200K from Uniswap V3."},{"date":1771804800,"name":"DGLD","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":250000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"DGLD (gold-backed stablecoin) cross-chain bridge on Base was exploited on February 23, 2026. Attackers discovered they could mint over 100M unbacked DGLD tokens on Base within 2.5 hours, where legitimate circulation was ~70.8M. Economic impact was ~$250,000, absorbed by DGLD as the primary liquidity provider."},{"date":1670198400,"name":"RFB","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":null,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"RFB protocol on BSC was exploited through predictable random number generation. The attacker predicted the random numbers used by the protocol's randomness mechanism, allowing them to manipulate outcomes."},{"date":1700265600,"name":"dYdX V3","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Risk Parameter Abuse","amount":9000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"144","parentProtocolId":"parent#dydx","language":null,"description":"On November 17-18, 2023, dYdX V3's insurance fund lost $9M via coordinated market manipulation in less-liquid SUSHI and YFI markets. The attacker built leveraged positions on dYdX, orchestrated spot market price surges, and triggered a liquidation cascade worth $38M notional to drain the insurance fund."},{"date":1756512000,"name":"Cozy V2","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":427000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2964","parentProtocolId":"parent#cozy-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"Cozy Finance lost $427K on August 29, 2025 on Optimism when completeWithdraw function lacked caller verification, letting attacker complete withdrawals using only a user's redemption ID."},{"date":1669680000,"name":"SEAMAN","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":7000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SEAMAN token on BSC was exploited through a business logic flaw in its protocol mechanics. The vulnerability allowed attackers to manipulate token flows."},{"date":1739232000,"name":"zkLend","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"First Depositor Attack","amount":9550000,"chain":["Starknet"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3079","parentProtocolId":"parent#zklend-finance","language":"Cairo","description":"zkLend lost $9.57M on February 11, 2025 on Starknet via an integer division rounding vulnerability. Attacker exploited truncated rounding in withdrawal calculations with precise wstETH deposits to inflate their raw_balance to 1724, draining all tokens from other pools. Attacker returned ~$3.2M after negotiation but lost remaining to a Tornado Cash scam."},{"date":1701820800,"name":"TIME","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":190000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"TIME token's integration of ERC-2771 with an unprotected multicall mechanism allowed arbitrary address spoofing. An attacker executed a delegatecall with malicious data, burned massive amounts of tokens from the LP, inflating the token price to extract ~$190K."},{"date":1708732800,"name":"BlueBerry","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1340000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On February 22-23, 2024, BlueBerry's lending market was exploited when borrowing was accidentally enabled early. A user obtained a 1 WETH flashloan from Balancer, deposited it into the lending contract to manipulate oracle prices, and overborrowed 457 ETH (~$1.34M). Whitehat c0ffeebabe.eth front-ran the exploit and recovered ~366 ETH (~$1.07M)."},{"date":1761523200,"name":"402bridge","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Stored Publicly","amount":17693,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 27, 2025, 402bridge on Base was compromised just days after mainnet launch, affecting over 200 users and losing 17,693 USDC. Attackers accessed private keys stored on servers with excessive authorization permissions in the x402 mechanism."},{"date":1731024000,"name":"CoinPoker","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":2000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 8, 2024, CoinPoker's hot wallet was compromised, resulting in the loss of approximately 2000 ETH (~$2M). The attacker performed a series of transactions testing the system before executing 82 transactions within 50 minutes, each under $25K to avoid detection. Funds were laundered through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1678406400,"name":"Hedera","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":600000,"chain":["Hedera"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Hedera Token Service (HTS) precompile bug March 9-11, 2023 allowed attacker to impersonate DEX pool accounts via delegatecall, draining ~$600K from Saucerswap, Pangolin, and Heliswap before network halted."},{"date":1665014400,"name":"RES Token","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":290000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 6, 2022, RES Token was exploited via a flash loan attack that manipulated the pool price. The attacker used the thisAtoB function to swap tokens multiple times at artificially inflated prices, extracting ~$290K in repeated transactions."},{"date":1647820800,"name":"LI.FI","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":600000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"LI.FI's swap aggregator was exploited via unchecked external calls in the swap contract. The attacker drained $600,000 from 29 user wallets that had granted infinite token approvals."},{"date":1524528000,"name":"SmartMesh","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 25, 2018, SmartMesh token suffered an integer overflow in the transferProxy function, allowing attackers to generate massive quantities of counterfeit tokens (~65.3 trillion). Though no direct USD loss is documented, ~16.6M counterfeit tokens were actually traded on exchanges before being halted."},{"date":1713571200,"name":"Rico","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":null,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 20, 2024, the Rico protocol on Arbitrum was exploited via an arbitrary external call vulnerability. An attacker was able to execute unauthorized calls within the vulnerable contract, extracting funds. The exact amount was not publicly disclosed."},{"date":1780272000,"name":"TSR","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":2500000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 1, 2026 TesseraDAO's mint function was exploited via inadequate access control, allowing an attacker to mint approximately 99 million TSR tokens, immediately selling them on PancakeSwap for ~2.5M USDT, then bridging to Ethereum and laundering funds via Tornado Cash."},{"date":1601337600,"name":"KuCoin","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":281000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2274","language":null,"description":"On September 25-26, 2020, attackers obtained the private keys to KuCoin's hot wallets and stole approximately $280 million. The Lazarus Group, working on behalf of North Korea, was attributed as the attacker. KuCoin recovered $235 million (84%) through on-chain tracking, contract upgrades, and law enforcement cooperation."},{"date":1727740800,"name":"FireToken","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":20000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"FireToken's transfer function automatically burned tokens sent to Uniswap pools and immediately updated reserve balances, allowing attackers to artificially inflate ETH price by reducing FireToken reserves, then repeatedly swapped FireTokens for overpriced ETH."},{"date":1621987200,"name":"Merlin","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":680000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"370","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 26, 2021, Merlin Lab (PancakeBunny fork) was exploited for ~$680K via reward calculation flaw. Attacker deposited small amount, sent 180 CAKE to LINK-BNB vault, exploited getReward() function that calculated rewards from contract balance rather than user deposit, and repeated process 36 times. Second $550K attack followed 8 hours later."},{"date":1628812800,"name":"Acala Network","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":1600000,"chain":["Acala"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A misconfiguration in Acala's iBTC/aUSD liquidity pool (deployed August 14, 2022) allowed minting of 1.28 billion unbacked aUSD tokens. The network halted swaps, burned the tokens, and limited realized losses to ~$1.6M despite the massive depeg."},{"date":1683417600,"name":"Art Coin","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Deposit Logic Flaw","amount":331000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An exploiter identified and leveraged a flaw in the Art Coin presale and Uniswap V3 LP configuration on May 7. By investing just 0.1 ETH in the presale, the attacker could withdraw at a highly favorable exchange rate due to misconfigured LP parameters. The attacker extracted 181 ETH (worth $331,000) by selling their presale allocation immediately after launch, exploiting the LP setup vulnerability."},{"date":1793491200,"name":"BTCPay Server","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":null,"chain":["Bitcoin","Litecoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 1, 2026, attackers exploited a vulnerability in BTCPay Server versions 2.4.1 and earlier to compromise self-hosted installations and steal BTC and LTC from their hot wallets. The vulnerability had been patched in version 2.4.2 in August, but outdated installations remained exposed. BTCPay Server urged affected operators to take their servers offline, migrate to fresh installations, replace compromised wallet seeds, and rotate potentially exposed credentials. Wallets whose spending keys were held off-server, including hardware wallets, were unaffected"},{"date":1729555200,"name":"Erc20transfer","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":14800,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An unverified Ethereum contract intended as an ERC20 transfer utility lacked access control in its erc20TransferFrom function, allowing anyone to transfer tokens from users who had granted approval, draining USDC across multiple victims."},{"date":1701216000,"name":"Velodrome","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":250000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"An attacker used social engineering to compromise the domain registrar account for both Velodrome and Aerodrome, bypassing 2FA protections. Nameserver records were altered to redirect legitimate traffic to malicious protocol clones. Users were tricked into approving transactions on fake contracts, losing funds to attacker wallets. ChainSec and ZachXBT estimated losses at over $100K-$250K across both protocols."},{"date":1729728000,"name":"US Government Crypto Wallet","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":20000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"A dormant US government wallet holding $20M from 2016 Bitfinex seizures had its private key compromised on October 24, 2024. Attacker drained $20M in ETH, USDC, aUSDC and USDT, but $19.3M was recovered within 24 hours; ~$700K went to instant exchanges."},{"date":1787443200,"name":"Arrakis V1","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":7100,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"641","parentProtocolId":"parent#arrakis-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"The attacker flash-loaned 1,800 WETH and swapped approximately 145 WETH for ENS to manipulate the ENS/WETH Uniswap V3 pool’s instantaneous spot price. The Arrakis V1 vault used pool.slot0() to value its Uniswap V3 position during mint() and burn() without a TWAP or price-deviation guard. The attacker minted vault shares while the price was distorted, restored the pool price, then burned the shares for a more valuable token mix, resulting in approximately 2.94 WETH profit"},{"date":1779840000,"name":"SUPERFORTUNE AI","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":15180000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"An attacker exploited insufficient verification controls in the multisig transaction process to redirect an airdrop transfer. A lookalike address was substituted for the GUA token claim contract, allowing the attacker to intercept the transfer."},{"date":1668556800,"name":"SheepFarm","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":72000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 16, 2022, SheepFarm gaming token on BSC was exploited via a register function that failed to update user timestamps after registration, allowing an attacker to call it multiple times to increase gems yield and drain approximately 262 BNB (~$72K). The attacker then converted the accumulated yield to BNB and withdrew."},{"date":1778544000,"name":"SQ Protocol","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":346137,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SQ Protocol was exploited when an attacker used EIP-7702 authorized transactions to call privileged staking functions via a hardcoded owner backdoor, minting fake positions and draining USDT."},{"date":1633046400,"name":"Coinbase","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Session Key Compromised","amount":null,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"9291","language":null,"description":"Attackers exploited a vulnerability in Coinbase's SMS-based account recovery process to bypass 2FA on 6,000+ customer accounts. Threat actors leveraged phishing campaigns to obtain email, password, and phone number combinations, then used the SMS recovery flaw to intercept 2FA tokens and drain accounts. Coinbase reimbursed affected customers."},{"date":1602374400,"name":"WLEO","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":42000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker gained access to the WLEO token contract's issuing mechanism and minted unlimited tokens. The attacker swapped the minted WLEO for ETH on Uniswap's liquidity pool, extracting ~$42K worth of Ethereum from the pool and causing a complete rug pull."},{"date":1764633600,"name":"Goldfinch","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":330000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"703","language":"Solidity","description":"A flaw in Goldfinch's legacy collectInterestRepayment() function permitted transfers from any approved address without proper safeguards. An attacker deposited USDC to manipulate share price, then repeatedly withdrew inflated amounts, draining the victim's holdings through the contract's misconfigured approval logic."},{"date":1708473600,"name":"Gain","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":3010000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5244","parentProtocolId":"parent#kelp-dao","language":"Solidity","description":"An unauthorized mint function allowed attackers to create 5 billion GAIN tokens without proper access control. The tokens were immediately sold, crashing the token price 95%."},{"date":1654646400,"name":"Osmosis","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":5000000,"chain":["Osmosis"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Go","description":"On June 7-8, 2022, Osmosis suffered a $5M liquidity pool exploit where the JoinPoolNoSwap function allowed liquidity providers to withdraw 50% more than they should have. The chain halted for 2 days to prevent complete pool drainage. Osmosis Labs covered all losses using strategic reserves."},{"date":1625875200,"name":"Multichain","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Weak Key Generation","amount":7900000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Fantom"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"591","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 10, 2021, Anyswap/Multichain bridge was exploited when an attacker identified two V3 router transactions with identical ECDSA R values. This signature collision enabled reverse-calculation of the MPC private key, allowing unauthorized extraction of ~$7.8M across Ethereum, BSC, and Fantom."},{"date":1630627200,"name":"Siren","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":3500000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"203","language":"Solidity","description":"On September 3, 2021, the SIREN protocol on Polygon was exploited via reentrancy in withdrawCapital, allowing repeated withdrawals before balance updates. The attacker drained ~$3.5M across multiple AMM pools (KNC, SUSHI, USDC, WETH, WMATIC), affecting 26 LP addresses."},{"date":1779148800,"name":"ElevateFi","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":16000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker manipulated the EFI/DAI Uniswap V2 pair's spot price mid-transaction using flash-loan-funded buying pressure, then exploited ElevateFi's staking vault which relied on raw pair reserves without any time-weighted or external oracle guard. By inflating EFI's spot price during staking, the attacker received disproportionate staking positions: creating $2.5M recorded staking principal for only 713.5 EFI of actual principal, repeated 100 times."},{"date":1668729600,"name":"Polynomial","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":7000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Polynomial Protocol on Optimism suffered a missing input validation vulnerability. The flaw affected a select number of users in a contract variant not used for all functionality. The protocol compensated affected users."},{"date":1561420800,"name":"Synthetix v1+v2","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"115","parentProtocolId":"parent#synthetix","language":"Solidity","description":"An oracle price feed reported Korean Won at 1000x higher than actual rate due to API outage reducing redundancy. A trading bot exploited the misconfiguration to generate over 37M sETH in profits within an hour. All funds were recovered through white-hat negotiation and bug bounty."},{"date":1665014400,"name":"Binance Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Proof Verifier Bug","amount":570000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On October 4-6, 2022 the BNB Chain's BSC Token Hub bridge (connecting BEP2 and BEP20) was exploited via incomplete Merkle proof verification in the bridge contract, allowing an attacker to forge proofs and mint 2 million BNB (~$570 million). Binance paused the chain on October 6; roughly $137M bridged out before containment; $433M remained frozen."},{"date":1498867200,"name":"Parity","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Uninitialized Proxy","amount":30000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 19, 2017, a vulnerability in Parity's multisig wallet library allowed an attacker to reset ownership of wallets and drain them. The attacker stole 153,037 ETH (~$30M) from Swarm City, Edgeless, and Aeternity. A white-hat group subsequently used the same exploit to rescue ~$166M in additional vulnerable wallets."},{"date":1681084800,"name":"SushiSwap","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":3300000,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum","Optimism","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":3300000,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SushiSwap's RouteProcessor2 contract was exploited due to missing validation of route parameters across Ethereum, BSC, Arbitrum, and Optimism. Attacker created malicious routes directing users to attacker-controlled pools, stealing ~$3.3M."},{"date":1779926400,"name":"DxSale","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Liquidity Rug","amount":7300000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1901","language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker exploited unprotected owner key in DxSale's legacy 2021 locker contract on May 26-27, 2026, draining over 1,400 liquidity pools on BNB Chain for $7.3M using EIP-7702 batch delegation. Key had no timelocks or multisig controls."},{"date":1781654400,"name":"Little Boy Plus","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":367000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 17, 2026, Little Boy Plus was exploited for ~$377.6K USDT when a zero-value transferFrom call bypassed authorization checks in the custom transfer logic. This enabled the attacker to mint LBP tokens directly into the PancakeSwap pair, creating a reserve imbalance exploitable via swap."},{"date":1703030400,"name":"INX Digital Company","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":1600000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"INX's third-party vendor serving one of the company's subsidiaries was compromised, allowing a malicious actor to execute unauthorized trades on the vendor's servers. The attacker drained approximately $1.6M from the subsidiary before being discovered."},{"date":1687824000,"name":"Themis Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":370000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3158","language":"Solidity","description":"Themis Protocol relied on DEX spot prices without flashloan protection. Attackers used flashloans to manipulate BLP prices via large wstETH swaps, borrowing assets at inflated collateral values."},{"date":1774656000,"name":"GoonFi","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":254000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6556","language":"Rust","description":"GoonFi v2's WSOL/USDC pool on Solana was drained of ~$254,000 in March 2026 via a program configuration bug in the AMM pricing logic."},{"date":1787875200,"name":"Ajna V2","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Liquidation Logic Flaw","amount":775400,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4019","parentProtocolId":"parent#ajna","language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers exploited Ajna’s internal liquidation accounting across multiple lending pools. Current on-chain analysis shows liquidation operations could be sequenced to extract collateral while returning insufficient quote assets to the pool, including bucketTake, collateral removal, take, and settlement operations"},{"date":1620432000,"name":"Rari Capital","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":10000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"136","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 8, 2021, attacker exploited Rari's ibETH integration; using dYdX flashloan and ibETH.work's arbitrary call capability, attacker artificially inflated ibETH.totalETH() to withdraw more ETH than deposited, draining ~$11M from Rari's Ethereum Pool."},{"date":1717286400,"name":"Velocore V2","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Fee Accounting","amount":6800000,"chain":["Linea","zkSync Era"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3330","parentProtocolId":"parent#velocore","language":"Solidity","description":"Velocore V2 was exploited for ~$6.8M when a fee rate calculation allowed values exceeding 100%. The attacker used a flash loan to shrink the pool and trigger LP token underflow, creating excess LP tokens."},{"date":1638662400,"name":"Pizza DeFi","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":5000000,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"Pizza DeFi was exploited via an integer overflow in eCurve that allowed unbounded minting of Tripool tokens. The attacker used these tokens as collateral to drain $5M in assets."},{"date":1664668800,"name":"Transit Swap","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":28900000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On 2022-10-02 an attacker exploited a missing payer check in Transit Swap's claimTokens function, pulling tokens from any wallet with an approval to the contract across Ethereum and BSC. Transit Swap lost $28.9 million; the attacker was traced and returned funds the following day."},{"date":1729814400,"name":"Base Lending","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Deposit Logic Flaw","amount":1000000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 25, 2024, an unverified Compound Fork lending protocol on Base Chain was exploited via a deposit logic flaw, resulting in approximately $1M in losses. The vulnerability was in the improper implementation of deposit verification logic."},{"date":1708819200,"name":"RiskOnBlast","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Exit Scam","amount":1300000,"chain":["Blast"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On February 25, 2024, RiskOnBlast (GambleFi) presale (420 ETH/$1.29M raised Feb 22-23) became Blast's first rugpull when anonymous team drained balances through MEXC, Bybit, ChangeNOW."},{"date":1702425600,"name":"Peapods Finance","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":231192,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4063","language":"Solidity","description":"Peapods Finance's WeightedIndex contract suffered a reentrancy attack exploited via flashloan mechanisms. The attacker extracted PEAS tokens from the protocol; the hacker (white-hat) returned approximately 90% of funds on Dec 14."},{"date":1729555200,"name":"Vista Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":28000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Vista Finance's integration of ERC20FlashMint with staking logic failed to properly distinguish staked from free balances, allowing flashMint to incorrectly calculate available free balance for loans despite tokens being staked."},{"date":1778803200,"name":"THORChain DEX","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":10700000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum","Base","BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"412","language":null,"description":"On May 15, 2026, a flaw in the GG20 threshold-signature scheme securing Asgard vaults allowed a newly churned malicious node to authorize unauthorized withdrawals, draining approximately $10.7-$10.8 million across Bitcoin, Ethereum, BNB Chain, and Base."},{"date":1708041600,"name":"ParticleTrade","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":140000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"ParticleTrade suffered an exploit due to unverified user input validation, allowing attackers to manipulate contract state and steal funds."},{"date":1679097600,"name":"Zircon Gamma","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":350000,"chain":["BSC","Moonriver"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2143","language":null,"description":"On March 18, 2023, Zircon was exploited on Moonriver and BSC via a donation attack on the burnOneSide function in modified Uniswap V2. Attacker donated to inflate pool reserves, then withdrew shares at favorable rates due to incorrect share calculation, draining ~$350K."},{"date":1731888000,"name":"Tectonic","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Cronos"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1115","language":null,"description":"Unverified incident claimed for November 18, 2024 on Cronos chain; extensive search found no credible reports, announcements, or news coverage of a Tectonic hack on this date."},{"date":1654300800,"name":"BAYC/Otherside","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":257000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Discord accounts of BAYC's community manager were compromised, and attackers posted fake limited-quantity giveaway links to a phishing site. Users were tricked into approving malicious contracts, losing 32 NFTs and over $257K in ETH."},{"date":1692403200,"name":"Harbor Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":250000,"chain":["Comdex"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2388","language":"Rust","description":"On August 19, 2023, Harbor Protocol's oracle was manipulated via low-liquidity cSwap prices. An attacker borrowed CMST against inflated stOSMO, LUNA, and WMATIC collateral, draining ~$250K and dropping TVL from ~$370K to ~$81K."},{"date":1773446400,"name":"Goose Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":8435,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"205","language":"Solidity","description":"Goose Finance on BSC exploited for $8K via share accounting flaw in vault withdrawal logic on March 14, 2026. The bug evaded prior audits."},{"date":1667260800,"name":"Save","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Risk Parameter Abuse","amount":1026000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"458","parentProtocolId":"parent#save-protocol","language":null,"description":"Solend on Solana was manipulated when the protocol relied on a single oracle source from Saber pool vulnerable to price manipulation. The attacker inflated USDH price from ~$1 to $15 through transaction spam, creating $1.26 million in bad debt."},{"date":1750377600,"name":"Hacken Token","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":250000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Hacken's HAI token private key was exposed during bridge architecture changes on Ethereum and BNB Chain. The compromised key allowed minting of 900 million HAI tokens, which were dumped on decentralized exchanges, causing the token price to crash 99%."},{"date":1756684800,"name":"OlaXBT","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Signer Phishing","amount":2000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"In September 2025 OlaXBT suffered a multisig wallet compromise resulting in the theft of 32 million AIO tokens (valued at approximately $2 million). The team responded by deploying a new token contract and migrating user holdings."},{"date":1759968000,"name":"Astera.fi","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":573000,"chain":["Linea"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 9, 2025, Astera's lending markets on Linea were exploited through a liquidity-index inflation attack. The attacker inflated the index to overvalue their collateral, then borrowed across asUSD, LINEA, and WETH minipools for ~8% of the protocol's TVL. Linea's security team detected the pattern and froze the attack within minutes."},{"date":1750118400,"name":"Meta Pool","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":130000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 17, 2025, Meta Pool's ERC4626 vault contract on Ethereum was exploited via an unprotected mint() function in Staking.sol. An attacker called the public mint function to create 9,705 mpETH tokens (~$27M at face value) without depositing collateral, extracting only $130K due to low liquidity in affected pools."},{"date":1698710400,"name":"Unibot","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":640000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3106","language":"Solidity","description":"On October 31, 2023, Unibot's newly-deployed unverified router contract contained a call injection vulnerability allowing attackers to insert arbitrary transferFrom() calls and drain $640,000 in approved tokens from user wallets. The stolen funds were moved to Uniswap then Tornado Cash."},{"date":1746748800,"name":"LND","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1180000,"chain":["Sonic","Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6071","language":null,"description":"LND, a Sonic-based Aave fork, lost $1.18M in May 2025 when a developer with unilateral deployment control introduced a malicious access-control modification that reached production unreviewed. Halborn identified the developer as a DPRK IT worker."},{"date":1675728000,"name":"LianGoPay","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":1600000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On February 7, 2023, LianGoPay was exploited by attackers with access to private keys who deployed fake staking pool contracts with addresses similar to legitimate ones. Users were tricked into depositing into these malicious contracts, resulting in a loss of approximately $1.6M in tokens."},{"date":1626307200,"name":"Bondly","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":5900000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Bondly's CEO was phished for admin credentials, allowing the attacker to mint 373M BONDLY tokens and crash the price 82% by dumping on liquidity pools."},{"date":1613174400,"name":"Alpha Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Borrow Logic Flaw","amount":37500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Alpha Finance was exploited when an attacker used recursive flash loans to borrow against inflated sUSD debt in the CREAM Iron Bank. A rounding error in the borrow function math enabled manipulation of undercollateralized lending."},{"date":1647993600,"name":"Cashio","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":52800000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"793","language":"Rust","description":"Cashio's infinite-mint bug arose from two missing account-validation checks in the collateral deposit path, letting attackers use fake tokens as Saber LP collateral. ~2 billion CASH were minted and swapped for ~$52.8M in USDC, USDT and UST; CASH crashed to $0.00005."},{"date":1612828800,"name":"Growth DeFi","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":1400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"159","language":"Solidity","description":"On 8 February 2021 an attacker created a worthless rAXZZ token and a GRO/rAXZZ Uniswap pool, then used the single-asset deposit feature of Growth DeFi's stkGRO/rAAVE farming contract which failed to validate LP token identity, accepting the GRO/rAXZZ LP shares as legitimate GRO/rAAVE LP shares, allowing the attacker to mint 14,513 stkGRO/rAAVE shares and drain the pool."},{"date":1716336000,"name":"TonUP","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":107600,"chain":["TON"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"TonUP's staking contract was exploited due to incorrect parameter configuration, allowing attackers to steal 307,264 tokens worth approximately $107,600. The team quickly suspended redemption and bought back stolen tokens."},{"date":1794700800,"name":"Chain Games","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":20000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 15, 2026, attackers exploited a reward accounting flaw in Chain Games' delegation staking contracts on Polygon, stealing approximately 37.98 million CHAIN ($20,000). The contracts failed to synchronize reward checkpoints during share transfers, allowing attackers to repeatedly claim historical rewards through restake() and inflate their staking positions over 360 cycles. The inflated shares were subsequently redeemed for CHAIN from the staking pool. Chain Games disabled delegation across its validators and committed to fully compensating affected stakers and delegators"},{"date":1681430400,"name":"Bitrue","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":23000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5731","language":null,"description":"On April 14, 2023 at 07:18 UTC, Bitrue's hot wallet was compromised; attackers withdrew ~$23M in ETH, QNT, GALA, SHIB, HOT, MATIC. Compromised wallet represented <5% of total exchange funds."},{"date":1765497600,"name":"ZEROBASE","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":250000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers deployed a malicious phishing contract on BSC that impersonated the ZEROBASE frontend, tricking users into authorizing USDT transfers. The fake contract collected token approvals, then drained hundreds of connected wallets of approximately $250K total, with one user losing $123K."},{"date":1719446400,"name":"APEMAGA","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":32000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"APEMAGA smart contract experienced a business logic vulnerability that violated an invariant, allowing attackers to drain approximately 9.4 ETH (~$32K). The exploit was significant enough to be studied for invariant-synthesis security improvements."},{"date":1731801600,"name":"MFT","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":33700,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 17, 2024, the MFT protocol on BNB Chain was exploited via a logic flaw in its contract implementation, resulting in approximately $33.7K in losses."},{"date":1620777600,"name":"xToken","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":24000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"206","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 12, 2021, xToken was exploited when an attacker used an $81M flash loan (61,800 ETH) from dYdX to manipulate Kyber Network's oracle, enabling minting of xSNXa tokens at manipulated prices for ETH and SNX. The xBNTa contract had an additional flaw allowing minting with any token, not just BNT."},{"date":1780099200,"name":"Alephium Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":815000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3813","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 30, 2026, Alephium TokenBridge was exploited via off-chain backend flaw in guardian message verification. Attackers deployed fake contracts to forge VAAs, disrupted node connectivity to trigger fallback validation, and authorized transfers totaling $815K across Ethereum and BNB Chain, plus 13.76M unbacked ALPH minting."},{"date":1662422400,"name":"Nereus Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":371000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Nereus Finance on Avalanche was exploited when the protocol lacked time-weighted average price protection for newly introduced collateral types. The attacker manipulated prices through Trader Joe and Curve, extracting $371,000 in USDC."},{"date":1715126400,"name":"GPU","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":32400,"chain":["BNB"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"GPU token's balance update logic did not properly account for self-transfers, allowing attackers to arbitrarily inflate their balance by repeatedly transferring tokens to themselves. The vulnerability was amplified via flash loans."},{"date":1679702400,"name":"Swerve","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":1300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"142","language":"Solidity","description":"Swerve Finance, a defunct Curve clone, was targeted in a governance attack where the attacker created proposals to transfer $1.3M in stablecoins to their contract. Though the attack ultimately failed due to insufficient voting power, it represented a live governance exploit attempt."},{"date":1644796800,"name":"Titano Finance","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Backdoor Contract","amount":1949000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Titano Finance relied on a contractor to deploy the PLAY contract, but the contractor included a backdoor allowing either the contract owner or deployer to modify the PrizeStrategy. The contractor exploited this privilege to steal 4,828.7 BNB. All stolen funds were returned to Titano's treasury on February 23rd."},{"date":1698796800,"name":"Onyx Protocol","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":2100000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1631","parentProtocolId":"parent#onyx","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 1, 2023, Onyx Protocol (Compound V2 fork) was exploited for $2.1M. An attacker used a 4,000 ETH flashloan, swapped to PEPE, and donated to inflate the new oPEPE market's exchange rate, exploiting rounding errors in redemption logic."},{"date":1751673600,"name":"RANT","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Fee Accounting","amount":204000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 5, 2025, RANT token on Binance Smart Chain was exploited through a vulnerability in the _sellBurnLiquidityPairTokens() function. The flaw allowed attackers to manipulate the token burn process and steal approximately $204,000 from the protocol."},{"date":1536710400,"name":"EOSBet","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":200000,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"EOSBet gambling platform was exploited on September 14, 2018 via a smart contract vulnerability. Hackers created a malicious contract that generated fake transfer notifications, tricking EOSBet's verification into sending 44,427 EOS (~$200,000) to attacker accounts. This was discovered when a Reddit user published the exploit code."},{"date":1765843200,"name":"FutureSwap","classification":"Governance","technique":"Flashloan Governance Attack","amount":270000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"228","language":"Solidity","description":"In December 2025, attacker exploited FutureSwap on Arbitrum using flash loans to acquire temporary governance voting power and pass a malicious proposal transferring protocol funds."},{"date":1782345600,"name":"Lixir Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":12300,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"465","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 25, 2026, Lixir Finance vaults were exploited via insufficient nonce validation in permit() function. Attacker reused a single non-owner signature across 41 calls on six vault clones to gain allowances and extract USDC, USDT, ETH, and LIX tokens."},{"date":1665273600,"name":"Xave Finance","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3731","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker submitted a fake verification message to Xave's oracle on October 8-9, 2022, enabling four malicious proposals to pass through the DaoModule. This resulted in the minting of an enormous amount of RNBW tokens sent to the attacker's address, which were then converted to xRNBW."},{"date":1757376000,"name":"SwissBorg","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"API Key Compromised","amount":41500000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2295","language":null,"description":"SwissBorg's SOL Earn program lost 192,600 SOL (~$41.5M) when staking partner Kiln's API credentials were compromised. Attacker embedded malicious authorization instructions in unstaking transactions to transfer withdrawal authority to attacker-controlled addresses."},{"date":1682899200,"name":"pcash","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":2000000,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"The pcash DeFi protocol on EOS was attacked on May 1, resulting in the draining of the main swap contract's liquidity. The attacker stole approximately 2 million EOS tokens and attempted to evade governance by moving funds to EOS EVM accounts. The Pcash team covered user losses and worked with the EOS ecosystem to recover stolen assets, with significant funds recovered through EOS EVM administrative actions."},{"date":1618790400,"name":"EasyFi","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":59000000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On April 19, 2021 an attacker compromised EasyFi CEO Ankitt Gaur's admin machine with malware-tampered MetaMask to exfiltrate admin keys, then transferred 2.98M EASY tokens (~$75M) and drained ~$6M in stablecoins from liquidity pools. The incident was catalogued in Taylor Monahan's Lazarus/BlueNoroff research."},{"date":1670889600,"name":"ElasticSwap","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":850000,"chain":["Avalanche","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":520650,"defillamaId":"1919","language":null,"description":"On December 13, 2022, ElasticSwap was exploited on Avalanche and Ethereum via inconsistent accounting between addLiquidity (constant K) and removeLiquidity (pool balance), draining ~$854K."},{"date":1679356800,"name":"Indexed Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":9925,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"188","language":"Solidity","description":"The ORCL5 index token was exploited through a flaw in the tokenAmountOut output calculation, allowing a flashloan-enabled attack to drain approximately $9,925 from the protocol within 11 minutes of vulnerability discovery."},{"date":1621987200,"name":"Merlin","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":550000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"370","language":"Solidity","description":"Merlin Labs (PancakeBunny fork) suffered a second exploit 8 hours after the first on May 26, 2021, draining ~$550K. The priceCalculator had critical math errors in share price computation that allowed attackers to manipulate prices and drain funds."},{"date":1765411200,"name":"0G Labs","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":516000,"chain":["0G"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"0G Labs emergencyWithdraw function had improper access control or validation, allowing unauthorized withdrawals of $516K."},{"date":1788566400,"name":"Reddio RedSonic","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":22800,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"RedSonic’s permissionless registerErc20() allowed stETH to be registered as a separate vault asset even though the ETH vault’s rsvETH share price already counted the vault’s raw stETH balance through its Lido position. As a result, the same stETH balance simultaneously backed rsvETH and newly minted rsvstETH shares. The attacker deposited stETH to inflate the rsvETH share price, redeemed rsvETH against that inflated valuation, then redeemed rsvstETH to recover the same stETH collateral, effectively using one asset balance to support two share classes"},{"date":1790294400,"name":"Demex Perp","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Cross-Chain Message Spoofing","amount":191929,"chain":["Demex","Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2001","parentProtocolId":"parent#demex","language":"Solidity","description":"Demex’s bridge was exploited through insufficient verification between its bridge module and external-chain contract system. The attacker used a helper contract to falsify token-deployment reports, registering the low-value nLEND token against canonical WETH and WBNB contracts. Subsequent withdrawals released approximately $191,929 in bridge reserves despite deducting only $10.47 worth of nLEND. The withdrawal limiter also failed because it valued the deducted tokens rather than the assets released"},{"date":1768608000,"name":"Meteora DAMM V2","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Impersonation Scam","amount":1500000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6288","parentProtocolId":"parent#meteora","language":"Rust","description":"On January 17, 2026, Meteora DAMM V2 lost $1.5M when the team transferred funds to a fraudulent OTC counterparty impersonating a legitimate token buyer on Solana, which never delivered tokens."},{"date":1750291200,"name":"Bankroll Network","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":65000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 19, 2025, old BankrollStack contracts containing an integer underflow vulnerability in the sell() function were exploited. Attackers manipulated dividend accounting through lingering token approvals, draining funds from users who had previously interacted with the abandoned contracts."},{"date":1666828800,"name":"Team Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":15800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1864","language":"Solidity","description":"Team Finance's migrate function, which moves locked LP positions from Uniswap v2 to v3, never validated that token and pair parameters matched the caller's lock. On 27 October 2022, an attacker locked a worthless token, then used another user's lock parameters to move that liquidity into an attacker-controlled v3 pair at a skewed price. Four locked projects lost ~$15.8M for $2,700 of attacker capital."},{"date":1765497600,"name":"Ribbon","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"281","parentProtocolId":"parent#ribbon-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"Aevo's legacy Ribbon DOV vaults were drained of $2.7 million on December 12, 2025. An oracle upgrade created a decimal mismatch (8 vs 18 decimals) with legacy assets. The attacker exploited a publicly-accessible oracle price-setting function and minimal collateral requirements to create undercollateralized positions and drain the vaults."},{"date":1680134400,"name":"Rocket Pool","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":3800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"900","language":null,"description":"Patricio Worthalter, a major RocketPool token holder and POAP founder, was phished and had 85,900 RPL tokens worth $3.8M stolen. The attacker subsequently exchanged the tokens for ETH and scattered the proceeds across multiple addresses."},{"date":1432252800,"name":"Bitfinex","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":329000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2275","language":null,"description":"Bitfinex's hot wallets were compromised in a breach attributed to security gaps and operational errors. Approximately 1,460 BTC were stolen from the exchange's online storage systems."},{"date":1784592000,"name":"FlashTrade","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":98000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4107","language":"Rust","description":"Flash Trade's Solana perpetuals exchange suffered a $98K unauthorized withdrawal when an attacker exploited an incomplete validation path in MagicBlock's SDK. The ephemeral macro's undelegation callback failed to validate a fake account, allowing the attacker to trigger a fake withdrawal."},{"date":1788134400,"name":"Radix","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1249946,"chain":["Radix"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#radix","language":"Rust","description":"A Radix Engine execution-layer flaw allowed transactions to obtain direct references to arbitrary internal fungible and non-fungible vaults without verifying that the caller owned or was authorized to access them. The attacker supplied internal vault addresses to custom code and directly invoked withdrawal functionality, bypassing the authorization rules of the accounts and components holding those vaults. Across 26 transactions, the attacker drained nearly the entire Radix supply of six Hyperlane-wrapped assets and then used their normal Hyperlane Warp Routes to bridge the stolen assets out of Radix"},{"date":1710892800,"name":"ParaSwap","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Augustus V6 contract vulnerability allowed attackers to drain approved user wallets. 386 wallets were exposed; approximately $300K was stolen, with 90% returned after the main attacker's wallet was identified and frozen."},{"date":1762819200,"name":"Impermax V3","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Liquidation Logic Flaw","amount":380000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5981","parentProtocolId":"parent#impermax-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 11, 2025, Impermax V3 on Base suffered a $380K exploit. The attacker created tiny positions in low-liquidity cbBTC-tBTC pairs to push totalBalance toward zero, collapsing the exchange rate and enabling exponential minting of borrowable tokens. When totalBalance hit zero, all deposits were redirected to the attacker."},{"date":1536883200,"name":"Zaif","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":60000000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Zaif cryptocurrency exchange suffered a hot wallet breach on September 14, 2018 when attackers gained access to private keys storing customer funds. Approximately 5,966 Bitcoin, unspecified Bitcoin Cash, and MonaCoin totaling 6.7 billion yen (~$60 million) were stolen from the exchange's operational wallets. Discovery occurred three days after the theft."},{"date":1714435200,"name":"Pike V1","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Proxy Upgrade Hijack","amount":1600000,"chain":["Ethereum","Optimism","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4100","parentProtocolId":"parent#pike","language":"Solidity","description":"Pike upgraded spoke contracts with new dependencies that altered storage layout, particularly the 'initialized' variable. On April 30, 2024, this storage misalignment allowed attackers to upgrade contracts, bypass admin access, and withdraw funds. The second exploit involved 99,970 ARB, 64,126 OP, and 479.39 ETH."},{"date":1346803200,"name":"Bitfloor","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Stored Publicly","amount":250000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Bitfloor's servers were breached and hackers accessed an unencrypted backup of Bitcoin wallet keys. The founder, Roman Shtylman, had failed to encrypt the digital wallet containing encryption keys during a system upgrade, leaving the backup in unencrypted form on disk."},{"date":1663632000,"name":"Wintermute","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":160000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On September 20, 2022, Wintermute's $160M DeFi hot wallet was compromised. Attacker brute-forced the private key using a weak 32-bit seed from the Profanity vanity address generator; only DeFi operations were affected."},{"date":1731283200,"name":"DeltaPrime","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":4800000,"chain":["Arbitrum","Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2479","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 11, 2024, DeltaPrime was exploited across Arbitrum and Avalanche when an attacker created a malicious trading pair, used it to convert borrowed collateral into fake reward tokens, and withdrew them, leaving the protocol with ~$4.8M in uncollateralized bad debt. This was DeltaPrime's second major hack in 2024."},{"date":1667347200,"name":"Save","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1260000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"458","parentProtocolId":"parent#save-protocol","language":"Rust","description":"On November 2, 2022, an attacker manipulated USDH price on Saber DEX from $1 to ~$15 to inflate collateral value on Solend, borrowing across isolated pools. By locking the Saber account to prevent arbitrage, the attacker created approximately $1.26M in bad debt."},{"date":1716336000,"name":"YON","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":118000,"chain":["BNB"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"YON token's transferFrom function lacked proper permission validation, allowing an attacker's contract to drain tokens directly from the liquidity pool shortly after deployment. Attackers exploited this to steal 190 BNB."},{"date":1721779200,"name":"Spectra Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":73000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 24, 2024, Spectra Protocol's router contract was exploited for approximately $73,000 via an arbitrary call vulnerability in the execute function. The attacker crafted inputData to manipulate contract calls with arbitrary parameters, draining 188 quadrillion asdCRV tokens (inflated representation) from approved wallets."},{"date":1792368000,"name":"AlpsCon AI Trade Hub","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":152809.36,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"AlpsCon AI Trade Hub’s V7–V9 contracts incorrectly applied accumulated historical profit-per-share values to balances imported from preceding versions, allowing newly deposited funds to claim rewards accrued before the deposits existed. The attacker used a flash loan to create temporary ALPS service credits and exploited the accounting flaw to extract USDC. The attack was facilitated by an authorization whitelist containing a publicly known Hardhat test account, which the attacker used through EIP-7702 delegation"},{"date":1684454400,"name":"WDZD Swap","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":1000000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The attacker exploited a low-level access control flaw in the Swap-LP factory contract, transferring WDZD tokens from trading pairs to the factory address. This artificial manipulation inflated WDZD's value, allowing the attacker to trade WDZD for LP tokens at highly favorable rates and extract approximately 609 ETH (~$1M) by burning the LP tokens."},{"date":1768867200,"name":"Makina","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":4200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":3410000,"defillamaId":"6964","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker took a $280M flashloan and used $170M to manipulate Makina's sharePrice oracle via three compounding flaws: permissionless oracle updates, synchronous Curve spot prices with no TWAP, and pre-approved Weiroll paths. Extracted ~$4.2M."},{"date":1780963200,"name":"Token of Power","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":1580000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker acquired >50% voting power of TOP token via Balancer pool and passed malicious governance proposal to mint massive tokens, draining $1.58M WETH from Balancer V1 pool. Vulnerability stemmed from extremely low token supply (16,384 TOP total)."},{"date":1716854400,"name":"Orion Protocol","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":645000,"chain":["BNB"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Orion Protocol was exploited via inadequate access control in the PredyPool contract's trade() function. Attackers manipulated the liabilities array and drained liquidity from trading pairs using flash loans."},{"date":1680566400,"name":"Sentiment","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":1000000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":900000,"defillamaId":"2285","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 4, 2023, Sentiment on Arbitrum lost ~$1M due to reentrancy in integrated Balancer; attacker used flashloan price manipulation to drain funds. Sentiment recovered 90% ($900K+) within days through negotiation."},{"date":1711670400,"name":"ETHFIN","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1200,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"ETHFIN smart contract exploited via an access control vulnerability allowing unauthorized calls to privileged functions."},{"date":1710892800,"name":"LayerSwap","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":100000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attackers compromised LayerSwap's GoDaddy registrar account and redirected DNS to a phishing site, draining 50 users of $100K before the company regained access and began refunding users."},{"date":1644451200,"name":"Dego Finance","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":10000000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Cronos"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On February 10, 2022, Dego Finance was hacked when the contract deployer's private key was compromised. Attackers drained approximately $10-14.4M from liquidity pools on Uniswap and PancakeSwap across Ethereum, BSC, and Cronos."},{"date":1599696000,"name":"Coral","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":420000,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"The wRAM token contract had a reentrancy vulnerability in the buyram function. When wram::buyram was called multiple times simultaneously, the asynchronous call to eosio::buyram caused the same RAM bytes value to be used across multiple calls, allowing minting of more tokens than intended."},{"date":1511049600,"name":"Tether","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":30950010,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5009","language":null,"description":"On November 19, 2017, $30.95M USDT was removed from Tether's Treasury wallet and sent to an unauthorized address. Tether blocked the tokens and marked them as non-redeemable, preventing their circulation. Tether worked with the Omni Foundation to implement protocol upgrades allowing eventual token reclamation."},{"date":1677715200,"name":"ArbiSwap","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Liquidity Rug","amount":100000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2587","language":null,"description":"On March 2, 2023, ArbiSwap DEX on Arbitrum was rugged by the development team. Team promoted a fake staking scheme with 1330% APY less than 24 hours before draining 85 ETH and $112,000+ in tokens using admin functions."},{"date":1382486400,"name":"Inputs.io","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":1200000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Inputs.io was hacked twice in 2013. Attackers compromised email accounts used for password reset and bypassed two-factor authentication due to a flaw on the server hosting side. The attacker stole 4,100+ BTC across the two separate hacks."},{"date":1760832000,"name":"Astra Nova","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":9090000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"AI Agent","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Astra Nova's RVV token launch was disrupted when a third-party market maker account was compromised. The attacker gained access and liquidated 8.6% of the token supply for approximately $10.2M in USDT, causing the token price to plummet 75%. The attacker held stolen funds in USDT on a centralized exchange, allowing the team to coordinate recovery efforts."},{"date":1734134400,"name":"JHY Token","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":12000,"chain":["Binance"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"JHY Token's TokenDividendTracker contract had a critical flaw where it set user balances to the LP token balance, allowing users to swap more tokens than they owned. This accounting error enabled attackers to drain funds by exploiting the incorrect balance tracking."},{"date":1699488000,"name":"CoinSpot","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":2400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"CoinSpot lost ~1,283 ETH (~$2.4M) on Nov 8-9, 2023 from a compromised hot wallet private key. Attacker converted to BTC and dispersed across multiple wallets."},{"date":1688256000,"name":"Poly Network","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":5000000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1796","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 2, 2023, Poly Network was exploited across 11 blockchains via insufficient validation of block headers and validator signatures in bridging logic. Attackers minted ~$43B in tokens; limited liquidity and swift exchange intervention (Tether freeze of $33M USDT) contained cashed-out losses to $5-10M."},{"date":1714953600,"name":"Perpy","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Uninitialized Proxy","amount":132000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Perpy Finance's staking contract proxy was not properly initialized, allowing attackers to invoke initialization functions and gain control. The attacker updated the contract and withdrew 58.489M PRY tokens worth 41.895 ETH."},{"date":1784160000,"name":"CrowdRingCircle","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":209100,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"CrowdRingCircle's token contract allowed the pair's recorded reserves to desynchronize with actual balances by burning CRC directly from the pair address before calling sync(). An attacker exploited this to artificially inflate CRC's price and drain USDT from the PancakeSwap V2 CRC/USDT pool."},{"date":1615766400,"name":"TSD (True Seigniorage Dollar)","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":7095000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker accumulated 33%+ of TSD governance tokens by purchasing at low market prices, then proposed replacement of the token implementation contract with a malicious version via DAO governance vote. The attacker's voting weight passed the proposal, enabling the malicious contract to mint 11.8B TSD and immediately dump on PancakeSwap."},{"date":1734480000,"name":"SlurpyCoin","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":3000,"chain":["Binance"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"SlurpyCoin was exploited via a flash loan attack that targeted its buyback mechanism. The attacker used sandwiched swaps to manipulate price and profit from the deflationary token's burning logic."},{"date":1700265600,"name":"Kronos Research","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"API Key Compromised","amount":26000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Kronos Research's API keys were compromised, allowing attackers to drain 26M USD from trading wallets via unauthorized transactions."},{"date":1788134400,"name":"Float Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":28000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"497","language":"Solidity","description":"The attacker used flash-loan-funded swaps to manipulate the Uniswap V3 pool’s slot0 spot price consumed by Float’s Hypervisor contracts. This distorted currentTick() / getTotalAmounts() and consequently the valuation of LP shares, allowing the attacker to repeatedly deposit and withdraw at manipulated share values and extract 10.71 ETH"},{"date":1592438400,"name":"Bancor V3","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":544885,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1995","parentProtocolId":"parent#bancor","language":"Solidity","description":"Bancor Network v0.6 smart contract lacked authentication on the 'from' address parameter, allowing anyone to use stored token approvals to steal user funds. The Bancor team conducted a self-exploit withdrawing $409,656, but front-runners capitalized on the same vulnerability extracting an additional $135,229 before patch deployment."},{"date":1782172800,"name":"SecondFi","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Weak Key Generation","amount":2400000,"chain":["Cardano"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Haskell","description":"Between June 21-23, 2026, deterministic nonce reuse in SecondFi's Cardano signing code (one missing line) exposed 374 wallet private keys through all historical signatures. Attacker drained 16.1M ADA (~$2.4M); white hat protected $18.5M ADA. Total exposure: $20M+."},{"date":1724803200,"name":"Aave","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":56000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 28, 2024, the ParaSwapRepayAdapter peripheral contract of Aave was exploited for approximately $56,000. The _buyOnParaSwap function had excessive token allowances that weren't properly adjusted after swap failures, allowing attackers to exploit unvalidated paraswapData parameters and drain accumulated slippage tokens."},{"date":1701648000,"name":"Stargate Finance","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":43000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"An attacker acquired 50,000 STG tokens to create a malicious voting proposal on Stargate Snapshot, posing as a gSTG token launch. The phishing link in the proposal directed over 1,000 users to a fake eligibility-check website, stealing credentials and private keys. PeckShieldAlert confirmed $43K in losses tracked to the attacker's wallet."},{"date":1779667200,"name":"Bitmor","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":6000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"In May 2026, Bitmor DCA contract on Base was exploited; access control flaw allowed attackers to drain wallets of any users with active token approvals."},{"date":1784764800,"name":"Solido Cash","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":900000,"chain":["Supra"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6058","parentProtocolId":"parent#solido-money","language":"Move","description":"On July 23, 2026, Solido Cash's CDP suffered an oracle attack when the SOLID price feed went stale and fell back to near-par CASH valuation (0.99919999) while SOLID was trading at 22.2 SUPRA per unit. An attacker looped acquire-collateral, mint-CASH, sell-CASH twice across 18:21 UTC and 21:12 UTC transactions, minting 809,052 CASH of unbacked debt and selling it for 293.7M SUPRA."},{"date":1776556800,"name":"Custom sAVAX Rebalancer","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":64000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 19, 2026, a custom rebalancer contract on Avalanche was exploited via an arbitrary external call vulnerability. The attacker abused a public function that executed unchecked external calls while the contract held delegated credit from Aave V3, allowing them to borrow WAVAX on behalf of victims and extract approximately $64K."},{"date":1788048000,"name":"Balancer V1","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":234000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"116","parentProtocolId":"parent#balancer","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker first used swaps to reduce the Balancer V1 BPool’s WBTC reserve to near-dust levels, then exploited rounding in joinswapPoolAmountOut. When the function reverse-calculated the WBTC required to mint a caller-specified amount of BPT, 18-decimal fixed-point arithmetic rounded the required input down to 1 satoshi while still minting the full BPT amount. The attacker minted 4,408.8 BPT through these underpriced joins and exited the pool proportionally to drain DPI, USDC, WETH, and WBTC"},{"date":1541548800,"name":"Gate","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Supply Chain Attack","amount":null,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2314","language":null,"description":"The StatCounter analytics service was compromised on November 3, 2018 and weaponized to target Gate.io users. Attackers injected malicious JavaScript that specifically targeted the Bitcoin withdrawal page (myaccount/withdraw/BTC), replacing withdrawal addresses with attacker-controlled wallets. The script automatically submitted forms when amounts exceeded 10 BTC or the user's daily limit."},{"date":1745280000,"name":"Bitcoin Mission","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1300000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Bitcoin Mission lost ~$1.3M in wrapped BTC in April 2025 when a privileged wrapped BTC handling function lacked access-control checks, allowing an unauthorized caller to move the protocol's holdings."},{"date":1676505600,"name":"Platypus Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":8500000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":222634,"defillamaId":"944","language":"Solidity","description":"Platypus Finance was exploited for $8.5M via flashloan. The attacker manipulated the solvency check's cash/liability ratio calculation by depositing to increase liability and performing swaps to reduce cash, artificially inflating slippage."},{"date":1704153600,"name":"Radiant V2","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":4500000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2706","parentProtocolId":"parent#radiant","language":"Solidity","description":"On January 2, 2024, Radiant Protocol on Arbitrum suffered a flashloan attack exploiting rounding issues in the burn function on a newly activated USDC market. Attacker extracted 1,900 ETH (~$4.5 million) beyond legitimate deposits through three attacks within 6 seconds of market activation."},{"date":1777939200,"name":"Ekubo","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":1400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3499","parentProtocolId":"parent#ekubo","language":null,"description":"On May 5, 2026, Ekubo's EVM swap router contracts were exploited when attackers discovered the contracts failed to verify whether the payer had authorized transactions. Attackers stole 17 wBTC ($1.4 million) and laundered funds via Tornado Cash."},{"date":1781049600,"name":"Axelar Secret IBC Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Unbacked Cross-Chain Mint","amount":4670000,"chain":["Ethereum","Secret"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"An attacker exploited the Axelar Secret bridge ics20-for-axelar contract to mint $4.67M of unbacked saTokens by forging IBC deposit packets from a malicious blockchain. The attacker created a minimal Cosmos blockchain with a single validator, opened a fake IBC channel to Secret Network, and sent forged deposit packets that bypassed channel validation. The minted tokens were redeemed back over the legitimate IBC channel to drain Axelar's escrow account, remaining undetected for seven days until a failed cross-chain transfer revealed the empty escrow."},{"date":1732320000,"name":"AK1111","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":31500,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 23, 2024, the AK1111 contract on BNB Chain was exploited through an access control vulnerability that allowed unauthorized fund extraction of approximately $31.5K."},{"date":1512691200,"name":"NiceHash","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":64000000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On December 6-7, 2017, NiceHash's payment wallet was compromised after attackers obtained employee credentials via phishing. The attacker accessed the wallet and stole 4,700+ BTC (~$64M). NiceHash eventually repaid all affected users by December 16, 2020."},{"date":1665964800,"name":"MTDAO","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Deposit Logic Flaw","amount":702000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The MTDAO contract deployed on BSC was exploited on October 17, 2022 through a malicious function call that bypassed authorization checks. The attacker called transfer functions on both the MT and ULM tokens to extract 1,930 BNB and 487,042.615 BUSD, then routed funds through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1676419200,"name":"Multichain","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":130000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"591","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 15, 2023, the AnyswapV4Router contract of Multichain was exploited via a front-running attack. The attacker exploited a lack of signature verification in the permit mechanism to front-run the anySwapOutUnderlyingWithPermit function and transfer WETH worth approximately 87 ETH ($130K) from the contract."},{"date":1788912000,"name":"BeatXswap","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":77512,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BeatXswap’s LiquidityVestingConvert contract used the live V3 pool slot0() price as its sole BTX pricing source, without a TWAP, deviation limit, or manipulation check. The attacker flash-borrowed BTX, dumped it into the BTX/USDT V3 pool to sharply reduce sqrtPriceX96, then deposited 10,000 USDT and 2,000 USDT into the vulnerable contracts. The manipulated quote caused the contracts to contribute an excessive amount of their own BTX when minting LP positions, allowing the attacker to extract the BTX before reversing the swaps and repaying the flash loans"},{"date":1772236800,"name":"Wise Lending V2","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":66000,"chain":["Arbitrum","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4494","parentProtocolId":"parent#wise-lending","language":"Solidity","description":"Wise Lending V2 suffered a flashloan exploit on Arbitrum and Ethereum with significant losses. The exact attack vector remains unclear from available public sources."},{"date":1655337600,"name":"Inverse Finance Frontier","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":5800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"338","parentProtocolId":"parent#inverse-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 16, 2022, Inverse Finance Frontier was exploited for $1.3M direct loss ($5.8M protocol loss) via oracle manipulation. Attacker flash-borrowed 27K wBTC, swapped into Curve tricrypto to inflate yvcrv3crypto LP price, then borrowed DOLA against inflated collateral."},{"date":1691452800,"name":"Steadefi","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":1157000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2972","language":null,"description":"Attacker compromised deployer wallet private key to gain owner privileges over Steadefi pools, change pool ownership, and drain $1.148M in WBTC, WETH, and USDC via owner-only withdrawal functions."},{"date":1518393600,"name":"BitGrail","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":170000000,"chain":["Nano"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On February 9-12, 2018, BitGrail exchange suffered a massive breach affecting 17M Nano coins (~$170M). The exploit involved a flaw in the withdrawal mechanism that allowed repeated withdrawals of the same funds. Attackers gradually stole 2.5M Nano from hot wallets, with abuse continuing over months for a total of 7.5M+ Nano."},{"date":1763942400,"name":"Agentic FoF","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":531000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Agentic FoF suffered a security vulnerability that allowed attackers to drain approximately $531K from its vaults. All vaults were subsequently suspended pending an internal investigation, with the Basis vault secured but also halted as a precaution."},{"date":1680393600,"name":"Allbridge Core","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":573000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3944","parentProtocolId":"parent#allbridge","language":null,"description":"In April 2023, Allbridge Core on BNB Chain was drained when an attacker acting as both liquidity provider and swapper manipulated pool prices to drain BUSD and USDT."},{"date":1607904000,"name":"Nexus Mutual","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":8000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker gained remote access to founder Hugh Karp's computer and replaced his MetaMask extension with a malicious version. The compromised wallet was then used to sign and transfer 370,000 NXM tokens (~$8M) to attacker-controlled addresses. The attacker later demanded 4,500 ETH ransom."},{"date":1726790400,"name":"OcelotDex","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":4900000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4095","language":"Solidity","description":"On September 20, 2024 OcelotDex (a DEX gateway on Zetachain) suffered an infinite mint exploit draining $4.9 million when attackers exploited a vulnerability in the smart contract minting functionality that failed to enforce supply caps, creating unbounded tokens to flood the market and exchange for stable assets."},{"date":1649721600,"name":"Elephant Money","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":22200000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1378","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 12, 2022, Elephant Money on BSC was exploited via flash loan attack. Attacker borrowed 131K WBNB and 91M BUSD, manipulated ELEPHANT price via the manipulable oracle, and exploited insufficient flash loan guards in the TRUNK redemption mechanism to steal ~$22.2M."},{"date":1703030400,"name":"Transit Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":110000,"chain":["BSC","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Transit Finance's router contract failed to validate swap pool paths provided by users. An attacker supplied a forged pool address in the path parameter, causing the router to transfer more tokens than intended during swaps."},{"date":1737590400,"name":"Phemex","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":85000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Solana","XRP","Bitcoin","BSC","Sui","Base","Tron","Arbitrum","Avalanche","Polygon","Optimism","zkSync Era"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2369","language":null,"description":"On January 23, 2025, Singapore-based exchange Phemex's hot wallets were drained across more than a dozen chains (ETH, SOL, XRP, BTC, BSC, Tron) in a coordinated attack, with reported losses ranging from $69.1M to $85M. The hot wallet private keys and signing infrastructure were compromised."},{"date":1678665600,"name":"Euler V1","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":197000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":240000000,"defillamaId":"1183","parentProtocolId":"parent#euler","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 13, 2023, Euler Finance was exploited via flash loan attack on the donateToReserves function. The attacker stole ~$197M in DAI, USDC, stETH, and WBTC via account balance inflation without actual collateral. The hacker returned funds within weeks; recovery completed by early April."},{"date":1775174400,"name":"Silo V2","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":359000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5611","parentProtocolId":"parent#silo-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"Silo's soUSDC vault was exploited through an immutable oracle that priced wstUSR at 1.133 while market price had collapsed to 0.12, combined with accounting flaws that didn't mint shares for external deposits, allowing attackers to inflate redemption payouts."},{"date":1642204800,"name":"CityDAO","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":95000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DAO","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"CityDAO's Discord was compromised via social engineering, allowing the attacker to hijack an administrator account. The attacker created a fake land-drop announcement pointing users to a phishing site, where victims connected their wallets and unknowingly approved fraudulent transactions. The attacker extracted 29.67 ETH by exploiting Discord webhooks to ensure the phishing announcement immediately appeared to all logging-in users."},{"date":1762819200,"name":"Polymarket","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":500000,"chain":["Polygon","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Hackers injected malicious scripts into Polymarket's comment sections, posting phishing links that appeared to offer access to private markets. Users clicking the links were redirected to a fake Polymarket interface where attackers captured their credentials. Over $500K in user funds were drained via compromised email-login accounts."},{"date":1665964800,"name":"LiveArtX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":39000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"LiveArtX's treasury wallet was compromised on October 16-17, 2022, resulting in the theft of 197 NFTs from the Seven Treasures collection. The attacker exploited poor key management—the private key was shared among multiple team members with no multi-sig protection—to transfer the NFTs to their own address and sell them at depressed prices."},{"date":1785196800,"name":"LULA","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":578000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 29, 2026, LULA (BEP-20 token on BSC) suffered a ~$578K exploit via business logic flaw. Attacker exploited an accessible recycle() function in the Rental contract to transfer LULA directly from PancakeSwap V2 pair, then manipulated pair reserves via sync() call. Repeated recycle() calls drained LULA reserves to near-zero, allowing small swap for nearly all USDT."},{"date":1596153600,"name":"2gether","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":1183000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attackers compromised 2gether's infrastructure, stealing approximately 27% of platform funds: 114 Bitcoin and 276 Ether from user accounts. The platform announced reimbursement options converting losses to 2GT tokens."},{"date":1634515200,"name":"Glide Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":300000,"chain":["Elastos"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"806","language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker exploited a fee parameter error in Glide Finance's contract. The team had changed a fee parameter post-audit from 1,000 to 10,000 but failed to update the corresponding value in the contract code, leaving the incorrect parameter at 1,000 and allowing attackers to drain funds via incorrectly-calculated fees."},{"date":1628985600,"name":"Ref Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":3203000,"chain":["NEAR"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"On August 14-15, 2021, Ref Finance was exploited when a faulty security hotfix failed to properly validate and debit users' LP token balances when removing liquidity from pools. This allowed attackers to withdraw more tokens than they should have, extracting approximately 507K NEAR and 1M REF tokens worth ~$3.2M."},{"date":1711324800,"name":"Curio","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Delegatecall Hijack","amount":16000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Curio exploited March 23-25, 2024 via access control flaw in voting power. Attacker with small CGT stake escalated voting power to execute delegatecall to malicious contract, minting ~1B CGT worth $16M."},{"date":1692316800,"name":"Exactly","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":7600000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2385","language":"Solidity","description":"Exactly Protocol's DebtManager on Optimism was exploited on August 18, 2023 when unvalidated market address parameter allowed attacker to bypass permit checks and reenter crossDeleverage to steal users' deposited collateral. A copycat repeated the attack the same day."},{"date":1734307200,"name":"BTC24H","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":85700,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BTC24H Lock contract on Polygon was exploited in December 2024 for $85,700. The claim function failed to verify if msg.sender was an eligible claimant, allowing anyone to claim BTC24H tokens without authorization."},{"date":1745712000,"name":"Aventa","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":7000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Aventa Web3 utilities protocol exploited via flash loan attack. The attack mechanism drained approximately 3.9 ETH from the protocol through flashloan-funded exploitation of a protocol vulnerability."},{"date":1577059200,"name":"Nuls","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":480000,"chain":["NULS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Layer 1","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"518","language":null,"description":"NULS blockchain was hacked on December 23, 2019, losing 2M NULS tokens (~$480K) through exploitation of a signature verification vulnerability in NULS V2.2. Attackers compromised a NULS team account and transferred the funds. Of the stolen tokens, 548K NULS entered trading markets while 1.45M were frozen. NULS responded with an emergency hard fork at block 87,800 to permanently destroy the frozen tokens."},{"date":1775001600,"name":"Drift Trade","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Proxy Upgrade Hijack","amount":295000000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"970","parentProtocolId":"parent#drift","language":"Rust","description":"On April 1, 2026, Drift Protocol on Solana was exploited for ~$295M when attackers tricked Security Council members into pre-signing transactions via Solana durable nonces, handing over admin control. Attackers whitelisted a worthless fake token (CVT) as collateral, deposited 500M CVT, and withdrew $285M in real assets (USDC, SOL, ETH) in ~12 minutes. Security firms linked the attack to DPRK/Lazarus Group."},{"date":1777420800,"name":"Syndicate","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":380000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":380000,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 29, 2026, a private key leak allowed attackers to maliciously upgrade Syndicate's Commons bridge contracts and drain approximately 18.5M SYND tokens ($330K-$400K) across two networks."},{"date":1657670400,"name":"SpaceGodzilla","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":25379,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 13, 2022, SpaceGodzilla on BSC was exploited via a flash loan attack combined with price manipulation. The attacker borrowed 2.95M BUSD, swapped into SpaceGodzilla tokens to inflate the price in PancakeSwap, then swapped back to BUSD for a profit of 25,378 BUSD, which was converted to BNB and laundered through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1758844800,"name":"HyperVault","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":3600000,"chain":["Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6597","language":"Solidity","description":"HyperVault on Hyperliquid L1 conducted a rug pull in late September 2025, draining $3.6M in user funds. Developers falsely claimed audits by Spearbit and Pashov, then disappeared after moving assets through privacy tools."},{"date":1581465600,"name":"Trinity Wallet","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"CDN Compromise","amount":2000000,"chain":["Iota"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Trinity Wallet suffered a DNS hijacking attack on February 12, 2020 when the Cloudflare nameserver was compromised. Malicious code injected starting January 25 stole 8.55M MIOTA (~$2M to $2.35M) from 50+ users by exfiltrating private key seeds."},{"date":1686787200,"name":"CFC","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":16000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited CFC's custom transfer logic on a Uniswap V2-style pool by repeatedly transferring tokens to the pair and invoking skim(), triggering the _transfer() function to burn tokens. This reduced the LP pair's actual token balance, allowing the attacker to extract value through the token supply manipulation."},{"date":1605312000,"name":"ValueDefi","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":7400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"164","parentProtocolId":"parent#value-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 14, 2020, Value DeFi's MultiStablesVault was exploited for $7.4M DAI via a two-stage flashloan attack that manipulated stablecoin exchange rates through Curve's AMM-based oracle. The attacker voluntarily returned $2M after Value DeFi offered a $1M bounty."},{"date":1658016000,"name":"Premint","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Frontend Compromise","amount":375000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On July 16-17, 2022, Premint's frontend was compromised via a vulnerable open-source image upload tool that allowed an attacker to inject malicious JavaScript into a library file. The attacker created a malicious domain and updated the JavaScript to redirect to their code, which then tricked users into signing setApprovalForAll transactions, allowing theft of 314 NFTs including Bored Apes and Moonbirds."},{"date":1513641600,"name":"Youbit","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":null,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On December 19, 2017, South Korean exchange Youbit suffered its second breach of the year, losing 17% of total assets (~3,831 BTC equivalent from the first hack in April). Attackers compromised the hot wallet; cold storage remained secure. Korean authorities attributed the attack to BlueNoroff, a Lazarus subgroup. The exchange permanently closed after this incident."},{"date":1778457600,"name":"TAC Protocol","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Proof Verifier Bug","amount":2854486,"chain":["TON","TAC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The TON-TAC bridge lacked code-hash verification on jetton wallets. An attacker deployed a counterfeit USD₮ wallet and sent a fraudulent bridge message to receive unbacked minted TAC tokens, draining legitimate locked assets."},{"date":1789948800,"name":"DoinGud","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":35486,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"DoinGud’s acceptOffer settlement logic transferred an offer’s USDC price to the caller without deleting or zeroing the consumed offer record. Unlike cancelOffer, the acceptance path omitted the swap-and-pop cleanup. Missing checks also permitted the offerer to accept their own offer and permitted a zero NFT amount. By using amount=0, the attacker avoided listing cleanup and replayed identical acceptOffer calldata, causing the contract to pay the same offer repeatedly. A flash loan supplied the temporary USDC needed to construct the self-funded offer. Independent reporting likewise describes the exploit as failure to clear a bid after acceptance"},{"date":1793404800,"name":"b14g","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["CORE"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5541","language":null,"description":"On October 31, 2026, an attacker withdrew approximately 97 million CORE from assets staked through b14g and transferred them to attacker-controlled addresses. The protocol paused the affected contracts and coordinated with security partners and exchanges to trace the stolen funds. Approximately 68 million CORE remained on Core, while exchanges froze another 9 million CORE. BTC staked through b14g was unaffected and remained time-locked on Bitcoin"},{"date":1795132800,"name":"Wagyu (XMR1)","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":13510000,"chain":["Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"An attacker reportedly obtained Wagyu's XMR1 deployer signing key through a breach of third-party hosting infrastructure that retained files from a previously deleted server. The attacker transferred 5.2M XMR1 from the deployer account to a newly created wallet and sold approximately 369,623 tokens into Hyperliquid's spot order book for $13.51M USDC, causing XMR1 to lose approximately 99.8% of its market value. The proceeds were converted into ETH and transferred across Arbitrum and Ethereum"},{"date":1529539200,"name":"Bithumb","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":31000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"9293","language":null,"description":"On June 19-20, 2018, attackers compromised Bithumb's hot wallet and stole approximately 35,000 ETH and various other tokens worth ~$31M at the time. The attacker's method exploited infrastructure vulnerabilities to gain access to the exchange's online wallet system. Bithumb attributed the attack to Lazarus, the North Korea-linked hacker group."},{"date":1685404800,"name":"El Dorado Exchange","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":120000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2356","parentProtocolId":"parent#ede","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited a closed-source Oracle contract in El Dorado Exchange to manipulate prices and liquidate positions. The attacker extracted approximately $520K but was identified as a white-hat security researcher exposing a price manipulation fraud scheme. After the team admitted code vulnerabilities, the attacker returned over $400K."},{"date":1700611200,"name":"KyberSwap Elastic","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":48000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Base","Polygon","Optimism","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2615","parentProtocolId":"parent#kyberswap","language":"Solidity","description":"On November 22, 2023, KyberSwap Elastic was exploited via a double rounding error in computeSwapStep() that allowed the final swap price to exceed the target threshold without updating liquidity state. The attacker used strategic swaps to corrupt baseL and drain $48M across multiple networks."},{"date":1652832000,"name":"Seth Green NFTs","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Actor Seth Green's wallet was compromised via phishing from a cloned Gutter Cat Gang website. Attackers stole multiple NFTs including a Bored Ape with commercial rights to his upcoming TV show. Green recovered the Bored Ape through negotiation."},{"date":1730246400,"name":"Shoebill Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":1520000,"chain":["BOB"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 30, 2024, Shoebill Finance on BOB Chain was exploited via an oracle misconfiguration during the integration of new solvBTC assets. The vulnerability created an exploitable condition where attackers could borrow funds with minimal collateral. The attacker transferred 19.512 wBTC and 1.597 tBTC across multiple bridges."},{"date":1794614400,"name":"Kava Lend","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":3700000,"chain":["Kava"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"140","language":"Go","description":"On November 14, 2026, attackers exploited an arithmetic flaw in Kava Lend's BUSD market that allowed its supply interest index to increase approximately 243,000-fold when calculated against an extremely small effective supply. The attackers used the resulting inflated collateral claims to repeatedly borrow KAVA, then liquidated the loans through a process that erased the debt without recovering sufficient collateral. Approximately 53.9 million KAVA, worth $3.7 million before the subsequent market selloff, was stolen from the lending protocol. The attackers bridged and sold much of the stolen KAVA on BNB Chain, while approximately 612,416 USDT in laundering proceeds was blocked at the Relay bridge"},{"date":1712880000,"name":"Zest","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1000000,"chain":["Stacks"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Clarity","description":"On April 12, 2024, Zest Protocol on Stacks was exploited during its public launch via collateral list manipulation. An attacker repeated collateral entries to artificially inflate their perceived collateral value, borrowed well beyond their actual holdings, and removed 322K STX (approximately $1M). Zest paused contracts, offered a $100K bounty, and promised treasury-backed reimbursement."},{"date":1681257600,"name":"MetaPoint","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":820000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MetaPoint was exploited through a public approval function that allowed attackers to transfer all user assets. The attacker created bulk contracts to invoke the unrestricted approve function and drain maximum token amounts from user deposits."},{"date":1743033600,"name":"Vicuna Lending","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":700000,"chain":["Sonic"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5755","parentProtocolId":"parent#vicuna","language":"Solidity","description":"Vicuna Finance’s S Market and Stablecoin Market were exploited through an oracle manipulation vulnerability, resulting in approximately $700K in losses. The Main Protocol market was unaffected. Following the exploit, Vicuna removed liquidity from the affected submarkets and planned to distribute the remaining assets pro rata to affected users based on their net supplied positions"},{"date":1777248000,"name":"Singularity Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":413000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6670","language":"Solidity","description":"Singularity Finance on Base exploited for $413K in April 2026 via misconfigured oracle price validation. Attacker manipulated DEX pairs to inflate collateral values."},{"date":1755129600,"name":"BtcTurk","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":48000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Avalanche","Arbitrum","Base","Optimism","Mantle","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"In August 2025, Turkish CEX BtcTurk suffered a second major hack, with $48M drained from hot wallets across 7 blockchains (Ethereum, Avalanche, Arbitrum, Base, Optimism, Mantle, Polygon) after private keys were compromised."},{"date":1741910400,"name":"Berally","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":90000,"chain":["Berachain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On March 14, 2025, Berally on Berachain suffered a hack when the deployer key was compromised, allowing the attacker to drain all vesting tokens from the liquidity pool. The core dApp contracts remained unaffected."},{"date":1794268800,"name":"Arcus Perps","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":2234391,"chain":["Robinhood Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":2234391,"defillamaId":"8141","parentProtocolId":"parent#arcus","language":null,"description":"On November 10, 2026 (UTC), an attacker exploited an accounting flaw in Arcus Perps on Robinhood Chain that allowed transfers between subaccounts to artificially inflate an account's recorded balance. The attacker used the inflated balance to withdraw 2,234,391 USDG, while an additional $3 million in withdrawal requests was blocked by the bridge's rate limit and later reversed. Arcus patched the vulnerability, restricted the exploiter's accounts, and covered the entire shortfall from its company treasury, leaving user balances unaffected"},{"date":1794268800,"name":"Across","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":null,"chain":["Plasma"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1207","language":null,"description":"On November 10, 2026, an attacker compromised Across Protocol's domain through a social engineering attack targeting its registrar, Namecheap, redirecting users to a malicious website designed to steal cryptocurrency through fraudulent wallet interactions. Multiple users reported unauthorized withdrawals after interacting with the compromised interface. Across took its frontend and API offline, worked to block access to the malicious domain, and committed to compensating affected users. The total amount stolen remains undisclosed"},{"date":1773273600,"name":"Aave V3","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":862000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":862000,"defillamaId":"1599","parentProtocolId":"parent#aave","language":"Solidity","description":"Aave V3 oracle misconfiguration on March 10-12, 2026 caused ~$862K in losses. Chaos Labs' CAPO system reported wstETH at 1.1939 instead of 1.228, triggering liquidations of 34 otherwise-healthy E-Mode positions due to inconsistent snapshot configuration."},{"date":1615852800,"name":"Iron Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":170000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Iron Finance lost $170,000 when a ValueDefi error inflated farming reward rates by 365x, allowing attackers to drain all SIL rewards from the IRON/SIL and IRON/BUSD pools."},{"date":1562889600,"name":"BitPoint","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":27600000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum","Litecoin","XRP"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BitPoint, a Tokyo-based exchange, discovered hot wallet breaches on July 11-12, 2019, losing approximately 3.02B yen (~$27.6M) across multiple assets: 1,225 BTC, 1,985 BCH, 11,169 ETH, and 5,108 LTC. Of the loss, $23M belonged to customers and $9.2M to BitPoint itself. The exchange later recovered ~$2.3M in stolen cryptocurrency from overseas exchanges and reimbursed customers before resuming operations."},{"date":1785024000,"name":"WEMIX.FI Lend","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":737000,"chain":["WEMIX3.0"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2705","parentProtocolId":"parent#wemix.fi","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 26, 2026, an attacker obtained administrative control of the WEMIX$ stablecoin contract and minted 5.23M counterfeit WEMIX$ tokens. These were swapped for real WEMIX and USDC.e and dispersed across Ethereum and BNB Chain. The total exploit was estimated at $6.25M."},{"date":1701820800,"name":"ElephantStatus","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":165000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"ElephantStatus was exploited via a flashloan-funded price manipulation attack. The attacker borrowed BUSD, swapped for WBNB, and manipulated the liquidity pool to artificially inflate WBNB price, enabling unintended extraction of value."},{"date":1777593600,"name":"Bisq","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":550000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2588","language":"C++","description":"Bisq v1 was exploited via missing validation on negative miner fee values in trade protocol. Modified client allowed attacker to pull value from multisig outputs; ~11 BTC stolen from 10 users. Bisq v2 and Easy unaffected."},{"date":1624233600,"name":"Impossible Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":500000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Impossible Finance was attacked via flash loan when an attacker created a fake token (AAA/BBB) to manipulate liquidity pool prices. The attacker extracted 229.84 ETH (~$500K) through multiple swaps at artificial prices."},{"date":1790035200,"name":"Astroport","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":4900000,"chain":["Neutron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3117","language":"Rust","description":"Neutron governance proposal 9 contained MsgUpdateAdmin messages that reassigned administration of Astroport contracts despite those contracts previously being administered by Astroport’s own governance contract. After the proposal passed, the attacker migrated Astroport Staking and six Astroport pair contracts to attacker-uploaded code containing a withdraw_all entry point and swept their balances. The attack did not exploit Astroport’s swap or pool logic"},{"date":1726790400,"name":"DOGGO","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":7000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"DOGGO had a business logic flaw in its withdrawal mechanism where an incorrect formula or missing state update allowed attackers to withdraw more funds than their actual share of the contract."},{"date":1707350400,"name":"Starlay Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Redeem Logic Flaw","amount":2100000,"chain":["Acala"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1497","language":"Solidity","description":"An improper liquidity index computation in the Starlay USDC lending pool on Acala EVM allowed attackers to withdraw far more than their deposits. The rounding issue in the index calculation enabled the exploit."},{"date":1794960000,"name":"LUKSO","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":496000,"chain":["LUKSO"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Between November 17 and 18, 2026, an attacker exploited a security vulnerability in the backend of LUKSO's email-based Universal Profile recovery service, gaining unauthorized control over approximately 300 user accounts. The attacker abused the recovery service's permissions to add a malicious controller key to affected profiles and withdraw approximately 1.4 million LYX. The stolen tokens were subsequently bridged to Ethereum and exchanged for approximately 50 ETH ($95,000). LUKSO disabled the compromised recovery service, confirmed that its blockchain and Universal Profile smart contracts were unaffected, and began developing a reimbursement solution for affected users"},{"date":1716163200,"name":"Gala","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":22300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Gala Games minter private key was compromised on May 20, 2024, allowing minting of 5B GALA tokens (~$200M). The unused and unrotated key was likely stolen; attacker sold ~$200M before returning $22M (~11% recovery)."},{"date":1719878400,"name":"Bittensor","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":8000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4547","language":"Python","description":"Bittensor suffered an $8M hack on July 2, 2024 via a supply chain attack. The PyPI package v6.12.2 was compromised with malware that stole coldkeys when users initiated staking, delegation, or transfer operations."},{"date":1628553600,"name":"Poly Network","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":611000000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1796","language":"Solidity","description":"Poly Network was exploited for $611M on August 10, 2021 across Ethereum ($273M), BSC ($253M) and Polygon ($85M) via an access control and cryptography vulnerability in cross-chain bridge contracts. The attacker voluntarily returned nearly all funds within 15 days, keeping only transaction fees."},{"date":1793145600,"name":"Hifi Finance","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker acquired HIFI governance tokens and used four coordinated votes shortly before voting closed to pass a malicious governance proposal. Proposal 21 would upgrade Hifi’s BalanceSheet contract to introduce a function that incorrectly treats existing collateral as untracked funds, allowing it to be transferred to an attacker-controlled Safe. The proposal would also mint 25 million HIFI tokens to the attacker. At the time of reporting, the proposal was queued but had not been executed"},{"date":1686528000,"name":"Sturdy V1","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Read-Only Reentrancy","amount":775000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1577","parentProtocolId":"parent#sturdy","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 12, 2023, Sturdy Finance was drained of ~$800K via a flashloan-funded read-only reentrancy attack on Balancer pools during oracle checks, inflating B-stETH-STABLE prices."},{"date":1703203200,"name":"Pine Protocol","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":95000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2558","language":"Solidity","description":"Pine Protocol was exploited via a flaw where old and new contract versions shared the same liquidity pools. An attacker used this to borrow NFT collateral from the new pool while recording repayment as a flash loan, allowing them to drain vault assets repeatedly across multiple transactions."},{"date":1694822400,"name":"uniclyNFT","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":2000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A reentrancy vulnerability in uniclyNFT's PointFarm contract allowed an attacker to repeatedly call the deposit() function without proper state updates. The attacker minted rewards multiple times before the contract could update rewardDebt, draining uJENNY tokens through reentrancy into external calls."},{"date":1769644800,"name":"Revert Lend","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Staking Logic Flaw","amount":50000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6216","parentProtocolId":"parent#revert","language":"Solidity","description":"Revert Lend's Aerodrome Lend vault on Base was exploited on January 29-30, 2026 for $50,101 when missing validation allowed withdrawal of collateral that was still backing an active loan."},{"date":1755043200,"name":"Coinbase","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"9291","language":"Solidity","description":"Coinbase's corporate DEX wallet lost $300,000 on August 13, 2025 when MEV bots exploited misconfigured token approvals granted to a 0x protocol swapper contract."},{"date":1784764800,"name":"Lien","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":542000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"339","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 23-24, 2026, Lien Finance on Ethereum suffered a $542,000 exploit when an attacker bypassed the burn-before-swap logic in the GeneralizedDotc contract. The attacker minted unbacked bond tokens and swapped them for USDC from OTC pools."},{"date":1735430400,"name":"Fegex","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Cross-Chain Message Spoofing","amount":1070000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Base"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"672","language":"Solidity","description":"FEG's SmartBridge was drained for ~$1.3M across Ethereum, BSC and Base. The attacker forged Wormhole messages from an unauthorized chain that the relayer accepted as withdrawal requests without verifying the emitter's authority, marking the third major FEG incident."},{"date":1780876800,"name":"Humanity","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":32000000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7848","language":"Solidity","description":"Humanity Protocol's admin wallets were drained of $32M and 447M H tokens were unauthorized minted after a Humanity Foundation member's private key was compromised."},{"date":1587168000,"name":"Uniswap V1","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":220000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2196","parentProtocolId":"parent#uniswap","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited a reentrancy vulnerability in Uniswap V1's imBTC liquidity pool using ERC777's callback mechanism. By calling deposit, triggering the ERC777 callback before balance updates, and immediately withdrawing, the attacker could drain tokens from the pool at artificial prices. The Consensys team had discovered the vulnerability in 2019 but no exploitable ERC777 token existed until imBTC launched."},{"date":1743120000,"name":"Alkimiya","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":95500,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6344","language":"Solidity","description":"Alkimiya's SilicaPools contract unsafely downcast shares from uint256 to uint128 in the collateralizedMint function. An attacker used a flash loan to manipulate the truncated shares value, causing the contract to believe it had issued fewer shares than it actually had and allowing redemption of more collateral than deposited."},{"date":1682294400,"name":"KuCoin","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Social Account Takeover","amount":22628,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2274","language":null,"description":"KuCoin's official X (Twitter) account was hijacked for approximately 45 minutes on April 24. Scammers used the compromised account to promote a fraudulent giveaway, tricking users into sending BTC and ETH to a fake address. Users lost approximately $22,628 before KuCoin regained control and announced full reimbursement for verified losses."},{"date":1675468800,"name":"Sperax USD","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Unbacked Mint","amount":250000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1194","parentProtocolId":"parent#sperax","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 3, 2023, an attacker exploited a bug in the SperaxUSD token contract by pre-computing a Gnosis Safe address and sending 11 USDs to it. When the Safe was created, this triggered an overflow in the balance calculation, allowing the attacker to mint 9.7 billion unbacked USDs and exchange approximately $250K worth before the contract was paused."},{"date":1749168000,"name":"ALEX","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Caller Impersonation","amount":8373000,"chain":["Stacks"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1466","language":"Clarity","description":"On June 6, 2025, ALEX Protocol suffered an $8.37M exploit. Attacker deployed a malicious token with custom transfer logic, used it to spoof as-contract origin and masquerade as the vault, draining 8.4M STX, 21.85 sBTC, and stablecoins due to failed access control verification."},{"date":1668643200,"name":"UEarnPool","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":16038,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"UEarnPool on BSC was exploited using a flash loan to repeatedly manipulate the invitor reward distribution mechanism. The attacker inflated their staked ratio by calling the public bindInvitor() function multiple times, allowing the protocol to allocate portions of staked amounts to controlled invitor accounts. Each staking round distributed rewards while allocating the claimable reward back to the attacker."},{"date":1695600000,"name":"HTX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":8000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2276","language":null,"description":"On September 25, 2023, HTX's hot wallet was drained of 5,000 ETH (~$8 million). The attacker gained unauthorized access to internal wallet infrastructure via private key compromise; the attacker returned all funds on October 7, 2023, claiming a 250 ETH white-hat bounty."},{"date":1786147200,"name":"Oraichain","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Unbacked Cross-Chain Mint","amount":1000000,"chain":["Oraichain"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 8, 2026, the Oraichain network was exploited via an unbacked cross-chain mint, allowing tokens to be minted without matching collateral on the origin chain. Flagged by the Oraichain team; the loss amount was not disclosed and no dedicated post-mortem has been published."},{"date":1781568000,"name":"RetoSwap","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":2700000,"chain":["Monero"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Java","description":"RetoSwap (Haveno protocol) on Monero was exploited on June 16-17, 2026 (second incident in 30 days) when dispute resolution logic permitted fund release without proper two-way settlement. Attacker took buy offers, forced arbitration, and released XMR after Bitcoin confirmations without sending BTC."},{"date":1672012800,"name":"Amun","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":300000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"400","language":null,"description":"An attacker gained control of Amun's unprotected rebalance manager, rebalanced PECO and DFI indices into a worthless token it controlled, and minted roughly 80 billion tokens to dump on DEXs, causing about $300K in losses."},{"date":1694476800,"name":"CoinEx","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":55000000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Bitcoin","Tron","Kadena","Solana","Dagger","XRP","BitcoinCash","Polygon","Stellar","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3546","language":null,"description":"CoinEx exchange suffered multi-chain attack on September 12, 2023 when attackers accessed hot wallet private keys, draining $31-54M across Ethereum, Tron, Polygon, and other chains."},{"date":1688083200,"name":"Biswap","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":72000,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Biswap's V3 Migrator contract lacked proper access control and parameter validation when migrating liquidity from V2 to V3. An attacker exploited this to call the migrator contract and steal funds from liquidity providers who had authorized their LP tokens."},{"date":1743206400,"name":"Venus Core Pool","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":902000,"chain":["zkSync Era"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"212","parentProtocolId":"parent#venus-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 29, 2025 Venus Core Pool on zkSync Era suffered a donation attack when an attacker directly transferred tokens to the cToken contract, distorting exchange rates and accumulator calculations and bypassing collateral accounting and supply cap logic, resulting in $902,000 in losses and bad debt."},{"date":1759536000,"name":"Abracadabra Spell","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"347","parentProtocolId":"parent#abracadabra","language":"Solidity","description":"On October 4, 2025 Abracadabra Money on Ethereum suffered a critical exploit of the cook() multi-action function where improper state handling allowed attackers to bypass solvency checks: Action 5 set needsSolvencyCheck=true, but Action 0 reset the CookStatus, enabling under-collateralized borrowing and withdrawal of 1.79 million MIM tokens."},{"date":1793491200,"name":"Sovryn Dex","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":538749,"chain":["Rootstock"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"329","parentProtocolId":"parent#sovryn","language":null,"description":"On November 1, 2026, an attacker exploited Sovryn's XUSD/WRBTC AMM pool on Rootstock, receiving approximately 541,456 XUSD ($538,749) in an attacker-controlled wallet. Portions of the proceeds were subsequently converted into BTC and ETH, while other assets remained under protocol control. Sovryn implemented emergency fee-control changes, delisted the affected pool on November 2, and began reconciling the impact on liquidity providers. The underlying vulnerability and final realized losses remain under investigation"},{"date":1695427200,"name":"Mixin Network","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Database Breach","amount":200000000,"chain":["Mixin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On September 23, 2023, Mixin Network suffered a $200M hack when a cloud service provider's database containing hot wallet credentials was breached, allowing attackers to drain wallets of ETH, BTC, and USDT."},{"date":1628035200,"name":"WaultSwap","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Risk Parameter Abuse","amount":930000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 4, 2021, WaultSwap was exploited when an attacker manipulated the $WUSD pegging mechanism by repeatedly staking USDT to artificially increase the $WEX price in the USDT-WEX liquidity pool, then swapping $WEX back to $USDT for profit, extracting approximately $930K."},{"date":1621814400,"name":"AutoShark","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":822800,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1074","language":null,"description":"In May 2021, AutoShark Finance on BSC was exploited for ~$822,800 via flashloan attack. The attacker flash-loaned BNB to manipulate the SHARK-BNB pool, donated tokens directly into SharkMinter to inflate reward calculations, and dumped newly minted SHARK through 1inch and AnySwap."},{"date":1538870400,"name":"SpankChain","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":38000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SpankChain payment channel hub was exploited via a reentrancy vulnerability on October 6, 2018. An attacker created a malicious token contract masquerading as an ERC20, with a transfer function that called back into the payment channel contract multiple times, draining approximately 165.38 ETH (~$38,000). The attacker returned the stolen funds after negotiation."},{"date":1687132800,"name":"Ara Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":125000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1099","language":null,"description":"On June 18-19, 2023, an attacker exploited Ara Finance's unrestricted swap contract by flash-loaning 1.202 million USDT on BNB Chain. The contract lacked access control and held unbounded ARA and USDT approvals, allowing the attacker to steal ~$124,915."},{"date":1336694400,"name":"Bitcoinica","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":90000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Bitcoinica's production servers were compromised, allowing attackers to steal 18,547 BTC from the exchange's online wallet. The attacker gained access to the wallet infrastructure through a breach of the hosting provider."},{"date":1707955200,"name":"DualPools","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":41000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A precision truncation vulnerability in DualPools' share calculation allowed attackers to exchange 1.9999... dLINK for massive amounts of LINK by exploiting data truncation to 1 unit. Attackers then drained pools of WBNB, BTC, ETH, ADA, and BUSD."},{"date":1780185600,"name":"Fluid Lending","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":215000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4167","parentProtocolId":"parent#fluid","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker compromised operational keys used exclusively by Fluid’s Merkle rewards distribution infrastructure. The attacker used these permissions to submit and approve fraudulent reward allocations, allowing them to claim approximately 125,109 FLUID, 51,946 GHO, and a small amount of cbBTC. The incident was isolated to reward distribution contracts and did not compromise Fluid’s core protocol contracts, lending markets, or user deposits"},{"date":1726704000,"name":"Banana Gun","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Frontend Compromise","amount":3000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":3000000,"defillamaId":"3336","language":null,"description":"On September 19, 2024, Banana Gun's Telegram message oracle validation failure allowed attackers to forge transfer authorizations and drain $3M from 11 users' wallets. All users were reimbursed from the treasury."},{"date":1677456000,"name":"swapX","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"swapX on BSC was exploited through a lack of access control in the 0x4f1f05bc function. The attacker repeatedly called this function to manipulate DND token prices and drain approximately $1M from user wallets that had approved the contract."},{"date":1688774400,"name":"CIVNFT","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":180000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"CIVNFT smart contract shipped fund-transfer functions with zero access control. An attacker exploited this to initiate callback functions that transferred CIV and USDT funds to Uniswap for liquidation."},{"date":1627430400,"name":"PolyYeld Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":250000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"809","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 28, 2021, PolyYeld Finance was exploited when attackers discovered that the Masterchef contract could not properly handle xYELD's transfer tax reward distribution system. Attackers minted approximately 4.995 billion YELD tokens and converted 4% of them to ~123 ETH (~$250K) before the token crashed 100%."},{"date":1730678400,"name":"MetaWin","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":4400000,"chain":["Ethereum","Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 4, 2024, MetaWin casino's hot wallets on Ethereum and Solana were compromised, draining approximately $4.4M. The vulnerability was in the platform's frictionless withdrawal system. The attacker was tracked across 115 addresses and moved stolen funds through KuCoin and HitBTC. MetaWin restored 95% of user withdrawals."},{"date":1726790400,"name":"BingX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":43300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4859","language":null,"description":"On September 20, 2024 (4:00 AM Singapore time), BingX hot wallets were compromised via access control bypass, draining ~$43M in two separate transactions: $26M + $16.5M. Assets stolen included 13.25M ETH, 2.3M BNB, 4.4M USDT, and 360+ altcoin types. BingX promised reimbursement from reserves."},{"date":1787875200,"name":"Virtue","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":894500,"chain":["Iota"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6455","language":"Move","description":"An attacker exploited Switchboard’s IOTA guardian-attestation design to replace the signing keys of all 14 production oracles and submit arbitrary IOTA prices. The attacker first inflated IOTA to $10M, allowing 4.94M unbacked VUSD to be minted against 1.027 IOTA, then crashed the reported price to trigger liquidations of healthy positions. By pre-positioning the freshly minted VUSD in Virtue’s Stability Pool, the attacker captured 16.72M IOTA-equivalent of collateral from the manipulated liquidations"},{"date":1621209600,"name":"BearnFi","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":18000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"387","language":null,"description":"BearnFi's BvaultsBank contract interpreted deposit amounts inconsistently between BUSD and ibBUSD. Attackers exploited this via flashloan cycles to inflate withdrawal amounts."},{"date":1647993600,"name":"Ronin Bridge","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":624000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4440","language":null,"description":"On March 23, 2022 the Ronin Network bridge (connecting Axie Infinity sidechain to Ethereum) suffered the largest cryptocurrency theft in history when attackers compromised validator node private keys, gaining control of 5 of 9 validators and using the majority to approve fraudulent withdrawals of 173,600 ETH and 25.5 million USDC ($624M total). The breach was discovered six days later on March 29."},{"date":1689811200,"name":"Utopia","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":119300,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6970","language":"Solidity","description":"Utopia token on BSC was exploited via a business logic flaw in its swap or price calculation mechanism. The attacker exploited the broken logic to extract 492 BNB from the protocol."},{"date":1681948800,"name":"Tales of Elleria","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":280000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Tales of Elleria's bridge contract on Arbitrum was exploited on April 20. An attacker forged bridge signatures and minted 5 billion ELM tokens, then drained the associated liquidity pool. Approximately 140 ETH (~$280K) was extracted from the LP before the attack was detected. The project froze operations and announced plans to compensate affected users through an airdrop mechanism."},{"date":1778457600,"name":"Huma","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":101400,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7930","language":"Solidity","description":"Huma Finance's deprecated V1 BaseCreditPool contracts on Polygon were exploited via a credit-lifecycle logic error combined with unrestricted access control. An attacker created Requested credit records through an open requestCredit() path with preApproved=false, then advanced those unapproved records to GoodStanding using an unrestricted refreshAccount() call. The attacker then exploited drawdown() to borrow the pools' residual balances."},{"date":1687478400,"name":"Shido","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":238500,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Shido on BNB Chain suffered an exploit on June 23, 2023 due to a configuration error. The attack resulted in the loss of approximately 976 BNB worth ~$238.5K at the time of exploit."},{"date":1774483200,"name":"TUR Staking","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":133000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On March 26, 2026, the TUR staking protocol on BSC was exploited via a spot price manipulation attack. The attacker manipulated the TUR-NOBEL liquidity pool to artificially inflate the spot price, then used this inflated price to trigger oversized reward calculations in the staking contract. The attacker claimed amplified rewards through a referral account and profited approximately $133K by swapping the stolen TUR for USDT."},{"date":1769904000,"name":"CrossCurve","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Cross-Chain Message Spoofing","amount":3000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5146","language":null,"description":"CrossCurve's ReceiverAxelar contract failed to validate message origin, letting attackers forge cross-chain messages. Attackers crafted messages to release tokens without offsetting deposits on other chains, draining $3M across multiple blockchains."},{"date":1635292800,"name":"CREAM Lending","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":130000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"121","parentProtocolId":"parent#cream-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On October 27, 2021, CREAM Finance was exploited for $130 million via flashloan-enabled oracle manipulation. Attacker used flashloans from MakerDAO and Aave to manipulate yUSD price, then minted unbacked yUSD and crYUSD by exploiting vault accounting and composability across Curve and Aave."},{"date":1787875200,"name":"Avici","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":500859,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Crypto Card","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"8034","language":"Rust","description":"A vulnerability in a version of Rain’s Solana card contract used by Avici allowed unauthorized withdrawals from the contract holding users’ card balances. Avici reported that 1,685 users were affected for $500,859.22. The vulnerable contract was subsequently upgraded across all affected programs"},{"date":1789430400,"name":"Bonfire","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":47400,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BonfireSwap’s public transfer path accepted a caller-supplied token owner address and passed it as the from address to BONFIRE’s transferFrom without verifying that the caller was that owner or otherwise authorized by the owner. Because BONFIRE saw BonfireSwap itself as msg.sender, existing victim-to-BonfireSwap allowances authorized the transfers. The attacker repeatedly selected wallets with standing approvals, transferred their BONFIRE into the BONFIRE/WBNB PancakeSwap pair, and used the router’s public skim path to collect the resulting excess before selling the harvested BONFIRE for BNB. No private key, admin privilege, flash loan, or PancakeSwap invariant failure was required"},{"date":1790812800,"name":"FlashLoopAdapter","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":305000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"FlashLoopAdapter’s open()/close() authorization trusted any caller whose isModuleEnabled() response returned true, allowing an attacker-controlled fake Safe to pass the check. The attacker then supplied each real victim Safe as swapRouter and encoded execTransactionFromModule(...) as arbitrary swapCalldata. Because FlashLoopAdapter was already an enabled module on those Safes, they accepted the calls and transferred or withdrew collateral to the attacker"},{"date":1792713600,"name":"Initia","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":2600000,"chain":["Initia"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#initia","language":null,"description":"Initia suffered a security incident involving the unauthorized minting of multiple assets on its L1. The attacker reportedly transferred and converted some of the minted assets into Ethereum-based holdings. Initia halted its L1 and rollups while investigating the vulnerability and coordinating with validators, exchanges, and security teams"},{"date":1621296000,"name":"Venus Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":100000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker manipulated XVS spot price via low liquidity on centralized exchanges, driving it from $70 to $143 and back to $76. Using inflated XVS collateral, they borrowed 2,000 BTC and 5,700 ETH. Liquidations cascaded as borrowers defaulted, and Venus absorbed 100M+ USD in bad debt."},{"date":1545177600,"name":"ToBet","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"ToBet gambling platform was exploited on December 19, 2018 via a rollback attack using EOS's blacklist feature. Attackers rolled back losing wagers to their original states, extracting value from the platform. This was part of a coordinated attack against multiple EOS DApps."},{"date":1779494400,"name":"Mure","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":11700,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Mure's MureDistribution proxy on Ethereum was drained in a single transaction on 21 May 2026 after a caller-controlled signer address was passed to SignatureChecker, causing it to fall through to the ERC-1271 path and return true for a forged signature. This authorized transferFrom of 4.85M QUEST tokens pre-approved to the proxy, which sold for ~5.45 ETH (~$11.7K)."},{"date":1772064000,"name":"Ploutos Money","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":390000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6792","language":"Solidity","description":"Ploutos Money oracle misconfigured to use BTC/USD feed for USDC pricing. Attacker borrowed 187 ETH by depositing only 8 USDC (~10^12x discrepancy), exploiting the misconfiguration within one block."},{"date":1642377600,"name":"Crypto Burger","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":770000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Gaming","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On January 16-17, 2022, the CryptoBurgers play-to-earn game was exploited when the BURG token's burn function lacked access control, allowing attackers to burn tokens from the PancakeSwap liquidity pool to manipulate prices. Using flashloans, two attackers drained approximately $700K-$770K in BNB from the protocol by exploiting the unprotected burn mechanism."},{"date":1780876800,"name":"Flooring Protocol","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3644","language":"Solidity","description":"Flooring Protocol was exploited on June 8, 2026 via a packed storage and token-indexing vulnerability in its DN404/BT404 implementation. Attacker deposited small WETH to mint near-infinite fpToken balances, draining multiple NFT pools. Yuga Labs white hats rescued 68 blue-chip NFTs ($500K+) including 29 BAYC, 4 Mutant Apes and 2 CryptoPunks."},{"date":1784073600,"name":"Ostium","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":23750000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4932","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 15, 2026, Ostium perpetuals DEX on Arbitrum suffered a $23.75M exploit when an attacker used a compromised price oracle private key to sign fraudulent Bitcoin price reports ($5,000 vs. real ~$60,000), opening positions at fake prices and closing at market rates."},{"date":1726185600,"name":"OTSea","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":26000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4783","language":"Solidity","description":"OTSea's staking contract had a logical defect in reward calculation and state tracking that allowed attackers to manipulate reward variables and continuously withdraw staking rewards beyond their actual stake."},{"date":1673913600,"name":"Midas Capital","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":660000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1925","language":"Solidity","description":"On January 15-17, 2023 Midas Capital's Jarvis Polygon pool was exploited via a flashloan-enabled reentrancy attack targeting a recently-added collateral token, draining $660,000 of MATIC. Midas reached out with a bug-bounty offer and contributed $1,000 USDC weekly for 52 weeks toward affected protocols and users."},{"date":1778457600,"name":"INK Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Caller Impersonation","amount":140000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"INK Finance's Workspace Treasury Proxy on Polygon was exploited on May 11, 2026 for $140K USDT. Attacker deployed a malicious contract matching a whitelisted claimer address to bypass authorization checks and trigger unauthorized treasury transfers, facilitated by a $25K flash loan."},{"date":1628726400,"name":"DAO Maker Vesting","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":7000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"921","parentProtocolId":"parent#dao-maker","language":null,"description":"DAO Maker's vesting system was exploited when the init() function lacked access control, allowing an attacker to reset parameters on 4 token contracts (DERC, CPD, CAPS, SHO) and drain tokens via emergencyExit. Stolen tokens were swapped on DEXes, causing significant price impact."},{"date":1666224000,"name":"Ethereum Alarm Clock","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":260000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 20, 2022, Ethereum Alarm Clock's transaction scheduling protocol was exploited via a gas fee refund calculation vulnerability where the cancel() function calculated refunds too high when given inflated transaction fees, allowing attackers to call cancel with high gas prices and extract approximately 204 ETH (~$260K) in overpaid refunds."},{"date":1731110400,"name":"X319","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":12900,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 9, 2024, the X319 contract on BNB Chain was exploited through an access control vulnerability, resulting in approximately $12.9K in losses."},{"date":1711324800,"name":"ZongZiFa","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":229000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"ZongZiFa token exploit where the attacker artificially inflated token price to profit from the protocol's invitation-reward mechanism, netting approximately 391 WBNB."},{"date":1726444800,"name":"Rivus DAO","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Backdoor Contract","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4574","language":"Solidity","description":"Rivus DAO's Bittensor liquid-staking protocol was drained when a contracted developer inserted a backdoor in the migration contract. The team recovered funds using the developer's identity documents. Rivus relaunched on October 1, 2024."},{"date":1623283200,"name":"EvoDefi","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":1000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A design flaw in EvoDefi's MasterChef fork allowed attackers to arbitrage reward distribution by exploiting an incorrect update logic that failed to deduct minted rewards. The vulnerability allowed repeated reward claims without proper accounting."},{"date":1697155200,"name":"Platypus Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":2200000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 12, 2023, Platypus Finance on Avalanche was exploited via three flashloan transactions totaling ~$2.2-2.23M. Attackers manipulated swap prices by altering slippage calculations across multiple liquidity pools, then draining value from the protocol."},{"date":1794787200,"name":"Optimizely (OPTIMJACK)","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Supply Chain Attack","amount":2260,"chain":["Bitcoin","Litecoin","TRON","Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Web Infrastructure","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"JavaScript","description":"On November 16, 2026, an attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely's web experimentation platform to inject malicious JavaScript into scripts used by 178 organizations, including Ledger, HSBC, BBC and Zoom. The injected code replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses, redirecting approximately $2,260 in suspected victim payments across Bitcoin, Litecoin, Tron, Ethereum and BSC. The malware also attempted to steal payment-card information, cookies and screenshots, and delivered exploit kits targeting iOS devices. Optimizely removed the injected code and patched the vulnerability, while the full extent of data theft and additional financial losses remained unknown"},{"date":1704585600,"name":"MangoFarmSol","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":2000000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"On January 6-7, 2024, MangoFarmSOL on Solana was revealed as an intentional rugpull. The frontend and smart contract were malicious drainers that extracted all wallet tokens from users who approved transfers. The team deleted all social media and vanished."},{"date":1732579200,"name":"NFTG","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":10000,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 26, 2024, the NFTG protocol on BNB Chain suffered an access control vulnerability that allowed unauthorized fund extraction. The vulnerability was in the contract's access controls, permitting unauthorized callers to drain approximately $10K."},{"date":1733788800,"name":"Clober Liquidity Vault","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":500000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5315","parentProtocolId":"parent#clober","language":null,"description":"On December 10, 2024, Clober Liquidity Vault on Base was exploited for ~$501K via reentrancy in the Rebalancer contract's _burn function. The attacker used a malicious contract and 267.4 ETH flashloan to execute repeated state reads before balance updates."},{"date":1731283200,"name":"zkFinance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":200000,"chain":["zkSync Era"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4798","language":null,"description":"No credible sources found documenting a zkFinance hack on November 11, 2024, or proximate dates on zkSync Era."},{"date":1624838400,"name":"Safe Dollar","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":248000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"424","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 28, 2021, SafeDollar's staking pool on Polygon was exploited via incompatibility with deflationary tokens. The attacker used flash-loaned PLX to deplete the contract's actual balance to ~2 tokens while maintaining inflated deposit records, causing the reward formula to mint massive SDO amounts. These were sold for ~$248K in USDC and USDT."},{"date":1689206400,"name":"Ethscriptions","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2828,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A vulnerability in the Ethscriptions.com marketplace smart contract allowed unauthorized withdrawals. The contract contained code that permitted users to withdraw Ethscriptions they didn't own, resulting in ~202 inscriptions stolen across ~123 addresses."},{"date":1781654400,"name":"Aztec Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":2000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Aztec's private rollup bridge escape-hatch mechanism was exploited via incomplete proof validation, allowing an attacker to manipulate proof data and withdraw 1,158 ETH, 150,000 DAI, and ~0.47 renBTC. This was the second Aztec exploit in June 2026; the June 14 attack drained ~$2.1M via similar proof manipulation."},{"date":1665792000,"name":"Earning.Farm","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":1200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"EFLeverVault, a key component of Earning.Farm, was targeted with flash loan attacks on October 15, 2022. The contract failed to verify the origin of flashloan callbacks, allowing attackers to impersonate legitimate protocol calls and execute unauthorized ETH withdrawals from the collateral pool."},{"date":1778976000,"name":"SEA Token","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":153000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Suspicious attack on Arbitrum drained ~$153K from SEA token interactions; suspected price oracle or liquidity manipulation but mechanism unconfirmed pending technical analysis."},{"date":1771113600,"name":"Moonwell Lending","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":1780000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1853","parentProtocolId":"parent#moonwell","language":"Solidity","description":"Moonwell Lending on Base suffered a $1.78M loss when AI-generated code misconfigured the cbETH oracle to price it at $1.12 instead of nearly $2,200, failing to multiply the exchange rate by the price feed. This enabled abnormal liquidations and borrowing."},{"date":1644883200,"name":"Build Finance","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":470000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Build Finance DAO suffered a governance takeover when an attacker submitted a proposal to grant themselves minting and treasury controls. Low participation allowed the malicious proposal to pass unnoticed. The attacker minted 1.1 billion BUILD tokens, drained liquidity pools on Uniswap and Balancer, and stole 130,000 METRIC tokens from the treasury, ultimately extracting 160 ETH."},{"date":1787443200,"name":"Surf Lending","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":0,"chain":["Cardano"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6494","language":"Aiken","description":"A machine with access to Surf Lending’s admin key was compromised. According to Surf’s lead developer, the incident was not caused by a smart-contract bug. Surf placed the protocol into maintenance mode, temporarily migrated user vaults and supplied assets to its multisig treasury wallet, and began migrating the V1 contracts while rebuilding the affected infrastructure in a more secure environment. Surf subsequently described the event as a security incident and prioritized restoring V1"},{"date":1670544000,"name":"NOVAToken","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":null,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"NOVAToken on BSC was rugged through malicious unlimited minting. The admin used their privileged access to mint unlimited tokens and drain value from the protocol."},{"date":1628553600,"name":"Punk Protocol","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Delegatecall Hijack","amount":8950000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 10, 2021, Punk Protocol was exploited for $8.95M when attacker used delegatecall to rerun unguarded Initialize function, changing forge address to gain withdrawal control. White-hat frontran and recovered ~$5M, keeping $1M as finder's fee."},{"date":1783900800,"name":"Chi Protocol","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Redeem Logic Flaw","amount":8500,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4617","language":"Solidity","description":"Chi Protocol exploited on July 13, 2026 for ~$8.5K. Attacker flash-loaned 5 WETH, bought depegged USC from a thin Uniswap V2 pool, and burned it against the ReserveHolder. The burn() function assumed a $1 peg without checking, redeeming full-value collateral."},{"date":1678147200,"name":"Tender Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Stale Oracle Price","amount":1590000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2382","language":"Solidity","description":"Tender Finance on Arbitrum exploited March 7, 2023 for $1.59M via misconfigured GMX oracle. Attacker borrowed using only 1 GMX token (~$70 collateral). White-hat negotiated return for $97K bounty."},{"date":1758931200,"name":"Hyperdrive HL Lending","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":782000,"chain":["Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6298","parentProtocolId":"parent#hyperdrive-hl","language":"Solidity","description":"On September 27, 2025 Hyperdrive (lending protocol on Hyperliquid L1) lost approximately $782,000 to an exploit where attackers exploited an arbitrary router call vulnerability, making repeated withdrawals from the Primary USDT0 Market and Treasury USDT Market and extracting ~673,000 USDT0 and 110,244 thBILL, with stolen funds bridged to Ethereum ($494k) and BNB Chain ($279k)."},{"date":1733529600,"name":"MAAT Protocol","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":168173,"chain":["Binance"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"MAAT Protocol's withdrawal logic had a critical edge case where not all shares were burned during withdrawals from the BSC Stargate strategy. This left 1 wei of shares in the contract, allowing third-party addresses to call redeem with minimal share input and drain funds without consuming shares."},{"date":1786665600,"name":"Bodega Market","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Unknown","amount":3600,"chain":["Cardano"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6012","language":"Aiken","description":"An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Bodega Market’s prediction-market contracts to drain rewards and market seed funds. The team associated the exploit with a transaction involving an M-EVIL_ORACLE token, but has not yet disclosed the underlying vulnerability or explained how that token enabled the drain. Because the exploit mechanism remains under investigation, the precise root cause is not yet confirmed"},{"date":1622160000,"name":"BurgerSwap","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":7200000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1295","language":null,"description":"BurgerSwap exploited May 28, 2021 for $7.2M in BURGER, WBNB, and USDC. Missing code line in Uniswap V2 fork enabled reentrancy. Attacker created a fake token to manipulate price, then executed profitable swaps funded by a PancakeSwap flashloan."},{"date":1793491200,"name":"Premia V3","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":437000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3497","parentProtocolId":"parent#premia","language":"Solidity","description":null},{"date":1596499200,"name":"Opyn","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":371000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The Opyn ETH Put contract had a critical bug in its exercise function: msg.value was checked inside a loop but only the first batch of ETH was actually received. Attackers called exercise() with multiple vaults in a single transaction, reusing the same ETH batch to withdraw collateral multiple times."},{"date":1782777600,"name":"Edel","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":403000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7578","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 30, 2026, Edel Finance's xStock lending protocol was exploited via flash loan-enabled oracle manipulation. The attacker manipulated the wGOOGLx (tokenized Google shares) exchange rate, inflating collateral value by ~7,700% due to a missing price oracle fallback, allowing extraction of $403K in bad debt."},{"date":1669680000,"name":"MBC & ZZSH","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":5900,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MBC and ZZSH tokens on BSC suffered access control vulnerabilities combined with business logic flaws. Attackers exploited improper permission checks to drain protocol funds."},{"date":1766707200,"name":"FilDA","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":166800,"chain":["Elastos"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"348","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker manipulated token pricing used by FilDA’s Glide LP price oracle on Elastos Smart Chain, allowing the attacker to exploit distorted asset valuations and drain more than 140,000 ELA and 5,800 USDC from the lending protocol. FilDA subsequently suspended its ESC deployment and announced that it would permanently shut it down"},{"date":1780099200,"name":"AFI Protocol","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":480000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7391","language":"Solidity","description":"On 30 May 2026 the afiUSD vault of AFI Protocol, a proof-of-reserve and yield-vault platform for RWAs on Ethereum, was drained of approximately $480,000. AFI paused the affected vault within hours, rotated operational keys across the platform, and reported that its other vaults and the remaining ~$225M TVL were unaffected. The attacker swapped ~$252k DAI to ETH and sent ~150 ETH through Tornado Cash. AFI has not published the exploit path."},{"date":1656028800,"name":"Ribbon","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":12000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"281","parentProtocolId":"parent#ribbon-finance","language":null,"description":"On June 24, 2022, Ribbon Finance suffered a similar DNS hijacking attack that same week, likely using similar methodology as the Convex attack. Users were redirected to a phishing site and tricked into approving malicious contracts, resulting in limited token losses and a mass withdrawal from the protocol."},{"date":1778630400,"name":"Transit Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1880000,"chain":["Tron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On May 12, 2026, Transit Finance on Tron was exploited for $1.88M via deprecated contract officially discontinued in 2022 but left active on-chain. Attacker exploited historical vulnerabilities to drain DAI and other assets."},{"date":1676851200,"name":"Revert Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":29000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Revert Finance's V3Utils contract was exploited through an access control vulnerability allowing arbitrary code execution. Attackers transferred approved user funds by executing unauthorized contract calls, stealing approximately $29K before the team deployed a refund bot to recover all victim funds."},{"date":1726012800,"name":"Omnipus","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":30000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On September 11, 2024, Omnipus presale contracts were exploited for approximately $30,000 when a commented-out check in OAppSender.sol's payNative() function allowed attackers to bypass validation. The contract mistakenly refunded ETH to attackers who claimed overpayment, enabling unauthorized fund extraction."},{"date":1792972800,"name":"Myriad Markets","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":0,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6649","language":null,"description":"An attacker exploited a previously exposed private key belonging to Myriad’s automated market management wallet. The key had reportedly been leaked through a vulnerability in a third-party library used by a backend service. The attacker used the wallet’s privileges to manipulate positions and force incorrect resolutions across 10 prediction markets on BNB Chain. Myriad revoked the wallet’s permissions, secured the remaining funds, and announced that all affected markets would be voided and users refunded"},{"date":1708300800,"name":"RuggedArt","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A reentrancy vulnerability in the RuggedArt contract allowed attackers to manipulate contract state during transaction execution and drain funds through unsafe external calls."},{"date":1711584000,"name":"PrismaLST","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":11600000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3473","parentProtocolId":"parent#prisma","language":"Solidity","description":"Prisma Finance was exploited on March 28, 2024 via a flash loan attack on MigrateTroveZap. The onFlashLoan callback lacked origin validation, allowing the attacker to spoof migration logic and hijack troves, extracting 3,257.69 ETH (~$11.6M) in collateral."},{"date":1635465600,"name":"AutoShark","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":580000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1074","language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker exploited AutoShark's swap mining reward calculation using large-volume trades via flash loan. By performing multiple swaps in a single block to accumulate 3.18M FINS tokens, the attacker bypassed the single-transaction mitigation measures that AutoShark had previously deployed after an earlier attack."},{"date":1557187200,"name":"Binance CEX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":40000000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2269","language":null,"description":"On May 7, 2019, Binance's hot wallet private keys were compromised, resulting in theft of 7,000 bitcoin (~$40 million). The exchange halted transactions for one week and reimbursed all affected customers from its insurance fund."},{"date":1643068800,"name":"OpenSea","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":1000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"OpenSea's listing system contained a bug where transferred NFTs remained listed on the marketplace via the API despite appearing delisted. Attackers exploited this to purchase previously thought-delisted NFTs at old, far below-market prices and immediately resold them for profit. Three attackers collectively extracted over $1M by buying popular NFTs like Bored Ape Yacht Club at historical listing prices."},{"date":1783728000,"name":"BlueMove DEX","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":529000,"chain":["Sui"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2941","parentProtocolId":"parent#bluemove","language":"Move","description":"BlueMove DEX's liquidity pools were drained on July 11, 2026 totaling 700K+ SUI ($500K-700K) via either an LP token double-minting mechanism introduced in a May 31 upgrade or an arithmetic overflow in the legacy AMM code. BlueMove announced shutdown and promised compensation."},{"date":1782604800,"name":"AIDC","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":121000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 28, 2026, AIDC's _sellTransfer() accumulated a 30% burn without deducting it from the seller. An attacker exploited this to withdraw from the PancakeSwap LP at inflated rates, stealing ~$121K."},{"date":1675209600,"name":"BonqDAO","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":1800000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2477","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 1, 2023, BonqDAO's collateral pricing read directly from TellorFlex's last reported value with no TWAP, dispute delay, or bounds. An attacker staked 10 TRB to become a reporter, posted an arbitrary wALBT price, minted ~98.65M BEUR against near-worthless collateral, then reversed the price to liquidate other troves. Nominal damage was ~$120M but illiquidity capped realized gains to ~$1-2M."},{"date":1777334400,"name":"JUDAO","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":228000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 28, 2026, JUDAO was exploited on BSC via a double-sync bug in the token transfer hook that miscalculated pool balances. The attacker used a Moolah flash loan (2.3M USDT) to manipulate pricing and sell JUDAO at artificially inflated prices."},{"date":1640822400,"name":"SashimiSwap","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":210000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"580","language":"Solidity","description":"SashimiSwap was exploited via improper swap and router architectural design. An attacker used a 400 ETH flash loan to create fraudulent token pairings with liquidity, then exploited the UniswapRouter contract's swap logic to extract value. The attack was initiated on December 30, 2021 at 09:06 UTC, resulting in approximately $210K in losses."},{"date":1784073600,"name":"Sonic ICP","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":276000,"chain":["ICP"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1867","language":null,"description":"Sonic DEX, a decentralized exchange on Internet Computer, suffered an exploit involving transaction atomicity failures during asynchronous canister execution. The attacker submitted coordinated, high-frequency requests that exploited race conditions during intermediate state transitions, allowing unauthorized withdrawals before the protocol completed reconciliation. The attack affected 26 liquidity pools and resulted in approximately $276,000 in losses. Sonic paused the protocol and began implementing changes to prevent similar state inconsistencies"},{"date":1777075200,"name":"Purrlend","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Caller Impersonation","amount":1500000,"chain":["MegaETH","Hyperliquid L1"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7473","language":"Solidity","description":"Purrlend's 2-of-3 admin multisig was compromised on HyperEVM and MegaETH, allowing attackers to assign themselves the bridge role and inherit elevated permissions to drain liquidity pools."},{"date":1791331200,"name":"Locus Finance","classification":null,"technique":null,"amount":18000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3371","language":"Solidity","description":null},{"date":1791244800,"name":"Set Protocol","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":21872.67,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"266","language":"Solidity","description":"ETHMACOAPY’s actualizeFee() rounded redemption backing upward even when no fee was payable. Attackers donated collateral to trigger recalculation, temporarily acquired Set tokens, then redeemed them for more collateral than they contributed, with the difference coming from existing holders’ backing. Two separate EOAs repeated the process across two transactions, draining approximately 8.11 WETH"},{"date":1771718400,"name":"Blend Pools V2","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":10970000,"chain":["Stellar"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6122","parentProtocolId":"parent#blend","language":null,"description":"On February 22, 2026, an attacker pumped Stellar's thin USTRY market from ~$1.06 to ~$106.74, inflating collateral values. Two transactions drained $10.97M (1M USDC + 61M XLM) from YieldBlox DAO's Blend V2 lending pool, exploiting the lack of liquidity checks and anomaly detection in the oracle."},{"date":1722470400,"name":"Convergence","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":210000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 1, 2024, Convergence Finance lost $212K worth of CVG tokens when input validation was missing from the claimMultipleStaking function. The attacker passed an arbitrary malicious contract address to mint 58 million CVG tokens directly, then converted them to 60 WETH and 15.9K crvFRAX."},{"date":1793232000,"name":"Binance CEX","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":6360000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Bitcoin","TRON","Avalanche","Optimism","Arbitrum","Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2269","language":null,"description":"On October 29, attackers exploited Binance’s operational infrastructure to execute unauthorized withdrawals across multiple blockchains, resulting in approximately $6.3 billion in losses. Binance’s preliminary investigation identified a potentially compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop that allowed access to a service container, with no evidence of wallet private key leakage. Approximately $3 billion in stolen assets were later frozen with help from industry partners. Binance committed to covering all losses using its SAFU fund and company reserves"},{"date":1730937600,"name":"ChiSale","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":16300,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 7, 2024, ChiSale on Ethereum was exploited through a logic flaw in its contract implementation, resulting in approximately $16.3K in losses."},{"date":1782950400,"name":"Hinkal","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Deposit Logic Flaw","amount":820000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4487","language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers exploited deprecated note format in Hinkal's shielded-pool, performing unauthorized proofless deposits and bypassing proof verification for withdrawals. Attack was isolated to Ethereum."},{"date":1539561600,"name":"EOSBet","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":338000,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"EOSBet gaming platform was attacked on October 15, 2018 using a forged transfer notification exploit. Attackers leveraged the fake transfer notification vulnerability to drain funds from the contract. This was the second major hack of EOSBet within a month, with this incident resulting in losses of approximately $338,000."},{"date":1689984000,"name":"Conic Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2616","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 21-22, 2023, Conic Finance suffered two exploits via read-only reentrancy in CurveLPOracleV2. Attackers manipulated perceived prices to drain $3.26 million from the ETH omnipool; a second exploit of $300K occurred shortly after."},{"date":1709078400,"name":"Seneca","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":6400000,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4137","language":"Solidity","description":"Seneca Protocol's Chamber contract was exploited on February 28, 2024 via improper token approval handling that allowed unauthorized transfers of ~1,900 ETH and 50,000 senUSD. The attacker later returned 80% of funds after being offered a 20% bounty."},{"date":1777420800,"name":"Sweat Foundation","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":3500000,"chain":["Near"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"On April 29, 2026, an attacker exploited a logic flaw in the SWEAT token contract on NEAR Protocol, draining 13.71B SWEAT tokens (~$3.5M) from foundation wallets within 30 seconds via a malicious drain contract. Stolen tokens were quickly liquidated via MEXC and Rhea Finance; Sweat Foundation patched the contract and restored all external user balances."},{"date":1695081600,"name":"Balancer V2","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Frontend Compromise","amount":238000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2611","parentProtocolId":"parent#balancer","language":null,"description":"Balancer's DNS was hijacked and redirected users to phishing frontend, stealing ~$238K from users. Smart contracts were unaffected; only DNS infrastructure was compromised."},{"date":1656720000,"name":"Crema Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":8800000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1412","language":"Rust","description":"On July 2, 2022, Crema Finance's Solana protocol was exploited when an attacker bypassed owner verification on tick accounts used for fee calculations. The attacker created a fraudulent tick account, obtained a flashloan from Solend, added liquidity to the CLMM pool, and exploited the manipulated pricing to drain $8.78M (69,500 SOL + $6.5M stablecoins)."},{"date":1765670400,"name":"Mars Perps","classification":"Market Manipulation","technique":"Funding Rate Arbitrage","amount":960000,"chain":["Neutron"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5498","parentProtocolId":"parent#mars-protocol","language":"Rust","description":"On December 14, 2025, Mars Protocol's Perps market on Neutron was exploited for ~$973K via skew-based pricing arbitrage. The attacker executed the same-block arbitrage pattern 15 times, exploiting that funding rates were only applied between blocks rather than within them, eliminating downside risk."},{"date":1736121600,"name":"Mosca","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":37600,"chain":["Binance"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Mosca is an on-chain MLM/membership program where users join by depositing USDT, BUSD, or USDC for internal credits to withdraw later. The exitProgram function had incomplete state resets—only user.balance was zeroed after withdrawal but not user.balanceUSDT and user.balanceUSDC, enabling repeated withdrawals of the same funds from these alternate balance fields."},{"date":1617580800,"name":"Polkatrain","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":3000000,"chain":["Polkadot"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"The POLT_LBP contract's rebate mechanism lacked maximum rebate limits or exhaustion checks. An attacker repeatedly called the swap function to extract rebate rewards, draining 57K DOT (~$3M) from the contract. The contract's _update function failed to validate rebate constraints."},{"date":1767571200,"name":"TMX TRIBE","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":1400000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On January 5-6, 2026, attacker exploited TMX TRIBE perpetual futures (Arbitrum/Optimism) via flawed AUM calculation ignoring USDG liabilities. Repeated mint-stake-swap loops allowed artificially inflated redemptions, draining $1.4M."},{"date":1784592000,"name":"42DAO","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":912000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"42DAO's Balance Coin collapsed from $1 to $0.0012 on July 22, 2026 when attacker fed a fake low BTCB price to the oracle via the Spotter module. The oracle lacked drawdown limits and price floors, triggering liquidations of BTCB vaults at far-below-market prices."},{"date":1718064000,"name":"YOLO Games","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Caller Impersonation","amount":1500000,"chain":["Blast"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"YOLO Games' Bazaar LBP (Liquidity Bootstrapping Pool) on Blast was exploited on June 11, 2024 for $1.5M. The exitPool function failed to verify msg.sender, allowing anyone to withdraw assets as a liquidity provider. Unchecked function arguments permitted use of BazaarLBPFactoryBlast address as sender."},{"date":1420416000,"name":"Bitstamp","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":5200000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3543","language":null,"description":"Six Bitstamp employees were targeted in a sophisticated weeks-long phishing campaign starting in November 2014. The attacker sent social engineering emails to the CTO and system administrator, culminating in malware installation that gave the attacker access to the exchange's hot wallet infrastructure."},{"date":1629158400,"name":"SurgeBNB","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":5000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SurgeBNB suffered a reentrancy attack funded by a 10,000 BNB flash loan. The sell function updated balances after external calls, letting attacker repeatedly withdraw value."},{"date":1753315200,"name":"WOO X","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":14000000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum","Arbitrum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2346","language":null,"description":"WOO X exchange suffered a phishing attack via a fake open-source collaboration request that lured a developer to open a malicious development tool. Attackers gained access to the development environment and executed unauthorized withdrawals across nine user accounts, draining $14M across Bitcoin, Ethereum, Arbitrum, and BSC."},{"date":1703635200,"name":"Levana Perps","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Stale Oracle Price","amount":1100000,"chain":["Osmosis"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3474","language":"Rust","description":"Over December 13-26, 2023, Levana Protocol on Osmosis was exploited for $1.1M (10% TVL) via Pyth oracle staleness combined with Osmosis fee market bugs. Attacker executed profitable trades during volatile windows with stale price data; elevated gas costs amplified profitability."},{"date":1599696000,"name":"SYFI","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":250000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An anonymous trader exploited a rebase bug in SYFI's unaudited contract code. By staking a small amount and leveraging the arithmetic error in the rebase logic, they extracted nearly $250K in realized gains while crashing the token price from $174 to $0.0004."},{"date":1784678400,"name":"Zilliqa","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Weak Key Generation","amount":1640000,"chain":["Zilliqa"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"A buffer-copy error in the Zilliqa Ledger app's Schnorr signing code since 2019 fixed the top 64 bits of every nonce at zero. Attackers recovered private keys from ~5 on-chain signatures using lattice reduction and stole approximately 683.13M ZIL, with exploitation first spotted on July 19, 2026."},{"date":1686787200,"name":"Hashflow","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":605000,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum","Avalanche","BSC","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1447","language":"Solidity","description":"A vulnerable function in Hashflow's contract allowed attackers to trigger transferFrom() on approved user tokens. The attacker exploited an approve-related issue across five chains, draining approximately $605K. The white-hat nature of the attack was later confirmed, and a recovery function was provided by the attacker, with Hashflow committing to compensating all affected users."},{"date":1782345600,"name":"Polymarket International","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Frontend Compromise","amount":3000000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"711","parentProtocolId":"parent#polymarket","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 25, 2026, Polymarket frontend was compromised via third-party vendor, injecting malicious JavaScript that phished users into approving fraudulent token transfers, draining $3M from at least 11 wallets."},{"date":1769817600,"name":"Step Finance","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":40000000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4837","language":"Rust","description":"On January 31, 2026, Step Finance suffered a $40 million operational loss when attackers compromised executive team devices, gaining unauthorized access to treasury and fee wallet signing keys/credentials. The protocol had no smart contract vulnerabilities."},{"date":1649980800,"name":"Rikkei Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1100000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1570","language":"Solidity","description":"Rikkei Finance lending protocol lacked permission controls in the setOracleDate function, allowing an attacker to manipulate oracle prices. With only 0.0001 BNB as collateral, the attacker borrowed all USDC, BTC, DAI, USDT, and BUSD from liquidity pools by inflating collateral value through the malicious oracle."},{"date":1727308800,"name":"uniBTC","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":2000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4966","language":"Solidity","description":"On September 26, 2024, a former employee planted malware in Bedrock's Cargo.toml file, providing persistent access for three weeks through IDE execution. The attacker then exploited a flaw in the uniBTC minting mechanism that allowed arbitrary minting against ETH, draining $1.7M-$2M from the liquidity pool."},{"date":1751932800,"name":"Peapods Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Oracle Misconfiguration","amount":207000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Peapods Finance's aspLONGsUSDe pod on July 8, 2025 exploited for $207K via oracle misconfiguration. Attacker manipulated the WETH/aspLONGsUSDe price to inflate collateral values. The issue was in user-created pod logic, not core contracts."},{"date":1493251200,"name":"Yapizon","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":4800000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On April 22, 2017, Yapizon suffered an attack where hackers compromised four hot wallets and stole 3,816 BTC (~$5M), representing 37% of user funds. South Korean authorities later alleged the breach was perpetrated by North Korea. Yapizon replaced lost balances with Fei tokens representing IOUs."},{"date":1670630400,"name":"TiFi","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":43500,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2031","language":"Solidity","description":"TIFIToken on BSC suffered a flash loan price manipulation attack. The attacker used a flash loan to artificially move the token price, enabling profitable transactions on decentralized exchanges."},{"date":1693872000,"name":"Floor Dao","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":64200,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1505","language":"Solidity","description":"FloorDAO's staking contract for the rebasing sFLOOR token contained a logic flaw that could be exploited during rebasing operations. The vulnerability was discovered and exploited on September 5, 2023, with post-mortems published by the FloorDAO team."},{"date":1690934400,"name":"Bald","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Liquidity Rug","amount":23000000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On 31 July 2023 the anonymous deployer of the BALD memecoin on Base removed the two-sided liquidity provided two days after launch, crashing the token roughly 90%."},{"date":1685232000,"name":"Jimbos Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":7500000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On May 28, 2023, Jimbos Protocol on Arbitrum (launched <20 days prior) was exploited for 4,090 ETH via flashloan-enabled oracle manipulation. Attacker took $5.9M flashloan and manipulated JIMBO price to exploit shift/conversion logic lacking slippage protection."},{"date":1668211200,"name":"FTX","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":450000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 11-12, 2022, a SIM-swapping gang stole approximately $450M in crypto from FTX by walking into AT&T stores with fake IDs, hijacking employee phone accounts, intercepting 2FA codes sent to FTX users, and draining their wallets during the company's bankruptcy."},{"date":1586304000,"name":"Bisq","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":248000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2588","language":"Java","description":"Bisq's trade arbitration did not verify that the payout address for time-locked fallback transactions was the legitimate Bisq donation address. Attackers posing as sellers set their own donation address, then let trades time out, causing the platform to send the buyer's deposit, payment, and security deposit to the attacker's wallet instead of the Bisq DAO address. Six traders lost a total of 34.86 BTC on March 28 and April 7."},{"date":1682380800,"name":"MERLIN DEX","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":1820000,"chain":["zkSync Era"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2849","language":null,"description":"On April 25, 2023, zkSync DEX Merlin was exploited for $1.82 million. The attacker drained pools through the feeTo address in MerlinFactory which had unlimited asset transfer permissions and lacked multi-sig governance."},{"date":1652313600,"name":"Venus Protocol","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Stale Oracle Price","amount":11200000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Venus LUNA market had a hardcoded $0.10 minimum price while Chainlink froze updates due to LUNA volatility. Attackers bought LUNA at drastically reduced prices and used it as collateral at $0.10/token to borrow other assets, extracting $11.2M before Venus suspended the market."},{"date":1634947200,"name":"Alpha Homora","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":147000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"MEV bot extracted value from Alpha Homora V2 via sandwich attack on Uniswap V2 addLiquidity function. The attacker took advantage of implicit assumptions in Uniswap's contract that were not enforced at the contract level, allowing slippage to bypass checks on certain trade paths."},{"date":1741132800,"name":"Pond.fun","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":145000,"chain":["Linea"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Pond.fun's lead software engineer Genesis exploited privileged access to the platform's smart contracts, manipulating withdrawal functions to drain 64.8 ETH from the liquidity pools. The stolen funds were bridged to Railgun for privacy before moving to centralized exchanges. Chainalysis and Elliptic were contracted to track and prevent laundering of the stolen assets."},{"date":1617494400,"name":"Force DAO","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":367000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Force DAO was exploited hours after launch when the xFORCE vault contract assumed failed ERC20 transfers would revert. The Aragon Minime token returns false instead, allowing attackers to claim tokens without proper validation and drain ~$367K in FORCE."},{"date":1723766400,"name":"Zenterest","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Stale Oracle Price","amount":21000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 16, 2024, Zenterest lending protocol was exploited for approximately $21,000 when an attacker exploited severely stale oracle prices. The ZenterestPriceFeed had not been updated for 570 days, displaying MPH Token at an inflated price of 944,836,858,607,953 versus the actual 0.4677 USD, enabling excessive borrows that the attacker profited on."},{"date":1769472000,"name":"PGNLZ","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":100000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"PGNLZ's flawed burn mechanism allowed attackers to burn tokens directly from the PancakeSwap USDT-PGNLZ pool's balance without proper synchronization. This artificially reduced pool reserves, creating sharp price distortions that enabled attackers to execute reverse swaps and drain approximately $100K in USDT."},{"date":1727049600,"name":"Bankroll Network","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":234800,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Bankroll Network's token sale contract lacked validation on the _customerAddress parameter, allowing attackers to manipulate profitPerShare_ calculations and extract dividends without sending WBNB tokens."},{"date":1683244800,"name":"DEUS Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":6500000,"chain":["Arbitrum","BSC","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1387","language":"Solidity","description":"DEUS Finance lost $6.5M across Arbitrum, BSC, and Ethereum when an attacker exploited a parameter ordering error in the DEI stablecoin's burnFrom function, reversing approval relationships in the allowances mapping."},{"date":1650758400,"name":"Wiener DOGE","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":30000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Wiener DOGE token exploited via flash loan attack. The deflationary token failed to exclude LP pairs from transfer fees, allowing an attacker to drain tokens from liquidity pools. The k-value was destroyed, and the attacker profited approximately 78 BNB."},{"date":1727308800,"name":"ReHold","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"ReHold's CEO and co-founder Renat Gafarov unilaterally withdrew $700K in net profits and initial capital from the protocol's smart contracts without approval from his co-founder, then seized control of company infrastructure and domain access."},{"date":1652140800,"name":"OWNLY","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":37000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"OWNLY's unstake function lacked claim status validation, allowing attackers to repeatedly call unstake() and extract 930M OWN tokens without authorization. The staking contract was drained of ~$37K in BNB equivalent before discovery."},{"date":1644624000,"name":"IRA Financial / Gemini","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"API Key Compromised","amount":36000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Hackers obtained IRA Financial's master API key from unencrypted emails between Gemini and IRA, which contained a single point of failure that bypassed security protocols. The attackers consolidated funds from all sub-accounts into one and withdrew approximately $36M in Bitcoin and Ether within a two-hour window before Gemini could freeze accounts."},{"date":1787529600,"name":"Nesa","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":50000000,"chain":["Nesa"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Go","description":"Nesa was exploited through a Cosmos EVM vulnerability involving inconsistent balance accounting between Cosmos EVM and the Cosmos SDK. In the shared exploit mechanism documented by Cosmos Labs, delegation of locked tokens from a vesting account through the staking precompile could cause an unchecked EVM balance underflow to approximately 2^256. The resulting artificial balance could then be used to overflow a high-balance victim account, reducing the victim balance to zero while transferring its legitimate tokens to the attacker, with no net increase in token supply. Nesa has confirmed exploitation of a Cosmos EVM vulnerability but has not publicly disclosed its Nesa-side exploit transaction or victim account, so application of the exact shared mechanism to Nesa remains strongly supported but not independently demonstrated at transaction level"},{"date":1721692800,"name":"DeltaPrime","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Ownership Takeover","amount":1000000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2479","language":"Solidity","description":"DeltaPrime on Arbitrum suffered a $1M loss on July 23, 2024 when a flawed account ownership transfer allowed attackers to take control of accounts and withdraw collateral."},{"date":1706313600,"name":"Citadel.one","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":93000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Citadel.one, a portfolio management dApp on Arbitrum, suffered an access control vulnerability that allowed unauthorized extraction of wrapped Ethereum (WETH) and USD Coin (USDC). The attackers exploited improper access controls in the smart contract to drain approximately $93,000 in user funds."},{"date":1526947200,"name":"Verge","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":1750000,"chain":["Verge"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Between April and May 2018, attackers exploited Verge's timestamp validation mechanism by mining blocks with spoofed timestamps set one hour in the past, forcing rapid difficulty adjustments. This allowed mining at inflated rates, generating counterfeit coins valued at ~$1.75M. The attackers manipulated multiple mining algorithms to maximize coin generation."},{"date":1709596800,"name":"WOOFi Swap","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":8750000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1461","parentProtocolId":"parent#woofi","language":"Solidity","description":"WOOFi Swap on Arbitrum was exploited on March 5, 2024 via a flash loan attack on its synthetic proactive market making algorithm. An attacker borrowed 7.7M WOO tokens, exploiting the missing Chainlink price fallback to crash the price and profit ~$8.75M across three swaps in 13 minutes."},{"date":1652400000,"name":"Blizz Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Stale Oracle Price","amount":8300000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"807","language":null,"description":"Blizz Finance on Avalanche was drained of ~$8.3M in May 2022 when Chainlink froze LUNA pricing at $0.10 far above market value during Terra's collapse, allowing overcollateralized borrowing."},{"date":1690502400,"name":"Pond0x","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":2200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4200","language":"Solidity","description":"Pond0x's directTransfer() function allowed any account to transfer tokens from any other address without authorization. The function exposed an internal _transfer function with no access controls, enabling attackers to drain funds by moving tokens from any address to their own."},{"date":1701907200,"name":"Xai","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Impersonation Scam","amount":845800,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Malicious actors impersonated the legitimate Xai gaming blockchain project to deceive unsuspecting ETH holders. Victims transferred 374 ETH to the fraudulent scheme believing they were interacting with the Xai Launchpool or legitimate project channels."},{"date":1667692800,"name":"Pando Rings","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":22000000,"chain":["Mixin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2204","parentProtocolId":"parent#pando","language":"Go","description":"On November 5-6, 2022, Pando Rings suffered an oracle manipulation attack when an attacker inflated sBTC-WBTC LP token values in the oracle, enabling borrowing against inflated collateral and stealing approximately $20-22M."},{"date":1780790400,"name":"Syscoin Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":10000000,"chain":["Syscoin"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Syscoin bridge exploited via parsing inconsistency between Syscoin Core and NEVM relay. A malformed UTXO burn proof with duplicate asset commitments was accepted as valid by the relay, enabling unauthorized minting of ~5B SYS tokens."},{"date":1540944000,"name":"EOSCast","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":72912,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"EOSCast gaming contract was exploited via a fake EOS token attack. The attacker created a malicious token contract named 'EOS' and launched 17 transfer attacks of varying amounts (100, 1,000, and 10,000 counterfeit tokens). The contract failed to verify the token issuer, allowing the hacker to extract 72,912 real EOS from the bonus pool."},{"date":1716940800,"name":"Scroll Token","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The Scroll Token contract contained an arithmetic error in its transfer function allowing integer underflow from zero-balance addresses. Attackers exploited this to mint unlimited tokens, causing the price to collapse 99.99%."},{"date":1749168000,"name":"ForceBridge","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":3900000,"chain":["Nervos"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"On June 2, 2025, Force Bridge (Nervos Network) was exploited via missing access controls on privileged functions. Attackers drained $3.9M across ETH and BSC (539 ETH, 898,300 USDC, 257,800 USDT, 0.79 WBTC)."},{"date":1758499200,"name":"UXLINK","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Delegatecall Hijack","amount":11300000,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6040","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited a delegatecall in UXLINK's multisig wallet to rewrite the owner set without signer approval. This enabled draining ~$11.3M in stablecoins/ETH/WBTC, seizing ~490M UXLINK tokens, and minting 1-2B more before the token crashed over 70%."},{"date":1651968000,"name":"Fortress Loans","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":2976004,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2177","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 8, 2022 at 20:34 UTC Fortress Loans was exploited via an insufficient governance quorum (400k FTS tokens valued at ~$18K) when an attacker acquired governance quorum and passed proposal #11 to set FTS collateral factor to 700,000,000,000,000,000, then borrowed inflated collateral value combined with oracle manipulation to steal 1,048.1 ETH and 400,000 DAI (~$2.98M total)."},{"date":1758672000,"name":"SBI Crypto","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":21000000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum","Litecoin","Doge","BitcoinCash"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"On September 24, 2025 roughly $21M in BTC, ETH, LTC, DOGE and BCH flowed out of hot wallets belonging to SBI Crypto (Japanese SBI Group's mining pool) through five instant exchangers and into Tornado Cash. ZachXBT and Cyvers linked the laundering pattern to DPRK-affiliated actors; SBI Group never publicly confirmed the incident."},{"date":1690675200,"name":"Curve DEX","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Vyper Compiler Bug","amount":61700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3","parentProtocolId":"parent#curve-finance","language":"Vyper","description":"On July 30, 2023, multiple Curve Finance pools were exploited via a Vyper 0.2.15/0.2.16/0.3.0 compiler bug in reentrancy guards. Attackers stole ~$61.7M across pETH-ETH, alETH-ETH, msETH-ETH, and others; ~68% was later recovered."},{"date":1718496000,"name":"WIFCOIN","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"WIFCOIN_ETH experienced a business logic flaw on June 16, 2024 that allowed fund extraction. Technical details documented in DeFiHackLabs security research."},{"date":1712534400,"name":"SQUID","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":87000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 8, 2024, the SQUID Game Coin on BSC was exploited via swap logic vulnerability in the SquidTokenSwap contract. An attacker used a flashloan to acquire 163M SQUID tokens, then exploited the V2 PancakeSwap interaction to drain approximately $87K through unintended arbitrage opportunities."},{"date":1776470400,"name":"Kelp","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Cross-Chain Message Spoofing","amount":293000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3946","parentProtocolId":"parent#kelp-dao","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 18, 2026, Kelp DAO's rsETH bridge was exploited for $293 million when attackers compromised LayerZero's RPC nodes via social engineering and injected fraudulent cross-chain messages. Kelp's 1-of-1 verifier configuration created a single point of failure, affecting validation across 20 chains. The attack was attributed to Lazarus Group."},{"date":1607385600,"name":"Aeternity","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":5201000,"chain":["Aeternity"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Unknown attacker(s) controlled over 51% of Aeternity's hash power on December 5-8, enabling double-spend attacks. The attacker deliberately reorganized blocks and double-spent 29 million Æ coins across targeted exchanges (OKEx, Huobi, Gate.io, Binance). A subsequent January 8 attempt to repeat the attack was detected and blocked by community members."},{"date":1657411200,"name":"Omni","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":1400000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 10, 2022, Omni, an NFT money market, was exploited via reentrancy across two functions lacking reentrancy guards and not following the checks-effects-interactions pattern. The attacker used NFTs as collateral to borrow ETH, then cleared the debt at the reentrancy point, making the borrowing bad debt and removing the need to repay, stealing 1,300 ETH in testing funds."},{"date":1718236800,"name":"Holograph","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":1200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On 13 June 2024 a former Holograph technical contractor exploited inadequate access control on the mint/operator functions to mint 1 billion HLG across nine transactions using internal knowledge, with HLG falling roughly 80% within nine hours of the exploit."},{"date":1736726400,"name":"Mosca2","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":37600,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Mosca2's join() function was a balance multiplier due to composable logic flaws. The function attempted to top-up a member's balance but instead allowed permissionless balance inflation, enabling complete treasury drainage."},{"date":1790208000,"name":"Limit Break Payment Processor","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":1800000,"chain":["Ethereum","ApeChain","Polygon","Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A vulnerability in Limit Break’s Payment Processor allowed an attacker to abuse users’ existing token and NFT approvals to transfer assets without a legitimate marketplace purchase. Payment Processor V2 on Ethereum was exploited first, and V3 contained the same vulnerability. Limit Break paused V3 where possible, while whitehats transferred vulnerable NFTs to safe custody because V2 could not be paused and ApeChain V3 could not immediately be paused. The same underlying approval flaw could be used in reverse against WETH approvals, resulting in 660 WETH being stolen along with other tokens before whitehats could secure it "},{"date":1706745600,"name":"Affine Protocol","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":88000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The Affine Protocol's flashloan callback failed to validate userData parameters from untrusted sources. Attackers exploited this to trigger the upgrade path and steal collateral assets."},{"date":1697673600,"name":"Synthetify","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":230000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"731","language":null,"description":"Synthetify was compromised through a governance attack targeting an inactive DAO with pure token-based voting. The protocol was frozen and no funds were recovered as stolen assets were mixed through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1714348800,"name":"Rain","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":14800000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum","XRP","Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Rain lost ~$14.8M on April 29, 2024 when exchange wallet private keys were compromised across four chains (BTC, ETH, SOL, XRP). Stolen assets were consolidated into 137.9 BTC and 1,881 ETH via instant exchanges; the breach wasn't disclosed until ZachXBT surfaced it two weeks later."},{"date":1698537600,"name":"Astrid Finance","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":228000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On October 28-29, 2023, Astrid Finance on Ethereum was exploited for $228K via missing input validation on withdraw() parameters. Attacker manipulated _restakedTokenAddress to create counterfeit tokens and convert to ETH; returned ~$182K after legal threat."},{"date":1733961600,"name":"BNBS","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":20300,"chain":["Binance"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BNBS token on BSC was exploited via a reentrancy vulnerability where the contract failed to update state before transferring funds. The attacker invoked the vulnerable function repeatedly before completion, draining funds from the contract."},{"date":1531094400,"name":"Bancor V3","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":23500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1995","parentProtocolId":"parent#bancor","language":"Solidity","description":"Bancor decentralized exchange platform suffered a security breach on July 9, 2018 where attackers gained unauthorized access to the platform's wallet containing BNT tokens, ETH, and other ERC-20 tokens. The attacker drained approximately $23.5 million in assets. Bancor identified the breach, secured affected accounts, and announced recovery and user compensation measures."},{"date":1705968000,"name":"Gamee","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":7000000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Gamee's deployer private key was compromised via an unsecured GitLab environment, enabling an attacker to gain control of the project's deployer address on Polygon. The attacker exploited recoverERC721s() function bypass protections and stole approximately 600 million GMEE tokens worth ~$7M at the time."},{"date":1670198400,"name":"BBOX","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":null,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BBOX token on BSC was exploited through a flash loan price manipulation attack. The attacker used a flash loan to artificially move the token price on DEX, enabling profitable transactions."},{"date":1787875200,"name":"Fogo Foundation","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":3000000,"chain":["Fogo"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Foundation","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#fogo","language":"Rust","description":"An unknown actor compromised the Fogo Foundation and transferred 400M FOGO tokens to an attacker-controlled destination. Fogo has not disclosed the specific attack vector, affected Foundation wallet, or how authorization over the tokens was obtained. The Fogo blockchain itself was not initially compromised; the network was subsequently halted as a precaution to prevent movement of the affected tokens and upgrade the network to restrict associated addresses"},{"date":1574812800,"name":"Upbit","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":49300000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"9292","language":null,"description":"Upbit's Ethereum hot wallet was compromised on November 27, 2019, resulting in theft of 342,000 ETH (~$49.3M). The South Korean exchange immediately froze all deposits and withdrawals and transferred remaining hot wallet funds to cold storage. Upbit announced it would cover the loss from its own funds. Lazarus/Andariel hacking groups were later attributed responsibility by authorities."},{"date":1767744000,"name":"Polycule","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":230000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7125","language":"Solidity","description":"On January 13, 2026, Polycule's Telegram bot for Polymarket was hacked when the server storing user private keys was breached. The bot stored keys unencrypted on a central server with inadequate security, allowing attackers to drain $230,000 from affected users."},{"date":1626393600,"name":"Bunny","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Unbacked Mint","amount":2400000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"254","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 16, 2021, attacker minted 2.1M unbacked polyBUNNY tokens via QuickSwap price manipulation on Polygon. The token crashed 82% ($10 to $2), causing $2.4M loss. Bunny compensated users with $2.4M in MND tokens."},{"date":1783987200,"name":"BarnBridge","classification":"Governance","technique":"Malicious Proposal","amount":776000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"131","language":"Solidity","description":"BarnBridge suffered a governance attack on July 15, 2026 when an attacker passed a malicious proposal, replaced the SMART Yield provider contract, and drained ~$776K by exploiting pre-existing USDC approvals from 50 users."},{"date":1732752000,"name":"XT Exchange","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":1700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"XT.com lost ~$1.7M on November 28, 2024 when the hot wallet was compromised. Attacker drained twelve token types and swapped to 461.58 ETH. The exchange halted withdrawals and said user funds were covered by 1.5x reserves."},{"date":1638576000,"name":"BitMart","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":196000000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3577","language":null,"description":"BitMart's hot wallets were compromised on December 4, 2021, resulting in theft of $196M: $100M on Ethereum and $96M on Binance Smart Chain."},{"date":1702512000,"name":"Ledger Connect Kit","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Supply Chain Attack","amount":484000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Wallet","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attackers compromised a former Ledger employee's NPMJS account via phishing and published malicious versions of Ledger Connect Kit (1.1.5, 1.1.6, 1.1.7) containing Angel Drainer malware. The code rerouted user transaction approvals through rogue WalletConnect instances for less than two hours before detection."},{"date":1606003200,"name":"Pickle","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":19700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"134","language":"Solidity","description":"Pickle's ControllerV4.swapExactJarForJar function lacked jar whitelisting, allowing an attacker to create fake jars and siphon 19.76M DAI from the pDAI jar via missing input validation."},{"date":1685664000,"name":"Hector Lending","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":653000,"chain":["Fantom"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2761","parentProtocolId":"parent#hector-network","language":null,"description":"Hector Lending's cross-chain bridge on Fantom was exploited on June 2, 2023. An unlimited USDC approval on a beta bridge contract was exploited to drain ~650,000 USDC, after which the network voted to liquidate $16M in treasury."},{"date":1788825600,"name":"WealthManagementV2","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":26414,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The attacker obtained control of WealthManagementV2’s owner privileges, suspected to have resulted from a leaked owner private key. After taking ownership, the attacker used updatePlanConfig() to set period=0 and interestMultiplier/unlockMultiplier=528,300,000. Because the privileged configuration function had no timelock or parameter bounds, the attacker could invest and immediately redeem to generate artificially inflated interest, then use a second investment to unlock and withdraw the resulting balance"},{"date":1711929600,"name":"OpenLeverage","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":236000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1208","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 1, 2024, OpenLeverage on BSC suffered a business logic vulnerability exploited via flashloan attack. An attacker manipulated protocol accounting to extract funds from the leveraged trading protocol. OpenLeverage's insurance and buyback funds were mobilized to compensate affected users."},{"date":1777852800,"name":"SquidRouterModule","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":3200000,"chain":["Ethereum","Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SquidRouterModule, a third-party Gnosis Safe module for Squid Router, was exploited via a verification error in executeSameChainActions(). The function accepted a publicly available constant string as proof of message security. An attacker with this fixed string could impersonate Safe wallet owners and execute arbitrary calldata to drain 86 Gnosis Safe vaults over two hours, consolidating ~$3.2M worth into DAI."},{"date":1777161600,"name":"Litecoin","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":null,"chain":["Litecoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4499","language":"C++","description":"A zero-day in Litecoin's MWEB transaction validation allowed attackers to craft malformed transactions that non-updated nodes accepted, enabling unauthorized peg-outs. Fixed via 13-block chain reorganization."},{"date":1720742400,"name":"CoinStats","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":2200000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"CoinStats portfolio service suffered a breach affecting private keys for 1,590 user wallets, resulting in $2.2M in direct theft. Attackers compromised multiple CoinStats internal services and external integrations through sophisticated multi-vector intrusion. Lazarus Group is suspected as the attacker."},{"date":1632182400,"name":"Vee Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":34000000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"619","language":"Solidity","description":"Vee Finance on Avalanche was exploited on September 21, 2021 for ~$34-35M ($9M BTC + $26.2M ETH). The attacker manipulated Pangolin DEX prices by creating fake trading pairs and executing manipulative trades to distort prices that Vee Finance used as its single oracle source."},{"date":1679011200,"name":"General Bytes","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":1500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"General Bytes' Bitcoin ATM cloud service was compromised through a zero-day vulnerability in the master service interface. Attackers uploaded malicious Java applications to decrypt API keys, accessed hot wallet funds, and stole user credentials by scanning private keys entered at ATMs."},{"date":1790812800,"name":"NEAR Intents","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":3800000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6225","parentProtocolId":"parent#near-protocol","language":"Solidity","description":"NEAR Intents was exploited through a bug in the interaction between its Omni deposit and withdrawal infrastructure and the NEAR Intents smart contract, allowing unauthorized withdrawals. The team stopped services, patched the contract-side vulnerability, and temporarily suspended deposits and withdrawals across multiple networks while completing fixes to the Omni infrastructure. The stolen funds were traced toward KuCoin and then BTC, and NEAR Intents said the losses would be compensated in full"},{"date":1783209600,"name":"Lazy Summer Protocol","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":6040000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5796","parentProtocolId":"parent#summer.fi","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 6, 2026, Summer.fi's Lazy Summer Protocol USDC vaults were exploited when an impaired Silo vault (from November 2025 Stream Finance collapse) remained in NAV calculations. The attacker accumulated vault tokens whose value hadn't reflected economic impairment, transferred them to inflate totalAssets, and redeemed at inflated price for $6.04M in genuine USDC."},{"date":1729123200,"name":"Ambient","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3104","language":null,"description":"On October 17, 2024, Ambient Finance frontend domain was hijacked via compromised registrar credentials and redirected to malicious site. Users were tricked into approving token transfers via the fake site. Ambient recovered the domain and reimbursed affected users; smart contracts remained unaffected."},{"date":1788480000,"name":"Notional V2","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":1727782,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"234","parentProtocolId":"parent#notional","language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker exploited an unchecked uint128 cast in Notional V1’s collateral valuation logic. By minting two fCash positions against the same payer with notionals of 1 and 2^128-1, the attacker engineered a debt balance of exactly 2^128. When the free-collateral check converted the debt to ETH, uint128(balance.abs()) truncated 2^128 to zero, making the insolvent payer appear to have no debt. The attacker then settled the fabricated fCash claims and withdrew approximately $1.73M in USDC and DAI from the Escrow"},{"date":1787097600,"name":"Allbridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":191000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"parent#allbridge","language":"Solidity","description":"Allbridge’s CCTPTokenMessenger treated a valid Circle-attested message as proof that USDC had actually been transferred. An attacker created an arbitrary CCTP message on Polygon declaring a 1,000,000 USDC transfer without burning any USDC and directed its recipient to an attacker-controlled contract rather than Circle’s TokenMessengerV2. Circle legitimately attested the generic message, but redeeming it on Base minted no USDC. Allbridge nevertheless trusted the attacker-controlled amount encoded in the message and recorded a 1,000,000 USDC deposit without checking for a corresponding token balance increase. The attacker flash-loaned 808,844 USDC to temporarily bring the router’s balance to the declared amount, redeemed the phantom credit for 999,000 USDC, repaid the loan, and drained the router’s existing liquidity. A copycat subsequently used the same technique to take the remaining funds"},{"date":1769299200,"name":"Matcha","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Frontend Compromise","amount":13430000,"chain":["Base","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7555","language":"Solidity","description":"Matcha Meta users lost $13.43M on January 25, 2026 when the SwapNet aggregator was exploited for arbitrary-call ability. The vulnerability allowed unauthorized access to user-approved tokens across Base and Ethereum. The frontend UI inadequately warned about approval risks."},{"date":1664841600,"name":"Sovryn","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":1100000,"chain":["RSK"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On October 4, 2022, Sovryn's legacy Lend/Borrow pool was exploited via cross-contract reentrancy in closeWithDeposit. Attacker manipulated iToken price through fallback functions triggered by RBTC/rUSDT transfers, draining 44.9368 RBTC and 282,351.9644 rUSDT (~$1.1M)."},{"date":1764115200,"name":"Upbit","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":36000000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"9292","language":null,"description":"Upbit hot wallet was drained on November 27, 2025 in 54 minutes for $36M in Solana tokens (USDC, BONK, JTO, SONIC, RAY, RENDER, ORCA, PYTH). Attacker exploited weak digital signature infrastructure that allowed private key derivation from on-chain transaction history."},{"date":1778976000,"name":"Verus-Ethereum Bridge","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":11500000,"chain":["Verus"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On May 17-18, 2026, the Verus-Ethereum bridge was exploited when an attacker forged a cross-chain payload that passed all cryptographic checks but lacked amount reconciliation between chains, converting ~$10 in VRSC fees into $11.58 million in Ethereum assets (103.6 tBTC, 1,625 ETH, 147,000 USDC)."},{"date":1606694400,"name":"SushiSwap","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":15000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"119","parentProtocolId":"parent#sushi","language":"Solidity","description":"SushiMaker malicious-pool fee capture attack where an attacker created a malicious pool and redirected SushiSwap fees to it. The attacker captured approximately 15,000 USD in accumulated fees through access control vulnerabilities in the fee-distribution mechanism."},{"date":1750204800,"name":"Nobitex","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Malware","amount":82000000,"chain":["Tron","Ethereum","BSC","Avalanche","Arbitrum","Polygon","Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Nobitex hot wallet private keys compromised on June 18, 2025, leading to $82-90M theft across blockchains. Attackers deliberately destroyed the stolen funds by sending to inaccessible addresses as a political statement."},{"date":1787356800,"name":"KiiChain","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":9700000,"chain":["KiiChain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Go","description":"An attacker exploited chained balance-accounting defects in the shared Cosmos EVM module used by KiiChain. By deploying a contract at a precomputed vesting-account address and delegating one wei more KII than its spendable balance, the attacker triggered an arithmetic underflow in the staking precompile’s EVM balance write-back. Combined with a missing overflow guard in the EVM value-transfer path, this allowed real KII to be redirected from victim accounts to attacker-controlled addresses without increasing total supply. The sequence was repeated against 18 targets"},{"date":1689120000,"name":"Platypus Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":50000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"944","language":"Solidity","description":"Platypus's liquidity conversion logic for LP-USDC assumed a 1:1 ratio between USDC and USDC.e, ignoring market price discrepancies. When exchanging USDC for USDC.e, the calculation produced unreasonably large quantities, allowing arbitrageurs to extract value."},{"date":1624060800,"name":"Visor Finance","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":504845,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An attacker compromised a single admin account managing Hypervisor emergency withdraw functions, enabling extraction of 504,845 USD from unpositioned assets awaiting LP placement. The team had not yet migrated to a multisig setup and the attacker lacked full visibility into safeguards, limiting losses. The team restored all withdrawn amounts using treasury funds."},{"date":1510185600,"name":"Parity Multisig","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Uninitialized Proxy","amount":150000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 8, 2017, a user called 'devops199' accidentally exploited a vulnerability in Parity's multi-sig wallet library contract by calling initWallet then kill(), permanently disabling over 500 multi-sig wallets containing approximately 500,000 ETH. The library lacked protection against reinitialization and destruction by non-owners."},{"date":1599523200,"name":"Eterbase","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":5400000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum","XRP","Tezos","Algorand","TRON"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attackers compromised Eterbase's internet-connected hot wallets holding Bitcoin, Ethereum, XRP, Tezos, Algorand and TRON. The stolen funds were transferred to attacker-controlled addresses and subsequently moved through multiple exchanges including Binance and Huobi."},{"date":1675728000,"name":"CoWSwap","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":180000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2643","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 7, 2023, CoW Swap was exploited through a vulnerability in the SwapGuard contract which permitted arbitrary external calls. The attacker forced the GPv2Settlement contract to approve a malicious contract and transferred DAI tokens worth approximately $180K from the settlement contract."},{"date":1689638400,"name":"BNO","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":500000,"chain":["BNB Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BNO's emergencyWithdraw function on BNB Chain lacked access controls and didn't check for NFT rights records. An attacker exploited this to deposit both NFT and ERC20 tokens, then withdraw only the ERC20 via emergencyWithdraw, bypassing reward calculations and earning undeserved mining rewards."},{"date":1709078400,"name":"Serenity Shield","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":586000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The Serenity Shield deployer wallet was compromised via spear-phishing attack, allowing attackers to access private keys. The attacker then transferred 6.9M SERSH tokens valued at $5.6M at the time, but only realized $586K after selling on available liquidity."},{"date":1649289600,"name":"Starstream Finance","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":4000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Starstream Finance's treasury was drained via an unprotected execute() function in the DistributorTreasury contract that allowed external calls bypassing owner restrictions on token withdrawals."},{"date":1768003200,"name":"FutureSwap","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":395000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"FutureSwap's changePosition collateral accounting was exploited via a large short position opened with an Aave V3 flash loan. The attacker corrupted the protocol's internal stableBalance tracking, enabling withdrawal of far more collateral than deposited, resulting in the loss of $395K in USDC."},{"date":1627948800,"name":"Popsicle Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":20700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"585","language":"Solidity","description":"On 3 August 2021 an attacker exploited Popsicle Finance's Sorbetto Fragola UniswapV3 optimizer pool where share transfers did not update fee-tracking state, allowing the same fee rewards to be claimed multiple times across accounts, draining ~$20.7M."},{"date":1791244800,"name":"MakerDAO ETH-A Liquidation Keeper Bot","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":538000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"A dormant third-party MakerDAO ETH-A liquidation keeper had an unprotected drain routine that lacked ds-auth authorization. Any caller could invoke the function and provide the withdrawal recipient. The attacker triggered Flipper.deal() for four auctions the keeper had won in 2020, causing 200 WETH of previously unclaimed collateral to move through Vat.flux to the keeper, then used GemJoin.exit() to send it to an attacker-controlled recipient and unwrap it to ETH. MakerDAO’s core contracts behaved as designed; the vulnerability was in the third-party keeper"},{"date":1771718400,"name":"LAXO","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":190000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"LAXO token's flawed burn mechanism allowed an attacker to execute a burn-before-sync exploit via flash loans. By burning LAXO directly from the PancakeSwap pool without triggering a reserve sync, the attacker artificially collapsed pool reserves and extracted 487k USDT through manipulated swaps."},{"date":1781827200,"name":"Namada Shielded Pools","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Unbacked Cross-Chain Mint","amount":600000,"chain":["Namada"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6295","language":"Rust","description":"On June 19, 2026, approximately $600K in assets (ATOM, USDC, OSMO, TIA, NYM) were drained from Namada's Multi-Asset Shielded Pool via an IBC transfer logic flaw. The loss went initially undetected due to a stale indexer continuing to display funds as available while live RPC queries showed zero balance."},{"date":1646265600,"name":"Treasure","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":1400000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1350","language":"Solidity","description":"Treasure marketplace's buyItem() function failed to validate token types, allowing attackers to purchase NFTs by specifying incorrect ERC721/ERC1155 amounts for free."},{"date":1779840000,"name":"Stake DAO Yield","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":91000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"249","parentProtocolId":"parent#stake-dao","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 27, 2026, Stake DAO on Arbitrum was exploited when a compromised deployer key reconfigured the LayerZero v2 OFT peer. The attacker minted 5.4 trillion vsdCRV tokens; despite massive nominal value, poor liquidity limited actual extraction to ~$91K."},{"date":1730937600,"name":"CoW","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":59000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On November 7, 2024, CoW Protocol on Ethereum was exploited through an access control vulnerability, resulting in approximately $59K in losses."},{"date":1773014400,"name":"Gondi V3","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Token Approval Abuse","amount":230000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5561","parentProtocolId":"parent#gondi","language":"Solidity","description":"Gondi V3 exploited March 9, 2026 when the Purchase Bundler lacked caller verification. Attacker drained 78 NFTs (~$230K) with lingering approvals from prior loan operations by calling the unprotected buy() function."},{"date":1710892800,"name":"Dolomite","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"An old Dolomite DEX contract on Ethereum (deployed 2019) was exploited via a reentrancy vulnerability. The attacker bypassed the noEntry reentrancy guard by calling the callFunction through the TradeManager contract, which lacked proper reentrancy protection, allowing recursive fund drainage from users who had approved the contract."},{"date":1784073600,"name":"Cascade Liquidity Strategy","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1340000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 15, 2026, Cascade Liquidity Strategy's perpetuals vault suffered a $1.34 million USDC drain through oracle price feed manipulation affecting deposit/withdrawal logic."},{"date":1788048000,"name":"Tectonic","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":124470000,"chain":["Cronos"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1115","language":"Solidity","description":"The attacker built a leveraged TONIC/tTONIC collateral position through 98 recursive operations, then transferred TONIC directly into the tTONIC contract twice without minting corresponding tTONIC, increasing the tTONIC exchange rate outside the normal deposit path. The attacker also increased TONIC’s market price, while Tectonic’s price feed relied on VVS Finance and Crypto.com Exchange pricing without smoothing or a circuit breaker. These effects compounded the collateral valuation, allowing the attacker to borrow and remove more than $120M of assets from Tectonic’s lending markets within roughly 11 minutes"},{"date":1700870400,"name":"TheNFTV2","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":19000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"TheNFTV2 contained a business logic flaw in its withdrawal mechanism that incorrectly calculated user shares and balances. An attacker exploited the logic error to withdraw more assets than their proportional stake, extracting funds from the protocol."},{"date":1776816000,"name":"Kipseli","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":72350,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 22, 2026, an MEV bot exploited Kipseli's PropAMM Router on Base via a denomination/decimals mismatch in the quote logic, swapping 0.04 WETH for 0.926 cbBTC worth ~$72.35K."},{"date":1615248000,"name":"DODO AMM","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":3800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"146","parentProtocolId":"parent#dodo","language":"Solidity","description":"DODO's V2 Crowdpooling contract left init() callable after funding, allowing an attacker to reconfigure pools with worthless tokens and drain the real reserves. Around $3.8M was taken, but $3.1M was returned within a day as MEV bots captured most of the exploit profit."},{"date":1652832000,"name":"Feminist Metaverse","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":540000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers exploited the FM token's skim() mechanism via flashloan, redirecting 75.15M FM tokens to SakeSwapPair and then to their own address for sale. 1838 BNB (~$540K) was extracted and sent to Tornado Cash."},{"date":1756080000,"name":"Panoptic V1.1","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Hash Collision","amount":0,"chain":["Base","Unichain","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6230","parentProtocolId":"parent#panoptic","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 25, 2025, a critical hash-collision vulnerability was discovered in Panoptic V1.1's position fingerprinting scheme. The non-collision-resistant XOR-hashing would have allowed attackers to bypass collateral checks and drain liquidity pools, but was reported by security researchers before exploitation."},{"date":1669161600,"name":"Numbers Protocol","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":13836,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1041","language":"Solidity","description":"Numbers Protocol's bridge integration with Multichain exposed a vulnerability in how excessive permissions were handled in the permit mechanism. An attacker exploited a user's unlimited permit grant to steal 557,754 NUM tokens, converting them to 13 ETH and draining multiple user accounts."},{"date":1659312000,"name":"Nomad","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":190000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1682","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 1, 2022, Nomad bridge was exploited when the protocol initialization set trusted roots to 0x00, matching the untrusted root value. This caused the Replica contract to accept any messages as valid, enabling 300+ copycat attackers to drain $190M total."},{"date":1653350400,"name":"HackDao","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":65000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attackers exploited HackDao's token fee mechanism and skim() function via flashloan, borrowing and liquidating themselves repeatedly without repaying. The contract's flawed accounting allowed extraction of 200 BNB (~$65K) before theft detection."},{"date":1779235200,"name":"RetoSwap","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":2700000,"chain":["Monero"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"On May 20, 2026, RetoSwap (Haveno fork on Monero) failed to verify ACK message sources. Attackers registered attacker-controlled addresses as arbitrators for multisig wallets, stealing $2.7M from traders."},{"date":1775520000,"name":"SquidMulticall","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":517000,"chain":["Arbitrum","BNB Chain","Avalanche","Optimism","Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SquidMulticall exposes a permissionless run() function that executes arbitrary external calls with no access control. When users mistakenly approved tokens directly to SquidMulticall (instead of Squid Router), attackers could call run() with transferFrom() payloads to drain those approvals across multiple chains. A wallet with $623K in infinite approvals was compromised, resulting in $517K extracted."},{"date":1661990400,"name":"KyberSwap Classic","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"CDN Compromise","amount":265000,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"127","parentProtocolId":"parent#kyberswap","language":null,"description":"KyberSwap frontend was compromised on September 1, 2022 via Google Tag Manager API key compromise, injecting malicious code that tricked whale wallets into approving fraudulent transfers, stealing $265K from 2 wallets."},{"date":1693526400,"name":"SharedStake","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Ownership Takeover","amount":175000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"275","language":null,"description":"On September 1, 2023, SharedStake was exploited when improper ownership checks allowed an attacker to gain admin access. The attacker created a minter address with unlimited permissions, minted sgETH tokens without collateral, and withdrew approximately 105 ETH from the protocol."},{"date":1768262400,"name":"YO Protocol","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Missing Slippage Check","amount":3600000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"YO Protocol's Automated Harvesting System executed a rebalance with a misconfigured slippage tolerance of 17,872,058 (disabling protection). The order routed through high-fee Uniswap v4 pools (85-88%), returning only 112,036 USDC for 3,840,651 stkGHO, costing ~97% of vault stkGHO. YO's multisig bought the position back the same day."},{"date":1702771200,"name":"Flooring Protocol","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Arbitrary External Call","amount":1600000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3644","language":"Solidity","description":"Flooring Protocol's contract upgrade introduced a vulnerability in its multicall mechanism that lacked proper context isolation. Attackers exploited this to call transferFrom on user NFT approvals without consent, stealing 36 Pudgy Penguins and 14 Bored Apes."},{"date":1644105600,"name":"Meter","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":7700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On February 5-6, 2022, Meter's bridge was exploited via missing validation on an alternative deposit function variant. Attacker called the function directly with arbitrary amounts, draining $4.4M from Meter and causing $3.3M cascading loss in Hundred Finance collateral pools."},{"date":1745625600,"name":"Impermax V3","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Fee Accounting","amount":300000,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5981","parentProtocolId":"parent#impermax-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 26, 2025, Impermax V3 on Base was exploited for $300K via fee accounting mismatch in collateral valuation. Attacker manipulated LP pool price ticks, accumulated fees, then overborrowed against LP collateral with incorrectly valued uncollected fees."},{"date":1715040000,"name":"SATURN","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":9000,"chain":["BNB"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"SATURN's transfer logic had a flaw where sync operations were performed before processing incoming token transfers. This allowed attackers to manipulate token reserves via flash loans and extract approximately 15 WBNB from the pool."},{"date":1696636800,"name":"Arena SocialFi","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":2974530,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3564","parentProtocolId":"parent#the-arena","language":"Solidity","description":"On October 7, 2023, Stars Arena (an Avalanche friend.tech clone) was exploited via reentrancy when the share issuance function lacked reentrancy guards. The attacker called the function multiple times in one transaction to manipulate weight calculations, buying 1 share and selling it at ~274k AVAX to drain $2.97M."},{"date":1613088000,"name":"BT Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":1500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BT Finance was exploited via flash loan attack that manipulated price oracles, draining over $1.5 million from the protocol."},{"date":1793404800,"name":"Troves","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":666935,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4952","language":null,"description":"On October 31, an attacker exploited permissions retained by a legacy rebalancing contract after it had been replaced, resulting in approximately 8.6 BTC in losses from Troves' xWBTC/WBTC vault. Troves revoked the legacy contract's permissions and paused three vaults as a precaution. No impact on other vaults has been identified"},{"date":1785369600,"name":"Set Protocol","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":9600,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"266","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 30, 2026, Set Protocol was exploited for ~$9.6K via reentrancy in Index Coop's ExchangeIssuance contract. Attacker supplied malicious manager pre-issue hook that inflated positionMultiplier mid-issuance. Unlocked state allowed the hook to mutate position accounting, causing overpayment of assets."},{"date":1624406400,"name":"StableMagnet","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Backdoor Contract","amount":27000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"StableMagnet team deployed an intentional smart contract backdoor hidden in unverified linked libraries (block explorer gap), enabling them to drain liquidity pools and steal tokens from wallets with active approvals."},{"date":1559433600,"name":"Kraken","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":10450000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"9290","language":null,"description":"A hacker compromised a whale account holding 1,200 BTC, placed orders to purchase BTC at artificially low prices, then dumped the stolen BTC to trigger execution and pocket $10.45M from liquidations of other users' positions."},{"date":1637798400,"name":"Snowdog","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Liquidity Rug","amount":18100000,"chain":["Avalanche"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"859","language":"Solidity","description":"SnowdogDAO ($SDOG) on Avalanche launched November 14, 2021, raising $45M in 8 days. On November 25, the team moved liquidity to a private Snowbank-controlled AMM pool requiring a secret challenge key. Only 7% of holders could liquidate, while three addresses drained $10M, $7.7M, and $3.3M, blocking $18.1M in total liquidity."},{"date":1789516800,"name":"Startale","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":2876,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker exploited Startale ERC-7579 smart-account initialization logic to take control of pre-funded counterfactual accounts as they were deployed. The initializeAccount(bytes) permitted an attacker-controlled bootstrap to execute via delegatecall, while an initialization authorization flag stored with transient storage remained set for the entire transaction. The attacker could therefore deploy a victim’s pre-funded account and reinitialize it again in the same transaction with a malicious bootstrap, allowing its assets to be swept"},{"date":1779494400,"name":"StablR","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":2800000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On May 24, 2026, one of StablR's three multisig keys was compromised. The attacker minted 8.35M USDR and 4.5M EURR against zero collateral and dumped them for ~$2.8M in ETH."},{"date":1785024000,"name":"ChainConnect","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":650000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Avalanche","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On July 26, 2026, ChainConnect's EVM integration was compromised through unauthorized access, allowing attackers to drain ~$650,000 in tokens from bridge contracts on Ethereum, BNB Chain, Avalanche C-Chain, and Polygon across 23 transactions. Venom Network assets were unaffected."},{"date":1703635200,"name":"Thunder Terminal","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":240000,"chain":["Ethereum","Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Thunder Terminal's MongoDB connection URL was compromised, allowing attackers to retrieve session tokens and execute unauthorized withdrawals from 114 user wallets. The attacker drained 86.5 ETH and 439 SOL in less than 9 minutes."},{"date":1662508800,"name":"GERA","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Deployer Key Compromised","amount":1480000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The GERA token's deployer private key was compromised, allowing an attacker to transfer ownership of the smart contract to another address. This gave the attacker full control over the token contract."},{"date":1681516800,"name":"Hundred Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":7400000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"607","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 15, 2023, Hundred Finance was drained of $7.4M on Optimism via a flashloan-funded donation to an empty WBTC pool, exploiting rounding errors in exchange rate calculation."},{"date":1678233600,"name":"PeopleDAO","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Signer Phishing","amount":120000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DAO","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On March 6, 2023, PeopleDAO lost 76.5 ETH (~$120K) when an accounting lead accidentally shared a public editable Google Sheets form in Discord. An attacker added a hidden fraudulent 76.5 ETH transaction row, which the multisig signers failed to catch during review and approved."},{"date":1635552000,"name":"BXH","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":139000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"404","language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker gained access to BXH's administrative private key, allowing digital signature of a transaction transferring $139 million in tokens directly to the attacker's account. The details suggest an insider or compromised system with access to the admin key storage, making this likely an inside job or successful targeted malware infection."},{"date":1729036800,"name":"Radiant V2","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Blind Signing","amount":50000000,"chain":["BSC","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2706","parentProtocolId":"parent#radiant","language":"Solidity","description":"On 16 October 2024 attackers compromised three Radiant core contributors' devices with the INLETDRIFT macOS backdoor (delivered via Telegram impersonation of a former contractor) and manipulated the Safe{Wallet} front-end so signers saw legitimate data while signing malicious transactions, taking ownership of and draining Radiant lending markets on BSC and Arbitrum. Mandiant attributed the attack to DPRK-nexus actors."},{"date":1780185600,"name":"AROS","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":295000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Suspicious attack on BSC drained ~$295.3K USDT from AROS/USDT PancakeSwap; suspected contract logic flaw or price oracle manipulation but mechanism unconfirmed pending technical analysis."},{"date":1683676800,"name":"SNK (Snooker)","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":197725,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The SNK token on BSC suffered an exploit of its referral reward mechanism. The attacker exploited the bindParent function of the SNKMiner contract to establish relationships between attack contracts, amplifying staking rewards based on child account SNK balances. By creating multiple attack contracts and establishing referral chains, the attacker was able to claim inflated rewards totaling approximately $197,725."},{"date":1780444800,"name":"ATM","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":243000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On June 4, 2026, ATM token on BSC was exploited for $243K via improper loop control in automatic swap-on-transfer mechanism. Contract was designed to convert 20% of transfers to BSC-USD, but flaw allowed repeated triggering beyond standard limits."},{"date":1667260800,"name":"Deribit","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":28000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2273","language":null,"description":"On November 1-2, 2022, Deribit's BTC, ETH, and USDC hot wallets were compromised, draining ~$28M in crypto assets. Client assets in cold storage and Fireblocks vaults were unaffected. Deribit covered the loss with company reserves; the specific compromise method remains undisclosed."},{"date":1686441600,"name":"Floating Point Group","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":15000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Floating Point Group, an institutional crypto prime brokerage, suffered a cybersecurity breach resulting in a loss of $15-20M from custody accounts. The attackers gained unauthorized access to the company's systems, leading FPG to freeze third-party accounts and migrate funds to secure wallets while working with law enforcement."},{"date":1773187200,"name":"DBXen","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":150000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"DBXen's ERC2771 meta-transaction implementation had an identity confusion bug where burnBatch() used _msgSender() to identify the actual user but onTokenBurned() used msg.sender() to identify the forwarder, allowing attackers to claim accumulated fees from 1,085 cycles using brand-new addresses."},{"date":1787788800,"name":"CCC","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":117000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"The CCC sell() flow allowed CCC held by the PancakeSwap liquidity pair to be burned and then synchronized the pair’s reserves. This artificially reduced the pair’s CCC reserve and distorted its AMM price, enabling the attacker to repeatedly sell CCC against the manipulated pool and extract BNB liquidity"},{"date":1776124800,"name":"CoW Swap","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":1200000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"The cow.fi domain was hijacked through social engineering at the .fi domain registrar. For 4.5 hours, users were redirected to a pixel-perfect phishing clone where they unknowingly signed malicious transactions draining funds."},{"date":1713916800,"name":"YIEDL","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":150000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 24, 2024, the YIEDL protocol on BSC was exploited via insufficient input validation on the dataList parameter in the redeem function. An attacker bypassed redemption share requirements by manipulating the dataList parameter and profited from repeated token exchanges totaling approximately $150K."},{"date":1742083200,"name":"WebKeyDAO","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":73000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"WebKeyDAO's buy() function lacked proper access controls, allowing an attacker to purchase WKEYDAO tokens at artificially low prices set via an unprotected setTokenInfo() call. The attacker exploited this to acquire tokens at 1/10th market price and immediately sold them on DEX for profit, limited only by a built-in 67-token sale cap."},{"date":1546732800,"name":"Ethereum Classic","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":219500,"chain":["Ethereum Classic"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"A 51% attack on Ethereum Classic's Proof of Work chain allowed attackers to reorg the blockchain and double-spend 219,500 ETC on two separate occasions. Low mining hashrate and cheap rental hashpower via services like NiceHash enabled the attack."},{"date":1776297600,"name":"Grinex","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":13740000,"chain":["Tron","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Grinex custodial wallets on Tron and Ethereum were compromised in April 2026, resulting in ~$13.74M drained. Attackers immediately swapped USDT into TRX and ETH to defeat stablecoin freezes before the exchange suspended operations."},{"date":1703894400,"name":"Locus Finance","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":321000,"chain":["Ethereum","Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3371","language":null,"description":"On December 30, 2023, Locus Finance vaults were exploited when an attacker compromised a developer's private key during a CTO transition. Without multisig security, the attacker used administrative access to drain $320,964 from vaults."},{"date":1694736000,"name":"Remitano","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":2700000,"chain":["Ethereum","Tron","BitcoinCash"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On September 14-15, 2023, a third-party data breach exposed private keys to Remitano's exchange hot wallets. An attacker used these keys to drain approximately $2.7M in cryptocurrency across Ethereum, Tron, and Bitcoin Cash chains ($1.4M USDT, $208K USDC, and Ankr tokens)."},{"date":1758585600,"name":"Corepound","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":400000,"chain":["CORE"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5952","language":null,"description":"Corepound (AI yield aggregator on Core DAO) rug-pulled on 23 September 2025 when the team used privileged control over the aggregator's vaults to withdraw roughly $400,000 of deposited user funds. The Core community acknowledged the incident and organized an impacted-user response with promises of stricter ecosystem vetting."},{"date":1718236800,"name":"UwU Lend","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":3700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2111","language":"Solidity","description":"On June 13, 2024, UwU Lend suffered a second $3.7M exploit three days after a $20M hack on June 10. The attacker reused sUSDe tokens stolen in the first exploit as collateral to drain additional pools (uDAI, uWETH, uLUSD, uFRAX, uCRVUSD, uUSDT) because the protocol failed to freeze compromised collateral or revoke stolen token permissions between incidents."},{"date":1789171200,"name":"Chainflip AMM","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":736442.17,"chain":["Tron"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3853","parentProtocolId":"parent#chainflip","language":"Rust","description":"An attacker exploited Chainflip’s TRON-specific swap instruction and refund handling. Unlike Chainflip’s other integrations, TRON swap instructions were derived from transaction memos. The attacker could attach a different memo to a transaction already signed by Chainflip validators, causing Chainflip to interpret the transaction as another swap. When that duplicate instruction failed, the protocol refunded it even though the underlying deposit had already produced a payout, effectively allowing the same deposit to be paid twice. The attacker attempted the sequence eight times over approximately 90 minutes, with six unauthorized payouts succeeding"},{"date":1766793600,"name":"Flow","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":3900000,"chain":["Flow"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Layer 1","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6104","language":"Solidity","description":"Flow's execution layer was exploited on December 27, allowing the attacker to mint FLOW tokens and bridge assets (WBTC, WETH, and stablecoins) via Celer and Debridge for $3.9M. The exploit was likely enabled by a compromised privileged admin key."},{"date":1541808000,"name":"EOSDice","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":25100,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"EOSDice gambling platform was attacked in November 2018 via exploitation of its controlled-seed randomness flaw. Attackers predicted the random number generation by analyzing blockchain state information. EOSDice was one of eight EOS DApps targeted simultaneously in coordinated randomness attacks."},{"date":1656028800,"name":"Convex Finance","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":14000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"319","language":null,"description":"On June 23, 2022, Convex Finance's DNS was hijacked after a customer support agent at NameCheap was compromised. The attacker redirected www.convexfinance.com to a phishing site with malicious smart contracts mimicking the original addresses. At least 40 wallet addresses were tricked into approving transactions, though only limited tokens were stolen. Convex reimbursed all affected users from their treasury."},{"date":1760918400,"name":"Sharwa.Finance","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":146000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6876","language":"Solidity","description":"Sharwa Finance on Arbitrum was exploited in October 2025 via sandwich attacks on margin trading. Attackers created margin accounts, borrowed additional assets via leverage, and sandwiched their own swaps to extract ~$61K and ~$85K before the platform paused."},{"date":1752883200,"name":"CoinDCX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":44200000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4042","parentProtocolId":"parent#coindcx","language":null,"description":"CoinDCX lost ~$44.2M on July 19, 2025 when a server breach compromised the operational hot wallet's private key used for liquidity provisioning. Stolen assets were bridged from Solana to Ethereum; customer cold storage funds were unaffected."},{"date":1694390400,"name":"Milady Maker","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":1000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"A rogue developer with access to the Remilia Collective treasury (backing the Milady Maker NFT project) siphoned $1M in accumulated fees from the Bonkler reserve-backed NFT system. The developer also attempted to seize control of project codebases and social media accounts, though Remilia's core reserves and NFT holdings remained secure."},{"date":1789516800,"name":"Nimiq","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":50400,"chain":["Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Nimiq’s Polygon swap contracts served as OpenGSN forwarders while relying on their own preRelayedCall path to authenticate requests rather than independently verifying the user’s signature inside execute(). An attacker registered an EIP-7702 EOA as an OpenGSN relay manager, relay worker and permissive paymaster, then selected Nimiq’s HTLC handlers as the forwarders. This allowed forged open() requests purportedly originating from a partner liquidity wallet to reach the handlers without the expected signature validation. Because that wallet had existing token approvals to the handlers, HTLCs were opened using its USDC, USDT0 and USDC.e, with the attacker-controlled contract as recipient, and subsequently redeemed by the attacker"},{"date":1649635200,"name":"CF Token","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1900000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"CF token contract exposed a public _transfer function with an unvalidated 'from' address parameter, allowing arbitrary transfers from any holder. The attacker executed 6 transactions to transfer 4.2M CF tokens, converting them to 4,200+ BNB and cashing out via Tornado Cash."},{"date":1553817600,"name":"Bithumb","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":19000000,"chain":["Ethereum","Ripple"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"9293","language":null,"description":"Bithumb hot wallet was compromised by insiders with access to private keys, resulting in theft of 12.5M EOS and 6.2M XRP. All stolen funds were company assets as user funds were stored in cold storage."},{"date":1726444800,"name":"DeltaPrime","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":5980000,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2479","language":"Solidity","description":"DeltaPrime suffered a $5.98M exploit on September 16, 2024 when an attacker compromised the ProxyAdmin private key (not multi-sig protected). The attacker used it to upgrade liquidity pool proxy contracts to malicious implementations that allowed unlimited minting of deposit receipt tokens and systematic draining of USDC, WBTC, and WETH pools."},{"date":1553385600,"name":"Etbox","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":132000,"chain":["Bitcoin","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Lazarus Group targeted Etbox exchange infrastructure using Worldbit-bot phishing tactics to obtain exchange wallet private keys and API credentials, resulting in theft of cryptocurrency assets."},{"date":1763683200,"name":"Aerodrome V1","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":700000,"chain":["Ethereum","Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"3450","parentProtocolId":"parent#aero-protocol","language":"Solidity","description":"The centralized domains for both Aerodrome and Velodrome were hijacked via a NameSilo registrar compromise. Attackers bypassed multisig controls, removed DNSSEC, and redirected domains to malicious pages. Users were silently redirected to phishing interfaces with malicious signature flows and unlimited approval prompts, resulting in $700K in losses. The underlying smart contracts remained uncompromised."},{"date":1739232000,"name":"four.meme","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":183000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5174","language":"Solidity","description":"On February 11, 2025, four.meme was exploited when an attacker created a malicious PancakeSwap V3 pool with an inflated sqrtPriceX96 parameter (368 trillion times correct). Four.meme's migration logic used the pool without verification, allowing the attacker to drain WBNB by providing minimal tokens at the fake price."},{"date":1679875200,"name":"Kokomo Finance","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":4000000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On March 26-27, 2023, Kokomo Finance developers initiated an exit scam, stealing ~$4M in user funds. The team manipulated the cBTC reward token contract, halted borrowing, converted the token implementation into a malicious contract, and removed all social media and website within days of launch."},{"date":1788739200,"name":"Cozy V2","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":163326,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2964","parentProtocolId":"parent#cozy-finance","language":"Solidity","description":"Cozy Finance confirmed an exploit affecting its v2 protection markets on Optimism, draining funds from the Main Set and Rabbithole Set. The affected markets relied on UMA’s Optimistic Oracle to resolve covered events. Cozy subsequently paused the affected Sets and stated there were no longer any open proposals against its UMA-based markets while it coordinated with UMA regarding dispute resolution. The precise mechanism that allowed the attacker to obtain payouts has not yet been confirmed"},{"date":1711843200,"name":"FixedFloat","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Key Leaked via Infrastructure","amount":3000000,"chain":null,"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On March 31, 2024, FixedFloat exchange suffered a hosting control breach through Time4VPS vulnerability. An attacker exploited residual access after an earlier February incident. FixedFloat suspended operations for two months to rebuild security infrastructure and relocate servers away from the compromised hosting provider."},{"date":1669075200,"name":"AUR Protocol","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":13000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"7173","language":"Solidity","description":"AUR token on BSC lacked proper permission checks in critical functions. The missing access control allowed attackers to call privileged functions and drain token assets."},{"date":1742515200,"name":"Zoth ZeUSD","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":8850000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5615","parentProtocolId":"parent#zoth","language":"Solidity","description":"Zoth's admin key was compromised, allowing the attacker to upgrade the proxy contract and execute unauthorized transfers of $8.85M in USD0++ stablecoins, converting them to 4,223 ETH."},{"date":1790899200,"name":"GoldPesa","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":114900,"chain":["Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"GoldPesa’s GPXHooks rebalanced protocol-owned GPX/USDC liquidity through Uniswap v4’s shared PositionManager without ensuring its currency deltas were isolated and settled. An attacker created an unpaid WETH/USDC position within the same PoolManager unlock and then triggered GoldPesa’s hourly rebalance. Because TAKE_PAIR operated on the PositionManager’s net credit, GoldPesa’s legitimate USDC credit offset the attacker’s outstanding debt, allowing the attacker to burn their position and withdraw the resulting USDC. Uniswap v4 itself behaved as designed"},{"date":1706486400,"name":"Barley Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":130000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Barley Finance, a volatility farming protocol, was exploited on its wBARL pod contract that had been deployed just two days prior. The attacker minted over 10% of the total BARL supply in a single transaction, extracting approximately $130K in value. The vulnerability was in the newly deployed pod contract."},{"date":1596672000,"name":"Ethereum Classic","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":1680000,"chain":["Ethereum Classic"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Layer 1","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Attackers executed a second 51% attack on Ethereum Classic within a week, controlling the network's hash power to reorganize 4,236 blocks and execute double-spends. The attack lasted over 15 hours, resulting in at least $1.68M in stolen value through block reorganization and transaction reversal."},{"date":1773187200,"name":"BONK Fun","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"DNS Hijack","amount":30000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"ICO","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"BONK Fun's domain was hijacked via social engineering of registrar support to remove 2FA. The attacker replaced the site with a cloned frontend running Inferno Drainer, a wallet-draining contract that prompted users to sign malicious transactions."},{"date":1717891200,"name":"Loopring","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"API Key Compromised","amount":5000000,"chain":["Loopring"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"126","language":null,"description":"On June 9, 2024, Loopring's Official Guardian 2FA service (off-chain infra) was compromised, allowing attackers to masquerade as wallet owners, reset ownership, and steal $5M from Smart Wallets. Users with single guardian reliance were especially vulnerable."},{"date":1660089600,"name":"Blur Finance","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Exit Scam","amount":600000,"chain":["BSC","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1891","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 10, 2022, Blur Finance developers executed a coordinated exit scam, withdrawing $600K from BSC and Polygon contracts, deleting social media, and disappearing, collapsing the token 99%."},{"date":1772409600,"name":"FOOM Cash","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":2260000,"chain":["Ethereum","Base"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6908","language":"Solidity","description":"On March 2, 2026, a misconfigured Groth16 verifier allowed attackers to submit forged zero-knowledge proofs and withdraw $2.26M from FOOM Cash. A white-hat recovered $1.84M (81%) of the stolen funds."},{"date":1650499200,"name":"Terra (LUNA)","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":4310000,"chain":["Terra"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Scammers ran malicious Google ads for Terra ecosystem projects, impersonating Anchor and Astroport. Users were redirected to fake sites where they entered seed phrases after connecting wallets, allowing attackers to drain 52 wallets totaling $4.31M between April 12-21."},{"date":1786233600,"name":"USM","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":136000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On August 9, 2026, USM on Ethereum was exploited via an arithmetic error in its token accounting logic, resulting in a loss of approximately $136,000. Flagged by SlowMist; no dedicated post-mortem has been published."},{"date":1641772800,"name":"Lympo","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":18700000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2323","language":null,"description":"Lympo's hot wallet was compromised, resulting in the theft of 165.2 million LMT tokens worth $18.7M. The attacker transferred the stolen tokens across 10 project wallets before consolidating them into a single address and swapping them for ETH on Uniswap and SushiSwap. The LMT token price dropped 92% following the incident. Cold wallet reserves remained secure."},{"date":1756771200,"name":"Bunni V2","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Rounding Error","amount":8400000,"chain":["Ethereum","Unichain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"5734","parentProtocolId":"parent#bunni","language":"Solidity","description":"On September 2, 2025, a rounding error in Bunni V2's withdrawal logic allowed attackers to systematically withdraw more tokens than entitled, draining $8.4M across Ethereum ($2.4M) and UniChain ($5.9M)."},{"date":1713744000,"name":"Z123","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":136000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On April 22, 2024, the Z123 token on BSC was exploited via a flashloan-enabled price manipulation attack. An attacker used a flashloan to acquire large token quantities and manipulate the trading pair price, extracting approximately $136K before repaying the flashloan."},{"date":1784592000,"name":"Wanchain","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":10000000,"chain":["Cardano"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Haskell","description":"On July 21, 2026, Wanchain's Cardano-BNB Chain bridge was drained of ~515M NIGHT tokens. The TreasuryCheck validator concatenated 14 variable-length fields without separators, allowing a signature authorizing ~3,110 NIGHT to be reused for vastly larger redemptions."},{"date":1637625600,"name":"Ploutoz","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":365000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker manipulated the DOP token price on Ploutoz Finance and used it as collateral to borrow CAKE, ETH, BTCB and other assets. After exchanging borrowed tokens to BNB via ParaSwap and PancakeSwap, attacker cashed out through Tornado Cash. Initial funds for the attack were withdrawn from Tornado Cash, indicating pre-planned coordination."},{"date":1766880000,"name":"MSCST","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":129900,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On December 29, 2025, an attacker exploited missing access control in MSCST's releaseReward() function, flash loaning 46.8M GPC tokens to inflate GPC/WBNB price on PancakeSwap and extract ~$130K in BNB profit."},{"date":1629331200,"name":"Solend","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":16000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Rust","description":"On August 19, 2021 at 12:40 GMT, Solend's UpdateReserveConfig() admin function was exploited when an attacker bypassed authorization checks by invoking the function with the admin's public key without requiring a valid signature. The attacker attempted to make lending accounts liquidatable, resulting in $16K in liquidations that were fully compensated by the liquidator."},{"date":1641254400,"name":"Arbix Finance","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":10000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Arbix Finance on BSC executed a rug pull on January 4, 2022, draining ~$10M in user funds via admin minting privileges. Team deleted web/social presence and moved funds via AnySwap."},{"date":1670976000,"name":"Nimbus","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Reward Logic Flaw","amount":76000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Nimbus Platform's reward distribution mechanism was exploited via a flash loan attack. An attacker manipulated the token ratio in the NIMB/GNIMB pool using a 278 BNB flash loan to artificially inflate their staked ratio, dramatically increasing their rewards payout."},{"date":1739836800,"name":"Cardex","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Signature Verification Flaw","amount":400000,"chain":["Abstract"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On February 18, 2025 Cardex (fantasy trading card game on Abstract layer-2) suffered a session key compromise affecting approximately 9,000 wallets when a session signer private key was exposed on the frontend, allowing attackers to impersonate all active user sessions and drain approximately $400,000 from users who had approved session keys."},{"date":1754784000,"name":"numa.","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Incorrect Share Accounting","amount":313000,"chain":["Sonic"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Numa's NumaVault on Sonic was exploited on August 10, 2025 for ~$313,000. Using a flash loan, the attacker inflated synthetic liabilities to collapse the collateral price, then liquidated under-collateralized positions before bridging 74.3 ETH to Ethereum."},{"date":1625270400,"name":"Haven Protocol","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":8187000,"chain":["Haven"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Beginning June 22, 2021, Haven Protocol was exploited through multiple vulnerabilities including miner reward validation bypass, xJPY to xBTC conversion exploitation, and hidden burn/mint amount bugs. An unknown quantity of XHV tokens were minted before the network rolled back to pre-attack state on July 20 via hard fork."},{"date":1640217600,"name":"Monkey Kingdom","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":1300000,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"NFTfi","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Monkey Kingdom's Discord was compromised via a breach in Grape (a Solana token-membership protocol), allowing attackers to impersonate admins. Bots flooded the Discord with fake minting links directing users to malicious websites requiring wallet connection. Users who authorized the transactions had their SOL tokens stolen. Some victims lost as much as 650 SOL each."},{"date":1651104000,"name":"DEUS Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":13400000,"chain":["Fantom"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1387","language":"Solidity","description":"DEUS Finance exploited on April 28, 2022 for $13.4M via flashloan oracle manipulation. A $143M flashloan skewed the DEI/USDC pool on Solidly, inflating DEI's oracle price to enable overborrowing. Attacker moved funds through Tornado Cash."},{"date":1715731200,"name":"Sonne Finance","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Donation Attack","amount":20000000,"chain":["Optimism"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2142","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 15, 2024, Sonne Finance on Optimism was exploited for $20M through a donation attack. Market setup was split into separate timelock transactions, allowing the attacker to control execution order and manipulate collateral factors in a newly-created market before protective guards were applied."},{"date":1710201600,"name":"BBT","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"BBT smart contract exploited via business logic flaw in protocol's core functions. Specific mechanism and loss amount not disclosed but documented in DeFiHackLabs vulnerability database."},{"date":1660435200,"name":"Acala","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Infinite Mint","amount":0,"chain":["Acala"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2787","language":"Rust","description":"A misconfiguration in the iBTC/aUSD liquidity pool's incentive mechanism allowed unlimited minting of aUSD tokens instead of LP tokens. Over 1.2 billion aUSD were minted before the network was paused and funds recovered."},{"date":1748390400,"name":"Cork V1","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":12000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6262","parentProtocolId":"parent#cork-protocol","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 28, 2025, Cork Protocol suffered a $12 million exploit when an attacker created fraudulent market structures with an unprotected beforeSwap hook lacking authorization checks. Missing input validation on market configuration and token validation logic allowed the attacker to create fake token derivatives, draining 3,761 wstETH."},{"date":1794700800,"name":"Luxor Commander","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Mining Infrastructure","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On November 15, 2026 (UTC), attackers compromised Luxor Technology's Commander mining-fleet management platform and redirected Bitcoin mining hashrate from more than a dozen client accounts to the OCEAN mining pool using an attacker-designated payout address. Approximately 13 EH/s of mining power was affected, generating unauthorized Bitcoin mining rewards of an undetermined total value. Luxor patched the vulnerability within two hours of detection, began restoring affected mining configurations and committed to fully compensating impacted clients. The underlying vulnerability remains undisclosed, while Luxor confirmed that its mining pool and LuxOS firmware were unaffected"},{"date":1740355200,"name":"Infini","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":49500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Infini suffered a $49.5M exploit on February 24, 2025 when a rogue former developer who had retained vault-draining privileges drained the contract. The attacker immediately converted USDC to ETH (17,696 ETH) through Uniswap, Sky Protocol, and 0x."},{"date":1666051200,"name":"Moola Market","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":8400000,"chain":["Celo"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"489","language":"Solidity","description":"On October 18, 2022, attacker exploited Moola Market on Celo by manipulating MOO token's low-liquidity price oracle to inflate collateral value, allowing unauthorized borrows and draining $8.4M in multiple tokens."},{"date":1715817600,"name":"ALEX","classification":"Social Engineering","technique":"Phishing","amount":4300000,"chain":["Stacks"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1466","language":null,"description":"On May 15-16, 2024, Alex Lab's XLink bridge private key was compromised through a phishing attack attributed to state-sponsored actors. Attackers transferred approximately $300,000 in BTC, $3.3M in stablecoins, and $75,000 in SKO tokens across the bridge."},{"date":1746921600,"name":"Mobius Token","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Decimal Miscalculation","amount":2150000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Mobius Token's minting function applied 10^18 decimal scaling twice to price data, allowing an attacker to mint ~9.73 quadrillion tokens and swap them for stablecoins, stealing $2.15M."},{"date":1638057600,"name":"Visor Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":975720,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Attacker exploited Visor's OHM-ETH 1% LP management contract by manipulating the Uniswap V3 pool price through large swaps. The steep liquidity gradient in the OHM-ETH pair made it susceptible to price manipulation via asset dump-and-buyback. User funds were secured and losses were covered by Visor's treasury."},{"date":1579737600,"name":"Bitcoin Gold","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Validator Key Compromised","amount":70000,"chain":["Bitcoin Gold"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Layer 1","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"Bitcoin Gold suffered two 51% attacks on January 23-24, 2020, resulting in 29 blocks being reorganized and deep chain reorgs that enabled double-spending attacks. Attackers rented hash power from NiceHash for ~$1,200 per attack and successfully double-spent approximately 7,167 BTG (~$70K) across two separate attacks. Binance adjusted its confirmation requirements after the incident."},{"date":1794268800,"name":"Initia","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":615000,"chain":["Initia"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Chain","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"chain#initia","language":null,"description":"On November 10, 2026, an attacker used compromised rollup infrastructure keys to fabricate IBC transfers and withdraw assets from escrow accounts on Initia's Layer 1 that held funds bridged to multiple rollups. Approximately $615,000 in assets, including 605,000 USDC, was transferred out through Noble before validators halted the Initia network at 06:18 UTC. Additional assets were moved from the affected escrow accounts but remained on the halted blockchain. Initia began investigating the compromise with security teams and exchanges, while the full scope of the incident and recovery status remained undetermined"},{"date":1690848000,"name":"Neutra Finance","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":36450,"chain":["Arbitrum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2459","language":"Solidity","description":"Neutra Finance's convert() function used spot price to value LP tokens, but two LP tokens with the same name (CMLT-LP) from different pools could be swapped for each other. An attacker exploited this by converting from one LP token pool (CMLT-LP-65eb) to the other (CMLT-LP-2ea3), extracting value from the price differential."},{"date":1541980800,"name":"HireVibes AirDropsDAC","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":13600,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"EOSIO.SG testing account sym111111add was compromised and used on November 12, 2018 to attack the AirDropsDAC contract. The attacker misappropriated HireVibes tokens (HVT) and other airdrop tokens, selling portions of the stolen HVT on Newdex and transferring profits to controlled accounts."},{"date":1693008000,"name":"PEPE","classification":"Rugpull","technique":"Admin Drain","amount":15080000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"PEPE team insiders including developer Zachary Testa gained control of the multisig by reducing its signature requirement from five-of-eight to two-of-eight, then transferred ~16 trillion PEPE tokens (~$16.9M gross, ~$15M net after slippage) to CEXs. Insiders subsequently deleted themselves as signers and removed social media accounts."},{"date":1659312000,"name":"Reaper Farm","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":1700000,"chain":["Fantom"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"394","parentProtocolId":"parent#oath-foundation","language":"Solidity","description":"ReaperVaultV2 contract's withdraw function failed to validate vault share ownership. Attackers exploited this access control flaw to destroy other users' vault shares and withdraw tokens from multiple vaults."},{"date":1662336000,"name":"DAO Swap","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":580000,"chain":["Binance Smart Chain"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2167","parentProtocolId":"parent#dao-maker","language":"Solidity","description":"DaoSwap's reward system had a flaw allowing users to set themselves as their own inviter. Attackers exploited this access control vulnerability to gain unauthorized mining rewards by claiming referral bonuses."},{"date":1788998400,"name":"Symbiosis","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Unbacked Cross-Chain Mint","amount":336000,"chain":["BSC","Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"1594","language":"Solidity","description":"A BridgeV2 receive transaction on BSC minted approximately 2^62 raw units of syBTC to a fresh attacker-controlled EOA, creating an enormous quantity of unbacked syBTC. The same beneficiary subsequently used the unbacked syBTC against syBTC/WBTC liquidity on Ethereum Uniswap V4, extracting and selling approximately 4.39 WBTC. The exact flaw that caused BridgeV2 to accept or authorize the malicious receive has not yet been publicly established"},{"date":1626912000,"name":"THORChain DEX","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Withdrawal Logic Flaw","amount":8000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"412","language":"Solidity","description":"On July 23, 2021, THORChain's ETH Router was exploited when an attacker deployed a custom contract to trick Bifrost Protocol into accepting fake asset deposits, triggering refunds of real assets. The attacker limited impact and requested a 10% bug bounty, suggesting a white-hat teaching lesson."},{"date":1792454400,"name":"GarudaDefi","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":null,"chain":["Terra Classic"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6324","language":"Rust","description":"Between October 20 and 31, 2026, Garuda DeFi suffered multiple security breaches affecting its NFT staking, cross-staking, governance, treasury, frontend and CW20 staking systems on Terra Classic. Attackers migrated staking contracts to malicious code, transferred user assets and rewards, compromised developer wallets to obtain administrative privileges, and injected malicious wallet approval prompts into the protocol's website. The incidents affected 1,114 NFTs and numerous staking tokens, while the total financial loss remains undisclosed. Garuda restored parts of its infrastructure, introduced multisignature administration and began preparing a recovery plan for affected users"},{"date":1776643200,"name":"Juicebox V3","classification":"Input Validation","technique":"Missing Input Validation","amount":52000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2835","parentProtocolId":"parent#juicebox","language":"Solidity","description":"On April 20, 2026, Juicebox V3 REVLoans was exploited for 21.77 ETH (~$52,000). Attacker exploited unvalidated source struct in borrowFrom to forge accounting context; by matching forged and destination currencies, attacker bypassed oracle and priced loan against inflated share price using attacker-controlled decimals."},{"date":1558656000,"name":"Poker EOS","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Private Key Compromised","amount":null,"chain":["EOS"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"C++","description":"Poker EOS game's private key was compromised and disclosed publicly, allowing attackers to drain the game's funds. Over 26,992 EOS were extracted and transferred to exchanges."},{"date":1747872000,"name":"Cetus CLMM","classification":"Token & Share Accounting","technique":"Arithmetic Error","amount":223000000,"chain":["Sui"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"2289","parentProtocolId":"parent#cetus","language":"Move","description":"Cetus CLMM on Sui suffered a math error in its checked_shlw function where an incorrect overflow threshold (0xffffffffffffffff << 192 instead of 1 << 192) allowed attackers to craft positions with phantom liquidity. Using flashloans to manipulate prices and create tight tick ranges, attackers minted enormous liquidity while depositing minimal real tokens, then withdrew actual reserves."},{"date":1643846400,"name":"KlaySwap","classification":"Frontend & Infrastructure","technique":"Frontend Compromise","amount":1900000,"chain":["Klaytn"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"KlaySwap was compromised via BGP hijack against its infrastructure provider, redirecting traffic to serve a malicious JavaScript SDK. The attack captured user transactions and stole approximately $1.9 million."},{"date":1639180800,"name":"AscenDEX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":77000000,"chain":["Ethereum","BSC","Polygon"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"On December 11, 2021, AscendEX exchange discovered unauthorized transfers of $77 million from its hot wallets across Ethereum, BSC, and Polygon due to compromised private keys, likely via phishing or malware."},{"date":1621382400,"name":"Bunny","classification":"Oracle Manipulation","technique":"Spot Price Manipulation","amount":45000000,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"254","language":"Solidity","description":"On May 19, 2021, PancakeBunny was exploited via flashloan-enabled oracle manipulation. Attacker manipulated USDT/BNB and BUNNY/BNB exchange rates to mint 7M BUNNY and steal 114,631 WBNB (~$45M), crashing BUNNY price."},{"date":1790208000,"name":"Payy Network","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Bridge Logic Flaw","amount":1828589.378132,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"Payy’s RollupV1 bridge processed a malicious verifyRollup batch containing an unauthorized 1,828,589.378132 USDC withdrawal to the attacker alongside ordinary withdrawals. The batch was submitted using Payy’s prover and validator infrastructure. ExVul reports that the malicious withdrawal had an all-zero burn hash that users cannot normally generate through Payy’s public circuits, indicating that the forged withdrawal entered during proving or aggregation rather than through an ordinary user withdrawal. Payy has confirmed the bridge exploit but has not yet established whether the cause was compromised prover/validator credentials or a proof-aggregation verification flaw"},{"date":1736208000,"name":"IPC AI","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Swap Logic Flaw","amount":590000,"chain":["Binance"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"Token","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"IPC AI token deployed on BSC suffered a flash loan attack where the attacker bypassed the flash loan protection mechanism and exploited the deflationary burning mechanism in the token pair. The attacker leveraged the swap() function to circumvent protective measures and extract approximately $590,000 from the liquidity pair."},{"date":1793836800,"name":"Loopscale Lending","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Unknown","amount":null,"chain":["Solana"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"6461","parentProtocolId":"parent#loopscale","language":null,"description":"In late October and early November 2026, Loopscale was targeted by a sustained attack campaign involving more than 30,000 malicious API requests per day, primarily directed at its SOL and USDC Genesis Vaults on Solana. On November 5, the protocol paused operations after detecting an escalation in the activity. Loopscale stated that the affected vaults had been made whole and that no user deposits incurred losses, but did not disclose whether funds had been stolen or explain the attack mechanism. The protocol remained paused pending further investigation and security improvements"},{"date":1740182400,"name":"Unverified_35bc","classification":"Reentrancy","technique":"Reentrancy","amount":6700,"chain":["BSC"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"An unverified smart contract on BSC was exploited via reentrancy, where the attacker repeatedly triggered a function that transferred funds before updating state."},{"date":1722902400,"name":"Ronin Bridge","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Uninitialized Proxy","amount":12000000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4440","language":"Solidity","description":"On August 6, 2024, Ronin Bridge was exploited for $12M (4K ETH + 2M USDC) due to an incomplete contract upgrade. The bridge manager was upgraded to v4, but the v3 initialization function, which set critical voting weights, was never called, leaving _totalOperatorWeight uninitialized and breaking vote-weight validation."},{"date":1792540800,"name":"CoinDCX","classification":"Key Compromise","technique":"Hot Wallet Key Compromised","amount":16000000,"chain":["TRON"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"4042","parentProtocolId":"parent#coindcx","language":null,"description":"CoinDCX experienced approximately $16 million in suspicious outflows from TRON addresses associated with its exchange infrastructure. The exchange attributed the incident to addresses compromised during its July 2025 security breach, which continued receiving deposits after being deprecated. CoinDCX acknowledged that its deposit-sweeping process failed temporarily and stated that it absorbed the resulting losses while crediting affected users. Investigators disputed whether the addresses had genuinely been removed from active operations"},{"date":1623801600,"name":"Alchemix V2","classification":"Protocol Logic","technique":"Borrow Logic Flaw","amount":6500000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"DeFi Protocol","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":"204","parentProtocolId":"parent#alchemix","language":"Solidity","description":"Alchemix alETH vault exploited via incorrect vault indexing in the deployment script. Wrong index in debt calculations allowed collateral withdrawal without loan repayment."},{"date":1778889600,"name":"Adshares","classification":"Bridge & Cross-Chain","technique":"Forged Proof","amount":628000,"chain":["Ethereum"],"bridgeHack":true,"targetType":"Other","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":"Solidity","description":"On May 16-17, 2026, the Adshares cross-chain bridge was exploited when the bridge-minter EOA signed three wrapTo() calls with non-existent native-chain transaction IDs. The attacker minted fake wrapped ADS tokens and dumped ~$628K worth (148.5 ETH + 305K USDC) on Ethereum."},{"date":1422316800,"name":"796","classification":"Access Control","technique":"Improper Access Control","amount":270000,"chain":["Bitcoin"],"bridgeHack":false,"targetType":"CEX","source":"","returnedFunds":null,"defillamaId":null,"language":null,"description":"The 796 exchange suffered from a vulnerability in its withdrawal system that allowed attackers to modify withdrawal addresses. A hacker exploited this by submitting a withdrawal with a modified address that the exchange staff failed to notice, routing 1,000 BTC to the attacker instead of the legitimate customer."}]